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Abstract
With the current situation of credit spread contagion illustrated by the European sovereign
bonds crisis and the chain reaction triggered by the derivatives books of Lehman Brothers, finan-
cial institutions have increasingly focused on pricing and risk management of counterparty credit
risk. Recent credit contagion through financial contingent claims highlight the fact that contagion-
links impact the value of products when investors are exposed to counterparty risk.
This thesis plan to build on reduced-form credit risk models to assess the credit risk contagion
that is inherent in a obligor multivariate framework. The aim is to evaluate the requirements that
are necessary in generating a mathematical framework consistent with the valuation of financial
claims, credit and non-credit related, where the parties of those claims exhibit credit risk conta-
gion.
By applying a multivariate framework of credit contagion to counterparty credit risk based on
a queueing theory, called phase-type distribution, we hope to highlight the benefit of bottom-up
models versus top-down ones in terms of extracting information relative to dependence within an
identifiable obligor set. We will review the mathematical literature in addressing credit dependence
modelling in dynamic and static format. This will be the opportunity to value a set of claims under
our model to show that claims that contain “credit leverage”are particularly sensible to credit risk
contagion and could benefit from our developed framework to gain adequate counterparty credit
risk pricing.
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0.1 Introduction and overview of content.
The title of this document is “Counterparty Credit risk under credit risk contagion using the mul-
tivariate phase-type distribution”.
In relation with the title, the content of this thesis is structured a follow
• First, an introduction in chapter 1 on the various aspect of credit risk, describing the char-
acteristics of credit risk and their diversity in terms of definition. Then, a presentation of
the type of financial products that are based around credit. Those are categorised as “de-
faultable”products meaning that a credit related event is the trigger of the valuation of such
products such as the single-name credit default swaps and the index credit default swaps.
The product coverage will span towards “non-defaultable”products such as the interest-rate
swaps which will be credit-linked indirectly due to the credit sensitivity of the parties involved
in this bilateral claim. This will introduce the need to cover counterparty credit risk.
• Second, a general presentation on one specific area of credit risk, called Counterparty Credit
Risk, in chapter 2, that will be the core of the focus of the risk we want to value in this
document. This part will mainly present the reasons of interest in this metric from the
industry and its coverage according to regulatory requirements.
• In chapter 3, we then introduce the mathematical framework necessary to value the contin-
gent claims. The claims space described in section 3.1.1 will be separated into defaultable
and non-defaultable claims. The separation line is mainly the distinction between credit and
non-credit linked value and the different approach to establish price under risk-neutral expec-
tation using the pricing measure Q. Then, in section 3.1.2, we adjust those formulas under
Q to take into account the riskiness introduced by the credit risk of both parties introducing
the well-known Credit Valuation Adjustment.
• In chapter 4,in section4.1, we enlarge the probability space to a multivariate settings with a
set of m obligors where the filtration is also enlarged to G to encompass multi-name default
observations in H and state variables in the filtration F. The previous section 3.1.2 is adjusted
to redefine Counterparty Credit Risk in the valuation of claims under the new multivariate
framework. Addtionnal technical assumptions like the (H)-hypothesis, no-simultaneous de-
fault, and the separability of processes in section 4.1 are specified to ensure valuation across
filtrations for a finite sequence of stopping times.
• The next section introduces credit risk models to move towards numerical valuations. Sec-
tion 5.1 will review the litterature on credit models, structural models and reduced-form
models, then focus on dependence credit modelling with a distinction between “bottom-
up”and “top-down ”models.
• After reviewing the credit dependency models, we focus in section 6.1 on a Markov jump pro-
cess, called phase-type distributions, that will be able to modelise dependency for m obligors
with closed-form formula. We adjust the formula in section 6.1.2 in the Credit Valuation for-
mula to account for credit dependency or credit contagion under the multivariate framework
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in section 4. We realise valuation under those credit contagion scenario for defaultable and
non-defaultable claims to realise the potential impact of stressed event. We believe that the
leveraged credit default swap will exhibit high sensitivity to those dependency events thus
displaying the impact of the “gap risk ”concept.
• Finally, due to the optionality aspect of the Credit Counterparty Risk and its sensitivity
to credit spread volatility, we adjust the phase-type distribution model, in section 6.3, to
encompass regime shifts in the markov jump parameters. We try to assess the conditions
under which such a framework could exist.
5
Chapter 1
Credit risk
In this section, we give a short overview of some aspects of credit risk. A much more extensive
discussions can be found in [Bielecki01], [Duffie03], [Lando04] and [Scho˝nbucher03]. There are
several ways of defining the credit risk such as in [Duffie03]
• as “the risk of changes in value associated with unexpected changes in credit quality.”
or as in [Scho˝nbucher03]
• as “the risk that an obligor does not honour its payments.”
The concept of credit risk has to be put in the framework where it will be used:
• single obligor level, or on a portfolio level,
• in a static or dynamic environment,
• from a risk management or a pricing point of view,
• from a counterparty-risk exposure or standalone point of view
Additionally, as presented in [Scho˝nbucher03], page 2, many of the different framework of credit
risk have to address the characteristics of the associated credit event with
• arrival risk: i.e. the occurrence of credit event over a given time period,
• timing risk: i.e. the uncertainty of the time of arrival risk,
• recovery risk: i.e. the size of the actual loss when the arrival risk is observed,
• market risk or credit spread risk: i.e. the deterioration or improvement of credit quality
prior to the arrival risk,
• interaction between market risk and arrival risk: i.e. the joint dependence structure
of credit event with parameters such as interest rates, equity prices, liquidity, etc.
• cross-arrival risk: i.e. the risk of several obligors jointly defaulting during some specific
time period. This is of particular interest in a context of credit portfolio.
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It is of course interesting to account as many of these topics as possible in any model. This
will however lead to complex models that might be hard to calibrate from observable market data.
Thus, given a specific credit risk problem one has to make a decision which components that should
be taken into account.
In the case of a big wholesale credit portfolio at a commercial bank, such as credit card loans
or Small and Medium Enterprise loans (SME), it is important to study the macro-economic fac-
tors that affects the households and the businesses. Those factors will be typically the level of
interest rates or the credit scoring by opposition to modelling each of the thousand loans under
consideration. The timing of default of each loans will be of reduced interest.
In the case of a portfolio of commercial loans, it will be of interest to model the loans but also the
dependency arising from business interactions per industries. This will lead to some dimension
reduction to make the problem tractable.
In the case of a portfolio up to a dozen of obligors, it is possible to model the obligor depen-
dency behaviour in a portfolio context. This case is the situation that we will investigate by
modelling the dependency links between those obligors and its impact in terms of valuation for
bilateral agreement.
A default risk is a possibility that a counterparty to a financial contract will not fulfil a
contractual commitment to meet her obligations stated in the contract. If this actually happens,
we say that the party defaults, or that the default event occurs. More generally, by a credit risk
we mean the risk associated with any kind of credit-linked events, such a: changes in the credit
quality (including downgrades or upgrades in credit ratings), variations of credit spreads, and the
default event. The spread risk is thus another component of the credit risk. To facilitate the
analysis of complex agreements, it is important to make a clear distinction between the reference
(credit) risk and the counterparty (credit) risk . The first generic term refers to the situation
when both parties of a contract are assumed to be default-free, but due to specific features of the
contract the credit risk of some reference entity appears to play an essential role in the contract’s
settlement. Credit derivatives are financial instruments that allow market participants to isolate
and trade the reference credit risk. The main goal of a credit derivative is to transfer the reference
risk either completely or partially, between the counterparties. In most cases, one of the parties
can be seen as a buyer of insurance against the reference risk; consequently, the party that bears
the reference risk is referred to as its buyer.
Let us now focus on the counterparty credit risk. An important feature of all the over-the-
counter (OTC) derivatives is that, unlike exchanged-traded contracts, they are not backed by the
guarantee of a clearinghouse or an exchange, so that each counterparty is exposed to the default
risk of the other party. In practice, parties are required to post collateral or mark to market
periodically. The counterparty risk emerges in a clear way in such contracts as vulnerable claims
and defaultable swaps. In both cases, one needs to quantify the default risk of both parties in order
to correctly assess the contract’s value. Depending on whether the default risk of one or both
parties is taken into account, we say that a contract involves the unilateral (one sided) or the bi-
lateral two-sided default risk. We review now some of the products associated with credit exposure.
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1.1 Products
1.1.1 Corporate Bonds
Corporate bonds are debt instruments issued by corporations. They are part of the capital structure
of the firm (along with the equity). By issuing bonds, a corporation commits itself to make specific
payments to the bondholders at some future dates and the corporation charges a fee for this
commitment. However, the firm may default on its commitment in which case the bondholders
will not receive the promised payments in full and, thus, will suffer financial loss. Of course, the
occurrence of default, possibly caused by the firm’s bankruptcy, is meaningful only during the
life time of a particular bond. A corporate bond is an example of a defaultable claim. If we fix
the maturity date of the bond as T , the price at time t of a T -maturity defaultable bond will be
denoted by
D(t, T )
By contrast the notation B(t, T ) is used to denote the price at time t of a T -maturity default-free
bond with the face value 1.
The defaultable term structure is the term structure implied by the yields on the default prone
corporate bonds or sovereign bonds. A large portion of the credit risk literature is devoted on the
modelling of a defaultable term structure as well as to pricing related credit derivatives.
Recovery rules
The recovery payment is frequently specified by the recovery rate δ, i.e. the fraction of the bond’s
face value amount paid to the bondholders in case of default with time of default τ . The timing of
the recovery payoff is of course another essential parameter. The most common models are (with
bond face value L = 1) with their associated bond payoff at T
• fractional recovery of par value,
D(T, T ) = 1{τ>T} + δB−1(τ, T )1{τ≤T}
• fractional recovery of Treasury value
D(T, T ) = 1{τ>T} + δ1{τ≤T}
• fractional recovery of market value
D(T, T ) = 1{τ>T} + δD(τ−, T )B−1(τ, T )1{τ≤T}
where D(τ−, T ) is the value of the bond just before default time.
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It is more common to use the generic term loss given default (LGD) to describe the likely loss of
value in case of default with LGD being equal to 1 minus recovery rate.
In a more abstract formulation to the recovery rule it is assumed that if a bond defaults during
its lifetime then the recovery payment is made either at the default time τ or at the maturity
T of the bond. In the first case the payment is denoted by the value Zτ at default time of the
recovery process Z. In the second case, the recovery payment is determined by the realisation of
the recovery claim X˜.
Credit spreads
A credit spread measures the excess return on a corporate bond over the return of an equivalent
Treasury bond. A credit spread may be expressed as the difference between respective yields to
maturity or as the difference between respective forward rates. The term structure of credit spreads
will refer to the term structure of those differences. The dertermination of the credit spread is
important in credit risk modeling as the information encapsulated in this spread with respect to
the default free case information gives indication of the likelihood of default of the credit entity
under consideration. Typically Distressed securities are defined by the high level of credit spreads
yielded by some corporate securities.
Credit ratings
A firm’s credit rating is a measure of the firm’s propensity to default. Credit ratings are typically
identified with elements of a finite set, called the credit grades. The credit ratings are attributed by
commercial rating agencies notably Moody’s Investors Service an Standard and Poor’s Corporation.
It is worth noting that the ratings primarily reflect the likelihood of default and thus provide not
the most adequate assessment of the debt credit quality.
Typical products
Typical products include
• Corporate Coupon Bonds: Consider a corporate coupon with face value L which matures at
time T = Tn and promises to pay (fixed or variable) coupons ci at times T1 < T2 < · · · <
Tn = T . Assume that the recovery payment is proportional to the face value and this it is
made at maturity T in case the default event occurs before or at the maturity date. The
bond cash flows are
n∑
i=1
ci1{τ>Ti}1Ti(t) + (L1{τ>T} + δL1{τ≤T})1T (t)
• Fixed and Floating Rate Notes: Consider two fixed coupon bonds, a defaultable bond paying
c1 and a risk-free bond paying c2. Thus to compensate for default risk, the coupon rate of
the corporate bond would be greater than of the risk-free bond and be referenced as the
fixed-rate credit spread S := c1 − c2.
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• Floating Rate Note: Each of the coupon payments is made according to the floating interest
rate value on the coupon’s date. As previously if L(Ti) is the floating interest rate for the
risk-free borrowing at Ti and lending over the accrual period [TiTi+1], the payment on coupon
date Ti is the risk adjusted floating rate Lˆ(Ti) = L(Ti) + s. The non-negative constant s
represents the bond-specific floating-rate credit spread. The higher level of credit spread s
usually corresponds to the lower credit quality of the issuer.
1.1.2 Credit Derivatives
A credit derivative is a financial instrument that allows banks, insurance and other participants
to isolate, manage and trade their credit sensitive investments. Initially credit derivatives were
designed as tools to partially or completely remove credit risks. However credit derivatives is a
very broad class of derivatives and it is hard to give an exact mathematical definition that covers
all the different versions. [Scho˝nbucher03] provides a general feature definition
• “A credit derivative is a derivative security that is primarily used to transfer, manage or
hedge credit risk.”
• “A credit derivative is a derivative security whose payoff is materially affected by credit risk.”
The credit derivatives space can be categorised according to [Bielecki01] as either
• default products : Those are credit derivatives that are linked exclusively to the default event.
It includes contracts with the payoff determined by the default event as opposed to changes
in the credit quality of the underlying instruments. The most notable products are Default
swaps, first-to-default swaps, kth-to-default swaps and basket default swaps.
• spread products : Those are credit derivatives whose payoff is determined by the change in
credit quality of the reference obligor. The most common products are credit spread swaps,
credit spread options and credit linked notes.
• credit-transferred products : Those products allow for the transfer of total risk of assets. The
most common products are Total return swap and collateralised debt obligation (CDO).
A full coverage of credit derivatives products can be found in [Das98a], in [Gallo06] for a good
coverage of credit index derivatives, and in [Batchvarov01] for credit-transferred product (or more
commonly called securitised products).
Credit default swaps
Credit default swaps are the most traded credit derivatives instruments and are used as building
blocks for more exotic credit derivatives such as basket default swaps and CDO’s. The single-name
default swaps will then be used as a hedging tool with other instruments such as bonds or asset
swaps, etc. They are also used to hedge counterparty-risk that arise in a more traditional interest-
rate derivatives such as swaps or caps and floors and any other OTC products where there is a
risk of a counterparty not fulfilling its obligations as in the case of vulnerable claims.
[Scho˝nbucher03] gives a definition of credit derivatives of the default type along with notations
that will be useful in the reminder of this document
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Definition 1.1.1. Consider two counterparties entity A and B. The credit derivatives of default
product type is a bilateral agreement entered between A and B that has a payoff tied to a default
event. The default event is tied to a reference composed either of an obligor C, a collection of
obligors (C1, . . . , Cn) or reference credit assets issued by those references. If there is a default
event over the course of the financial agreement, the entity A will make a default payment to B
according to the rules set at the inception of this agreement.
We will generally by referring to a credit derivatives imply that this derivatives is of the default
type unless stated otherwise.
This is equivalent to an “insurance”contract with the entity A referred as the “protection
buyer”, the entity B as “protection seller”while C or (C1, . . . , Cn) are the reference obligor(s).
The default event is characterised through a set of rules established by the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (ISDA -www.isda.org) with the following events listed:
• bankruptcy
• failure to pay
• obligation default
• obligation acceleration
• repudiation/moratorium
• restructuring
• ratings downgrade below given threshold (for ratings-triggered credit derivatives)
• changes in the credit spread (for credit spread-triggered credit derivatives)
However for modelling reasons, the main default event under consideration will the bankruptcy
of the obligors in the reference set (C1, . . . , Cn). The time of the default event connected to the
reference obligor C will be a crucial variable in pricing, hedging and managing dynamic credit risk.
This positive random variable will be denoted τ and mainly modelled as a hitting time.
Single-name credit default swaps
A single-name credit default swaps is characterised as in definition 1.1.1, page 11, with a unique
reference obligor C. Those products are the most actively traded credit derivatives and are stan-
dardly characterised by the following elements:
Consider a single-name credit derivatives that starts at time t with a maturity set at T the fee
payment that A makes to B to acquire protection w.r.t obligor C is paid in two streams
• A pays an upfront-fee at t
• A pays a recurrent-fee to B until T ∧ τ
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Both parties enter the agreement having agreed on
• the reference obligor C and its reference credit asset
• the notional amount N of the contract
• A detailed definition of the default event τ in accordance with ISDA rules
• the time period validity of the contract, i.e. [t, T ]
• the fee amount (also called default swap premium or default swap rate expressed as basis
point (bps) per annum on the notional
• the payment frequency, typically annually, semi-annually, quarterly
• the timing and size of default payments from B to A propotional to N . Those payments can
be specified either cash-settled or physically-settled,
After inception, for most common reference obligor C, the default swap rate is traded on
secondary markets and the value of this rate represents perceptions by the market of the changes
in the credit quality of the underlying, other valuation factors such as the level of interest rates and
technical factors such as liquidity in the market or expectations. This will be a source of valuable
information w.r.t to the default time τ of the obligor C.
Basket default swaps
Basket default swaps are identical in principle to single-name default swaps with the most notable
difference being the fact that the reference is constituted of a set of obligors (C1, . . . , Cn) or a
collection of assets issued by this set. The main difference is how the default event is characterised
out of the set of obligors and how the default payment is defined.
Consider m obligors in the set. Let τi denote the time of the default time associated with the
ith instrument and τ (i) the ith default time in the obligor set. The two most common denomination
for this family of products are categorised as
• first-to-default swap: We denote τ as the time when the first of these credit events occurs,
i.e. τ = min(τ1, . . . , τm) where it is commonly assumed that τi 6= τj,. It the first credit event
happens no later than at time T a contingent payment linked to the defaulted reference is
made.
• kth-to-default swap: the credit event is redefined as τ = τ (k), 1 < k ≤ m and the contingent
payment is the reference name to be the kth default name out of the obligor set.
Collateralised debt obligations
A collateralised debt obligation is structured through securitisation of a pool of defaultable assets
being a pool of loans, bonds, credit default swaps, etc. This pool is sold to a entity called a Special
Purpose Vehicle which will issue obligations whose payments are based by the income generating
pool. The service of the obligations is structured through a payment priority structure called
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tranches to reflect seniority.
Let’s consider an underlying pools constituted of defaultable assets of m obligors (C1, . . . , Cm)
with the corresponding notional amounts N1, . . . , Nm. The total notional of the CDO is thus
N =
∑m
i=1Ni. Let’s consider γ tranches dividing the notional N with N =
∑γ
k=1 Ti and then
define each tranche Tk by its attachment point ka and detachment point kd. The upper tranche is
called the super senior tranche while the lower tranche is often called the equity tranche.
The income generated by the loans will be paid at coupon dates t1, . . . , tn = T to the tranche
holders according to the schedule of payments that is usually a function of the tranche seniority.
Let introduce Lt the accumulated loss at time t due to the defaults from the underlying pool
accrued over the time period from inception until time t.
Lt =
m∑
i=1
Ni(1−RECi)1{τi≤t}
with RECi the recovery rate of obligor i.
The financial instrument tranche γ with maturity T is a bilateral contract where the protection
seller B agrees to pay the protection buyer A, all losses that occur in the interval [kγ−1, kγ] derived
from Lt up to time T . The payments are made at default times it they are prior to T . The
expected value of this payment is called the protection leg. As a compensation for this A pays B
a periodic fee proportional to the current outstanding (reduced due to losses) value of tranche γ
up to time T . The value of this payment constitues the premium leg. The tranche spread is the
premium fee that equates the value of both legs.
The loss Lt will be impacted to the notional of the notes in a seniority inverted logic, thus
first impacting the equity tranche, then the second tranche when the losses Lt is greater than the
notional of tranche T1, etc. The accumulated Loss L
(k) of the tranche k ∈ {1, . . . , γ} at time t is
defined as
L
(k)
t = (Lt − Tγ−1)1{Lt∈[Tk−1,Tk]} + (Tk − Tk−1)1{Lt>Tk}
and correspondingly will reduce the payments received by the notes holder. Note that in this
formula the loss Lt is adjusted with the recovery of defaultable securities which is not taken into
account in the case of index default swaps. (defined next)
The structure is of course a way to securitise loans. If the underlying credit portfolio contains
traditional loans which can not be readily traded on the market then the CDO allows market
participants to invest in notes connected to these loans, thus making it possible to put a market
price on loans. Those notes are characterised as cash CDO.
As a long position in a corporate bond has a similar risk to a short position in a CDS when the
reference entity in the CDS is the company issuing the bond it is possible to issue notes backed by
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a pool of CDS. Those notes are characterised as synthetic CDO.
We can point at this time that CDO’s value are dependent of joint default behaviour of its
underlying pool and are also impacted by the structural features of the Notes. Although CDO will
not be valued in this document, they are a key structure used to model dependency structure of
credit risk with related papers.
Index default swaps
The introduction of CDS indices such as the iTraxx in Europe and Asia, and CDX in North America
have revolutionized the trading of credit risk due to their liquidity, flexibility and standardisation.
Index default swaps are similar to synthetic collateralised debt obligations (CDO). An index CDS
with maturity T , has almost the same structure as a corresponding CDO but with two main
differences. The protection is on all credit losses that occurs in the underlying portfolio up to time
T . Secondly, in the premium leg the spread is paid on a notional proportional to the number of
obligors left in the portfolio at each payment date. Thus there is no account of the recovery rate of
defaulted entities. So with Nt =
∑m
i=1 1{τi≤t} the number of default obligors among the underlying
pool at time t then the fee is paid on the notional (1 − Nt
m
). A list of all the specificities can be
found in [Gallo06], page 73, in [Ginty04a] and in [Ginty04b]. So, similarly to CDO, index CDS are
by nature products whose prices are determined by the correlation of credit risk in the underlying
portfolio.
Leverage Super Senior
Leverage Super Senior (LSS) products are categorised as spread products build on top of super
senior tranche of CDO. LSS notes apply leverage outside the CDO deal to allow investors to achieve
a higher yield. The LSS notes structure means to attract a broader investor base by offereing a
portion of the super-senoir tranche in the form of a cash note. The notional of the LSS note is
a fraction of the notional of the super senior tranche. From that perspective, the LSS tranche
receives the benefit of the cash flows allocated to the full super senior tranche thus allowing it to
pay a considerably higher spread. However at the same time its exposure to loss is capped at its
size. In other words, the LSS note investment has limited recourse to the funded amount. Should
losses accumulate to exceed the LSS notional, this discrepancy, unless corrected with triggers
would be absorbed by the protection buyer. The triggers are based on either the market value or
collateral losses exceeding a threshold usually consistent with a downgrade below AAA. Triggers
are designed to mitigate the protection buyer’s “gap risk”. The protection buyer is exposed to the
risk that gapping spreads will result in a tranche mark-to-market exceeding the LSS note investor’s
tranche notional. To protect against such a scenario, the protection buyer desires the structure to
delevarage (increase the funded amount) or unwind, should the probability of such a scenario rise
significantly. To gauge the probability and protect against such risk, one of the following triggers
are used.
• tranche mark-to-market,
• weighted average spread (WAS) on the portfolio,
• Losses (of subordination/collateral).
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LSS are very interesting products since the triggers are very sensitive of the correlation of credit
risk and not only credit default implying a necessity to model credit risk dependence and not only
credit default dependence. A detailed explanation can be found in [Gallo06], page 148.
We now introduce the vulnerable claims category which can be defined as claims whose value
driver is non credit risk related as previously but might be vulnerable to counterparty credit risk.
1.1.3 Vulnerable claims
Vulnerable claims are contingent agreement that are traded over-the-counter between default-prone
parties: each side of the contract is thus exposed to the counterparty risk of the other party. The
default risk of a counterparty (or of both parties) is thus an important component of financial
risk embedded in a vulnerable claim.; it should necessarily be taken into account in valuation and
hedging procedures for vulnerable claims. On the other hand, the underlying (reference) assets are
assumed to be insensitive to credit risk. This assumption however might be relaxed and cross-effect
might be evaluated since for example higher credit risk might also correspond empirically in high
interest rate environment. Credit Derivatives are financial instruments that allow trading in the
reference credit might also be an example though unless the counterparty risk is negligible.
The classical example of a vulnerable contingent claim with unilateral default risk is an option
contract in which the option writer may default on its obligations. Thus, the payoff at T depends
on whether a default event associated with the option’s writer has occurred before or on the
maturity date, or not. The default risk of the holder of the option is not relevant here due to
the asymmetricallity of the payoff. Thus if CT is the payoff of the option, the vulnerable claim
adjustment from the option holder is
CdT = CT1{τ>T} + δCT1{τ≤T}
We will focus on a list of derivatives, thus exposed to bilateral counterparty risk, for the main
class of assets : interest-rate, currencies and equities. Those asset classes are considered to be risk-
free although in the case of equities that might not be an acceptable assumption. [Hull11] provides
a good account of all derivatives products per asset classes.
Interest rate derivatives
In an interest rate swap (IRS) is an agreement where one party A agrees to pay a fixed coupon to
a party B in exchange for a floating coupon over some sequence of date, generally at a semi-annual
frequency. The interest rate swap is thus characterised by
• a Notional amount N
• a floating-rate reference L,
• a fixed-rate coupon c
• a payment sequence t1, . . . , tn
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An interest rate swap can be understood as an agreement between two parties: one long a
coupon bond and short a floating-rate note (FRN) with the same maturity and notional, and the
other party taking the offsetting position. The two parties are called the (fixed-rate) payer and
the (fixed-rate) receiver. Of note, the payer and the receiver do not exchange the notional amount
at inception and maturity and only exchange the net difference between the fixed and floating
cash flows occurring at the payment dates, a risk management practice calling netting. However.
from a valuation perspective its interesting to keep the notional exchange to link with bonds and
FRN. The fixed-rate coupon, called the swap-rate is determined so that the swap has value 0 at
inception time t. The condition for c to be the swap rate is
FRN = 1 = c
n−1∑
i=0
θiD(t, ti+1) +D(t, tn)
with θi the basis , or
c =
1−D(t, tn)∑n−1
i=0 θiD(t, ti+1)
Swap rates are quoted and as the CDS rate should be viewed as market data. A more detailed
list of the interest rate derivatives products can be found in [Fabozzi12].
Currencies (or FX) derivatives
Another popular type of swap is known as cross-currency swap (CCS). This involves exchanging
principal and interest payments in one currency for principal and interest payments in another
currency. A currency swap agreement requires the principal to be specified in each of the two
currencies. The principal amount are exchanged at the beginning and at the end of the life of the
swap. Usually the principal amounts are chosen to be approximately equivalent using the exchange
rate at the swap’s inception. When they are exchanged at the end of the life of the swap their
values may be quite different. The type of the interest payments defines the nature of the swap
• fixed-for-fixed currency swaps : where a fixed interest rate in one currency is exchanged for a
fixed interest rate in another currency.
• fixed-for-floating currency swaps where a fixed interest rate in one currency is exchanged for
a floating interest rate in another currency.
• floating-for-floating currency swaps where a floating interest rate in one currency is exchanged
for a floating interest rate in another currency.
Equity derivatives
In a equity swap, one party promises to pay the return of an equity index on a notional principal
while the other promises to pay a fixed or floating return on a notional principal. Equity swaps
enable fund managers to increase or reduce their exposure to an index without buying or selling
stock. An equity swap is a convenient way of packaging a series of forward contracts on a index.
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Another product is an Equity default swap which is equivalent to a credit default swap but
where the reference asset is some company’s stock and protection is provided against a dramatic
decline in the price of that stock. (For example the trigger event could be 70% drop in the price
of the stock w.r.t some level at the contract inception date). The fact that the trigger is so low
will also be associated with a sharp deterioration of the credit quality of the reference. However,
we do not consider in this document the case of Hybrid products like Equity Default swaps since
they mix credit and equity risk.
In conclusion, from this list of products, most of those contingent claims are, even if their
underlying risk is not of credit type, exposed to the credit risk of their counterpart. Thus, the
risk of the counterparty defaulting during a transaction and also the impact of this default on
the ongoing transaction need to be valued at inception in order to reflect the riskiness of the
counterpart. Thus, counterparty credit risk has long being a risk that has captured regulators
attention and is reported in details.
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Chapter 2
Context Introduction
This part is mainly a presentation of the historical treatment of the counterparty credit risk and its
rationale in terms of integration in valuing contingency claims. Readers interested in the modelling
aspects could skip this part.
2.1 Introduction of counterparty credit risk
Following the events of the financial crisis and the major changes that it implied in terms of the
accuracy of pricing and risk management of correlation products, the widely used model of the
Gaussian copula has demonstrated that it failed to fully capture tail risk, especially through its
non-dynamic aspect of credit portfolio dependence. As a consequence of the growing popularity
of credit portfolio financial products in recent years, the understanding and the modelling of de-
fault dependency, as well as of counterparty risk, has attracted much attention like in [Brig11a].
The book [Brig11c] accounts very desriptively of all the modeling issues of credit risk dependency
that arose with the financial crises. We will try in this thesis to explore the valuation of counter-
party default risk regarding financial derivatives products while the market is currently undergoing
heavy financial stress. The intra-obligor “contagion”situation has recently attracted press coverage
interest.
• In [Xydias11], Synthetic Exchange Traded Funds represent risks of enhanced contagion chan-
nels across previously non correlated markets.
• In [Carver11], the Regulatory negative feedback loop between Credit Default Swaps products
value and their use in hedging Counteparty Valuation Adjustment risk might limit the effec-
tiveness or availability of the hedged position.
• In [Braithwaite12], leveraged credit positions such as in kth-to-default swaps (KTD) or Lever-
aged super senior claims (LSS) exposes the challenges for valuation of claims that exhibit
“Gap Risk”which can be defined as negative change of value that are not accounted by mod-
els.
Historically, the valuation and the management of counterpart risk has always been centre to
the preoccupation of financial institutions. As mentioned in [Canabarro03], this risk has evolved
from lending risk provisions to dynamically-hedged counterparty credit risk. This evolution has
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naturally developed in a rich array of quantitative metrics for banks to represent their ongoing
risk for regulation purposes. Regulatory capital documents from the Bank of International Settle-
ments, [BIS10a], [BIS01a] and [BIS98], cover the general description of risk from Economic Capital
concept to the more dynamic Counterparty Valuation Adjustment calculation. More recent pa-
pers, [BIS05] and [BIS10b], focus on the counterparty risk of centralised exchanges or the risk of
hedged exposure through double-default situations highlighting the constant evolution of this type
of risk due to new instruments or new types of counterparties. The current models implemented
across the industry place also emphasis on different levels of complexity in terms of the represen-
tation of risk permitted by the regulator.
But let’s first see, in the next section, how we define contagion?
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2.1.1 Correlation/Contagion - the usual suspects of dependence
From the Oxford Dictionary, contagion is defined as
• noun- the communication of disease from one person to another by close contact - in a
figurative way - the spreading of a harmful idea or practice. It is stated that the base of
Latin refers from con - together with and the base tangere - to touch.
Additionally, correlation is defined as
• a mutual relationship or connection between two or more things from the Latin cor - together
and relatio - relation.
These two definitions although encapsulating a similar behaviour, shed light to the causality as-
pect of the contagion and the symmetrically of correlation. It is the modelling of this causality
behaviour in relation to counterparty risk that we are trying to investigate in this thesis.
Interestingly, the causality of the contagion effect has been already extensively investigated in
other areas of finance such as macroeconomy or asset management.
For example, in a microeconomic context, companies rely on a chain of suppliers and service
providers to deliver the goods and services they need to meet customer demand. That journey
from source to destination has always had its risks and uncertainties and changes on nearly every
front have dramatically altered the dynamics of the supply chain for good and for bad. Typically,
shifts in global sourcing and production, information and communications technology, consumer
expectations, pricing volatility, product availability, financial conditions, regulation and compliance
rules ... combine to make managing the supply chain a new game now. These new vulnerabili-
ties all define a set of channels that in a stressed environment can generate rise to a contagion effect.
Additionally, the dependency of factors and risks is extensively studied in Management and Op-
erational Corporate Research like in [Chopra04] with financial risks such as supplier-bankruptcy,
exchange-rate risk or creditworthiness of customers. This web of interconnections that channels
contagion is also covered in the Asset Management Research space like in [Cohen06] where return
predictability through economically-linked firms can generate a monthly alphas of over 150 bps or
over 18% per year. The approach described in [Cohen06] is to associate companies which have a
20% supplier-customer link based on their financial accounts and enter trading pairs when earn-
ings announcements are not impacted on the paired company in order to play an Efficient Market
normalisation effect.
Finally, in the Asset Management world, another common application of contagion is called pairs
trading where [Zee06] gives an intuitive illustration of statistically cointegrated pairs like General
Motors and Ford that can be traded for profit using their mean-reverting feature. A good in-
troduction of those strategies can be found in [Vidyamurthy04] with [Vidyamurthy04] capturing
correlation while [Cohen06] captures contagion.
Moving back to credit risk, recent press coverage, like in [Economist12], has focused on assets
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correlations spiking to one and on the contagion of euro-zone sovereign spreads in 2011. Interest-
ingly, [Economist12] extended financial contagion between major countries that are trading part-
ners, like Mexico and the United-States, to less related ones involving Thailand, Indonesia and the
United-States. Those correlation to “pure contagion”aspects are also addressed in [Hartmann04]
which focuses on statistical methods for disentangling contagion from correlation by looking at
the asset returns linkage through extremal dependence measure instead of conditional correlation
analysis.
All those examples highlight the sound foundation of business relations that give rise to correlation-
contagion links in the financial world. Then, it is natural that all those links or relationship would
translate, in a credit risk setting, into credit contagion scenarios in the context of counterparty
credit risk exposure.
Historically, risks exposed to counterparty risk have been at the core of the banking industry
through its lending practice and was accounted through the metric defined as Economic Capital.
While there is no contagion feature embedded in it, we view it as an interesting starting point to
cover the set of metrics and their modelling that capture counterparty risk.
2.1.2 Economic Capital: early coverage of counterparty credit risk
The evolution from lending risk towards Counterparty Credit Risk through derivatives is encap-
sulated in the bilateral aspect of the risk depending on the future state of the market. Typically,
Economic Capital defines for a loan portfolio a measure of risk representing the potential Unex-
pected Loss (UL) of the Economic Value of a portfolio or business over some long time horizon.
Thus, as represented in figure 2.1 on page 22, the exposure evaluation will require a double level
of simulation:
• simulation in market rates (covered by desks specific risk management), and,
• simulation of the types of credit event (covered by Counterparty risk desks).
Additionally, [Picoult05] introduces also the concept of Current Counterparty Exposure
which is defined as the immediate exposure to a counterparty representing the current replacement
cost of the contracts under an immediate default. Extending to the case of multiple transactions,
the two most common ways of measuring this “Potential Exposure”of a counterparty are either a
• Simple Transaction methodology, or,
• a more precise and sophisticated portfolio Simulation Methodology.
Thus, to analyse the wide array of different transactions and their different precision needs, a set
of different metrics for Economic Capital has been developed to cover the cases ranging from
• a static position as in bank lending with a known profile to
• a dynamic position depending on market variables and requiring a full simulation.
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Figure 2.1: Definition of Economic Capital - Source: [Picoult05]
This last approach is close conceptually to VaR (Value at Risk) measurement to quantify
the potential exposure even if market-factor sensitivities are not normally distributed. Since the
counterparty loss exposure is mostly expressed from the investor point of view when a position
is in the money, and with the exposure profile calculated as of today (time t), the basis of the
VaR-equivalent approach is defined as the average positive exposure. A typical simulation
result for an exposure profile will have the shape presented in figure 2.2 in the case of an Interest
Rate Swap (IRS). The exposure profile over the forecasting time horizon will be used to produce
Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) metrics (which will be detailed later) such as:
• EPE: Expected Positive Exposure, and,
• PFE: Potential Future Exposure.
In the early 90s, some investment banks began to make a price adjustment called Counter-
party Value Adjustement (CVA) (This was first mentioned in the paper [Sorensen94]) to take
into account the counterparty’s credit risk with a valuation adjustment reported in transactions
as:
Market ValueCounterpartyk =
∑
Present Valuerisk−free − CVAk
Thus, as an analogy with bond price being the risk-free bond minus the risky adjustment, CVA
can be viewed as the difference between the risk-free value of a derivative portfolio and the value
after taking the counterparty risk into account. And, as in valuing any derivatives product, the
challenge of defining the Credit Charge (or CVA) is to take into account the effect of market
spreads on the market value of a derivative portfolio.
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Figure 2.2: Exposure Profile for an Interest Rate Swap
So, in conclusion, while Economic Capital for counterparty credit risk has evolved from static
to dynamic measurement to account for pricing requirements, the origin of valuing counterparty
exposure comes from regulatory reporting to encapsulate the extent of counterparty risk taken by
an institution. Therefore, for historic reasons, Regulatory Capital requirement provided the base
of definitions to account for this risk. We will present those requirement as they will also form the
basis of reporting the results in this thesis.
23
2.2 Counterparty Credit Risk Concepts
2.2.1 Is CVA valuation important?
The press releases
• [Citigroup10] of Citigroup Full year 2010 results, Fourth Quarter Included Negative CVA of
$1.1 Billion Pre-Tax Due to Citi Spreads Tightening, and,
• [Citigroup09] of Citigroup Q1 2009 Results, A net $2.5 billion positive CVA on derivative
positions, excluding monolines, mainly due to the widening of Citis CDS spreads.
give an immediate indication of the importance of the CVA. Especially, as it is mentioned in
page 9 - Appendix A of [Citigroup10] and reproduced in table 2.1, total CVA has evolved from
$+2,659 millions in Q1-2009 to $-1,897 millions in Q4-2009 to finish at $+288 millions in Q1-2010.
The staggering amounts and volatility show how it is important to have a precise and consistent
model throughout the accounting book and different over-the-counter (OTC) products for financial
institutions in order to reflect correctly the risks that are taken during the business cycles.
Table 2.1: CITICORP - Securities and Banking CVA - Source: [Citigroup10], [Citigroup09]
(in millions dollars) 1Q-2010 4Q-2009 1Q-2009
CVA on Citi Liabilities at Fair Value Option (2) (1,764) 197
Derivatives CVA 290 (133) 2,462
Total CVA 288 (1,897) 2,659
The magnitude of valuation changes, especially in a period of financial stress, indicates the
importance of a precise valuation of CVA and a consistent model to capture the diversity of risk
dynamics to which a financial institution is exposed. More recently, [Carver11] has focused and
demonstrated how a regulatory built feedback loop between sovereign CDS and CVA valuation
has increased the systemic risk encountered through financial institutions. [Carver11] especially
focused on the Basel III charges for Credit Value Adjustment (CVA) with the new regulation
using credit default swap spreads to calculate counterparty exposure in derivatives trades, and
requiring banks to hold capital against that number. However, it also allows banks to mitigate
the capital requirement by buying CDS protection. The result, dealers say, is pro-cyclical: if the
CVA charge increases, they are incentivised to buy protection; if they buy protection, spreads
rise and the charge increases further. That dynamic exists today – banks already calculate and
hedge CVA exposure using CDSs – but dealers argue the introduction of a specific capital require-
ment in 2013 will increase demand for protection in a market that is not liquid enough to support it.
Additionally, building on the increased volatility in CVA from [Carver11], the paper [Singh12]
details how multiple re-pledging of collateral between institutions unlocked vast stores of “new”cash
and how subsequent interbank mistrust and a shrinkage of what’s acceptable as collateral drained
the pool. The process of “re-hypothecation”, describes how a hedge-fund or mutual-fund borrows
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cash from a bank by posting a bond as collateral and then how that bank subsequently re-pledges
that same bond as collateral for its own purposes. According to [Singh12] at 2007 peaks, the re-use
rate of primary collateral from funds and custodians by the largest banks was about 3 times – cre-
ating a total web of intricate collateral chains in excess of $10 trillion. That compares with a U.S.
M2 money supply back then of some $7 trillion. But by 2011, this re-use rate was already down to
2.4, involving almost a halving of the total collateral pool. The loss in collateral flow is estimated
at $4-5 trillion, stemming from both shorter collateral chains and increased “idle”collateral due to
institutional ring-fencing. The knock-on impact is higher credit costs for the economy as well as a
higher contagion or correlation of the values of financial claims.
Those examples highlights the fact that a starting point for building a state-of-the-art model
is to understand the regulatory requirements to Counterparty Credit Risk and the regulatory
validation process of in-house Counterparty Credit Risk structures.
2.2.2 Counterparty Credit Risk regulatory approach
In the regulatory framework detailed in [BIS05], the Bank of International Settlements (BIS)
encourages banks to identify the risks they may face, today and in the future, and to develop or
improve their abilities to manage those risks. The implementation must cover:
• The treatment of the Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) for OTC derivatives, repo-style
securities financing transactions and the treatment of cross-product netting agreements;
• The treatment of Double-Default effects for covered transactions (i.e. regulatory capital
treatment of CVA-hedged transactions);
To realise this, the quantification of exposure requires the estimate of Exposure At Default
(EAD) for transactions. This can be viewed as the equivalent to the probability distribution of a
derivative as introduced earlier in section 2.1.2. The CCR generally refers to the bilateral risk of
transactions with uncertain exposures that can vary over time with the movement of underlying
factors. In summary, three methods are advanced for calculating the EAD for transactions involv-
ing CCR in the banking or the trading book under the “Revised Framework”introduced in [BIS05]:
1. the Current Exposure Method (CEM) as described in appendix A.2.
2. the Standardised Method (SM) as described in appendix A.2,
3. the Internal Model Method (IMM) as described in appendix A.2. That method develops
the concept of the Expected Positive Exposure (EPE) that we have already mentioned
in section 2.1.2, page 21, and is defined in section 2.2.4, page 29.
The three methods are intended to represent different points along a continuum of sophistication
in risk management practices and are structured to provide incentives for banks to improve their
management of Counterparty Credit Risk. The common aspects of those methods include collat-
eral to mitigate risk, legal netting or rights of offset contracts and re-margining agreements. They
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Figure 2.3: Stylised CCR Effective Expected Exposure and Effective Expected Positive Exposure
illustration - Source: Bank of International Settlements
rely on the knowledge of the credit exposure in the future for a given derivatives like the exposure
conceptually illustrated in figure 2.3, page 26. Typically, for regulatory purposes, the horizon
knowledge of the credit exposure is set to one year notably for liquidity of hedging and the preci-
sion of the forecasting horizon. With this set of exposures, the CEM is the most simple approach
with add-on factor α to account for the volatility of underlying parameters. The SM incorporates
in this valuation approach the benefit of bucketing of risk and their subsequent hedging. The
volatility of the underlying parameters used to generate the credit exposure is then incorporated
in a factor β. Interestingly, both α and β are set at 1.4, but supervisors have the flexibility to raise
either parameter in appropriate situations. This highlights to a certain extent the non-dynamical
feature of those risk measures. We will, in this thesis, try to address the applicability of static
volatility coefficients in different cases of credit risk regimes.
The last method, IMM, revolves around a full simulation of the underlying driver parameters
through a classical Monte-Carlo simulation as detailed in [Glasserman04]. This has the benefit
of generating a full distribution of each product enabling netting effect. Additionally, IMM with
the full distribution knowledge generates confidence interval based metrics, detailed a bit later in
section 2.2.4, page 29, such as:
• Expected Positive Exposure (EPE),
• Expected Exposure (EE), and
• Potential Future Exposure (PFE).
Banks typically compute and report the metrics named EPE, EE, and PFE using a common
stochastic model. The EPE is generally viewed as the appropriate Exposure At Default (EAD) mea-
sure to determine capital for CCR. Additionally, the EAD for instruments with CCR must also
26
be determined conservatively and conditionally on a “bad state”of the economy with the CEM
and SM scaling EPE using multipliers, termed “alpha”-α and “beta”-β, respectively. However,
in [BIS10a], following the financial crisis and to take into better account the volatility of exposure,
recent changes have focused on the risk reporting of hedged transaction or the use of central coun-
terparties like exchanges. Thus, to conclude, the regulatory metrics for the upside risk are viewed
as a V aR on the downside risk, where counterparty credit risk makes uses of the full distribution
knowledge of the product distribution and requires the knowledge of all type of risk and risk miti-
gation requiring the implementation of institution-wide pricing engine. [Cesari09] and [Gregory10]
provide a very detailed coverage of asset-class wide implementation of such pricing engine among
financial institutions.
2.2.3 The need to capture everything?
As mentioned in [Goldman10] on Goldman Sachs’ website and titled Overview of Goldman Sachs
Interaction with AIG and Goldman Sachs Approach to Risk Management, even if the counterparty
of a credit default swap trade is rated AAA among rating agencies and under Basel-II rules doesn’t
require to post collateral, events of the 2008 financial crisis highlights the benefits of dynamically
managing counterparty risk through the introduction of so-called Master Margining Agreements.
The speed of default of the counterpart might not give enough time to enter new margining agree-
ment and hedging might soon become too expensive. This was typically the case for the collateral
trades with the insurance company AIG as the figure 2.4 page 28 illustrates with credit protection
reaching levels where protection buying was too expensive (i.e > 500bps).
This systematic approach to counterparties is highlighted by Goldman’s practice in [Goldman10]:
“AIG was a AAA-rated company, one of the largest and considered one of the most sophisticated
trading counterparts in the world. Goldman Sachs established credit terms with them commensurate
with those extended to other major counterparts including a willingness to do substantial trading
volumes, but subject to collateral arrangements that were tightly managed. These arrangements
included the requirement that AIG give Goldman Sachs collateral to protect us against possible
future loss on the securities protected.”
Recently, counterparty risks have mushroomed in the financial markets due to
• the usual practice of offsetting rather than unwinding derivative positions, and,
• the array of inter-dealer trades required to connect final risk-takers.
This has led, in the current environment of financial stress, to derivatives and counterparties
risks being the focal points for market participants, policymakers, regulators, accountants, tax
authorities and many others. Over-The-Counter (OTC) derivatives such as credit default swaps
have been a focal point of attention in risk concentration due to the fact of being non centralised
instruments. [Canabarro10] and [Canabarro03],page 124, depict the challenges in connection with
the resources to build sophisticated PFE measurement systems with
• databases (incorporating trades, agreements, legal entities, legal opinions, collateral holdings,
risk limits, ...),
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Figure 2.4: AIG stock value and protection cost around the September 2008 bailout - LHS: AIG
Stock Price, RHS: CDS spread (bps) - Source: Datastream
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• Monte-Carlo simulation engines,
• trade pricing calculators,
• exposure calculators, and,
• reporting tools.
It is, thus, necessary to capture all those elements to build an integrated platform where different
market instruments require the specification of different stochastic processes to characterise their
evolutions through time. Classically, as listed in [Cesari09]
• Interest rates in developed economies are modelled as normal or lognormal diffusion processes.
When interest rates are low, the normal diffusion may be appropriate. When interest rates
are high the lognormal diffusion may be appropriate.
• Major foreign exchange rates are usually modelled as lognormal diffusions. In contrast,
emerging foreign exchange rates incorporate jumps.
• Commodity and equity prices are modelled usually as lognormal diffusions with jumps for
some less liquid commodities and equities.
In order to capture such a diversity of risks and exposures both for regulatory and internal
needs, a set of generic metric has to be computed as presented in section 2.2.4.
2.2.4 Counterparty Credit Risk metrics definitions
As defined in [Cesari09] and already mentioned, the Counterparty Credit Risk is the amount
a company could potentially loose in the event of one of its counterparties defaulting. Let us
generically consider a distribution of portfolio prices Vt that can incorporate collateral and priced
used either with neutral probability measure Q or real probability measure P.
Risk Measures
We define the following metrics:
• the Potential Future Exposure
PFEα,t = qα,t = inf{x : P(Vt ≤ x) ≥ α)} (2.1)
is the exposure of Vt in case of counterparty default with a α% confidence level under a given
probability measure P. Typically a high level quantile such as 97.5% or 99%.
• the Expected Shortfall
ESα,t = E(Vt|Vt ≥ qα,t) (2.2)
gives in the P measure a sense of some tail risk by expressing the average loss outside of the
confidence interval.
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• the Expected Positive Exposure
EPEt = E(V +t ) (2.3)
is the mean of the positive part of the price distribution.
This measure is used in practice for hedging counterpary exposure and for computing risk
weighted assets and capital with the use of CDS to hedge the counterparty by buying a CDS
with a notional related to the EPE profile.
In order to qualify as a proper risk metrics, a set of properties will be required as mentioned
in the next section.
Risk Measures Categorisation:
As subsequently developed in [Zagst02] and [Elliott04], [Artzner99] presented a set of desirable
properties which a risk measure should satisfy and called all risk measures holding their conditions
as coherent . The risk of a position X, defined as ρ(X), is the additional amount of capital which
has to be allocated by a banking institution to cover the risk position X. Assuming that the
interest on allocated capital is zero, the conditions are:
• Monotonicity: ∀X, Y ∈ X with X ≤ Y ,
ρ(X) ≥ ρ(Y ) (2.4)
A risk position with a lower value should be assigned a higher risk in the case of downside
risk and, a risk position with a higher value should be assigned a higher risk in the case of
counterparty risk.
• Translation - Invariance: ∀X, Y ∈ X and ∀c ∈ R,
ρ(X + c) = ρ(X)− c (2.5)
An additional position of risk-less capital should reduce the risk by exactly this amount of
money.
• Positive Homogeneity: ∀X, Y ∈ X and ∀ λ ≥ 0,
ρ(λ.X) = λ.ρ(X) (2.6)
The multiplication of an actual risk position should simply result in a corresponding multi-
plication of risk.
• Subadditivity: ∀X, Y ∈ X ,
ρ(X + Y ) ≤ ρ(X) + ρ(Y ) (2.7)
Diversification effect with the addition of two risk positions should lead to correlation effects
and reduce risk.
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Typically like a reversed V aR , PFEα is not a coherent risk measure. On the other hand,
ESα or TCEα define coherent risk measures. PFEα has been historically the measure of choice,
however the ESα has gained more use thanks to it’s ability to indicate potential losses in tail events.
In conclusion of this chapter, in order to focus on the effect of credit risk contagion in a
counterparty credit risk context, we need to use only the classical risk metrics defined here and
forget about the risk management structure that is required for regulatory reasons. Thus, we
will focus on typical financial claims to illustrate the implementation of a Counterparty Credit
Risk model and to generate the distribution of products in the future leading to the relevant risk
metrics. In order to generate those metrics we will need the following mathematical setting:
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Chapter 3
Mathematical setting
We present under this chapter the main assumptions and previously established results that will
be of interest in the context of valuing the counterparty credit risk for contingent claims when
reference obligors undergo credit risk contagion. Then we will, successively, introduce:
• the general mathematical background to value financial claims,
• the different approaches for multivariate obligor default-time modelling,
• the Credit Valuation Adjustment (CVA), and,
• the way of modelling dependence notably through Markov chains.
3.1 Problem introduction
The mathematical setting and notations used thereafter are mainly introduced in [Bielecki01] and [Musiela97].
[Bingham98] details risk-neutral valuation.
3.1.1 Mathematical settings
Consider a probability space (Ω,G,Gt,Q) with ω ∈ Ω a realisation of Ω representing all the possible
outcomes of random experiment. The σ−field G filtration represents the sets of events A ⊂ Ω and
where the σ− field Gt represents the information up to time t.
∀u ≤ t,Gu ⊆ Gt ⊆ G
The probability measure Q is the risk-neutral measure or the pricing measure and we define
the locally risk-free bank account numeraire βt evolving as
dβt = rtβtdt
where r is the risk-free rate along with
S0t = βt, . . . , S
n
t
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be n + 1 Gt-adapted ca`dla`g semi-martingales that all are strictly positive and represents the
prices of n+ 1 traded assets at time t. Under this measure all prices of tradable assets divided by
βt are Gt-adapted ca`dla`g martingales (Lemma 2.1.1, p. 37, in [Bielecki01]).
Let’s consider a set of m obligors with E = {1, . . . ,m} a finite set of obligors. The default times
τ = τi for any obligor i is an arbitrary non-negative random variable defined on the probability
space (Ω,G,Gt,Q). Each default is associated with a jump process H, the default process, defined
as Ht = 1{τ≤t},∀t ∈ R+. Ht is thus a right-continuous process with an associated filtration H.
The probability space is endowed with a right-continuous and complete sub-filtration Ft rep-
resenting all the observable market quantities but the default event (hence Ft ⊆ Gt := Ft ∨ Ht
where Ht = σ({τ ≤ u} : u ≤ t) is the right-continuous filtration generated by the default event).
Thus, Gt is the filtration modelling the market information up to time t including explicit default
monitoring up to time t whereas Ft is the default-free market market information up to time t
(Currencies, interest rates, etc) without default monitoring.
We distinguish claims in two universe:
• Non-defaultable claims: financial claims where the value is not linked to a credit event.
The stochastic drivers of value will be of type: stocks, currencies, interest rates, commodities,
etc. Typically the information will be encapsulated in the sub-filtration Ft.
• Defaultable claims: financial claims where the value is linked to a credit event. Naturally
such claims are named credit claims with credit as an underlying such as Credit Default
swaps, Collateral Debt Obligations, etc. Here the information will be encapsulated in the
sub-filtration Ht. It could be mentioned here that some hybrid claims such as Equity Default
Swaps could be categorised across the divide but we will only focus in this thesis on general
claims and not exotic ones.
Remark: The defaultable non defaultable vs defaultable name categorisation is mainly centred
on the fact that the refrence of the derivatives claims is credit risk based or not. We will keep this
notation in the reminder of this document.
Let’s now present the valuation of those claims starting with the non-defaultable case.
Non-defaultable case:
Let’s now consider a contingent claim X, an FT -measurable random variable, that represents from
a financial point of view a contract with a stochastic payoff, i.e. stochastic cash-flow that depends
on the information available at time T . From [Bingham98], we say that a contingent claim X is
Q-attainable if there exists a Q-admissible trading strategy φ (called replicating strategy) such
that
VT (φ) = X
This is established with the two theorems, with [Harrison81] establishing that
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Theorem 3.1.1 (Default-free attainable claim). If X is an attainable contingent claim such that
(βX) ∈ L1(Q,FT ), then the arbitrage-free price V Xt of X at time t is given by
V Xt = S
0
tEQ
[
X
S0T
∣∣∣∣Ft] = EQ [∫ T
t
βudXu
∣∣∣∣Ft] (3.1)
since X is an FT -measurable random variable and βt = 1. Note that in the reminder of the
document we will use the notation X(t) to define the claim instead of the notation V Xt to refer
more to the claim rather than its replicating portfolio. The replicability of the claim is obtained
in a complete financial market M with the following lemma
Lemma 3.1.1. Let Q be a martingale measure. Let X be a contingent claim such that (βtXt) ∈
L1(Q,FT ). Define the martingale Mt as
Mt = EQ
[
X
βT
| Ft
]
If Mt could be represented as
Mt = p+
n∑
k=0
∫ t
0
φkudS˜
k
u
for some φt = (φ
1
t , . . . , φ
n
t ) where φ
k
t is F-predictable and locally bounded for k = 1, . . . , n and x is
a constant, then X is attainable.
Let’s do now the case of a Defaultable claim:
Defaultable case:
Notation: Defaultable claim define in the current document claims that are credit-linked such as
credit default swaps, kth-to-default where the underlying driver of valuation is credit risk derived.
In this context, an equity default swap can be defined as being a defaultable claim even if the
underlying is the equity price of the reference name.
We fix the finite horizon date T . We suppose that the underlying probability space (Ω,F ,Q)
endowed with some filtration F = (Ft)0≤t≤T is sufficiently rich to support the processes into which
the Defaultable claim will be decomposed.
We consider a default time τ connected to some reference obligor i ∈ E with any defaultable
contingent claim of maturity T as the set
Π(t, T ) = (X,A, X˜, Z, τ, T ) (3.2)
where
• X represents a payoff that the holder of the claim receives at T if τ > T ,
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• A = (At)0≤t≤T is a process representing the accumulated promised cash flows received by the
owner of the claim up to time t, given that τ > t.
• Z = (Zt)0≤t≤T is a process representing the recovery payoff received by the holder of the
claim at τ if τ ≤ T , i.e. Z is what is recovered at the default time τ , if τ ≤ T ,
• X˜ represent a payoff that the holder of the claim receives at T if τ ≤ T .
The processes X and X˜ are Ft-measurable, and the processes At and Zt are Ft-predictable,
with At of finite variation and A0 = 0. Usually, by convention in claims either X˜ = 0 or Z = 0.
In the remainder of this document, we will consider X˜ = 0 as if the recovery payoff Z is received
at time of default τ .
With the default process Ht of obligor i as H
i
t = 1{τ=τi≤t} and its filtration up to default time
as Hiτ = σ(τ ≤ s, s ≤ t), from Proposition 8.1.1, p. 224 in [Bielecki01], the defaultable contingent
claim can be decomposed at time T as
XdT = X1{τ>T} + X˜1{τ≤T}
and viewed as a continuous dividend process Dt of Π(t, t) = (X,A, X˜, Z, τ, T ) of finite variation
on compacts in [0, T ] with
Dt = X
d
t 1{t≥T} +
∫ t
0
(1−Hs)dAs +
∫ t
0
ZsdHs
where, since 1−Hs = 1{τ>s}∫ t
0
(1−Hs)dAs =
∫ t
0
1{τ>s}dAs = Aτ−1{τ≤t} + At1{τ>t}
and ∫ t
0
ZsdHs = Zτ1{τ≤t}
Similary, as for formula (3.1), to find the arbitrage-free price V DCTt of the claim Π(t, T ) at
time t, let assume there exists S0t , . . . , S
n
t n + 1 F -adapted semi-martingales under a risk-neutral
measure Q on the market M. Additionally, for certain claims like CDS, let us assume that the
defaultable claim Π(t, T ) is also traded on this market, and Sn+1t be the strictly positive price of
the claim Π(t, T ) at time t. As in the default-free case, we define a trading strategy φt (w.r.t St)
as a locally bounded, F -predictable n+ 2 dimensional process
φt = (φ
0
t , . . . , φ
n
t , φ
n+1
t )
where the intuitive meaning of φt is as in the default-free case and where φ
n+1
t is the amount of
the defaultable claim held at t result in the portfolio value V DCTt :
V DCTt (φt) = φtSt =
n+1∑
k=0
φktS
k
t
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[Bielecki01] argues that this implies that the arbitrage-free price V DCTt of the Π(t, T ) at time
t is given by V DCTt = S
n+1
t where
Sn+1t = BtEQ
[∫ T
t
βsdDs
∣∣∣∣Gt = Ft ∨Ht]
where the expectation is taken under Q. Hence, if φ is self-financing and V˜ DCTt is a local-Q-local
martingale we could still use theorem 3.1.1 page 34 (but now with the enlarged filtration) to find
the arbitrage-free price of a defaultable claim Π(t, T ). Thus, unless explicit stated, arbitrage-free
prices of claims (default free or defaultable) will be computed simply by discounting their future
promised cash flows under the risk-neutral measure Q.
Theorem 3.1.2 (Defaultable attainable claim). If Π(t, T ) is an attainable defaultable contingent
claim, then the arbitrage-free price V DCTt of Π(t, T ) at time t is given by
Sn+1t = BtEQ
[∫ T
t
βs(1−Hs)dAs +
∫ T
t
βsZsdHs + βTX
d
t
∣∣∣∣∣Ft ∨Ht
]
(3.3)
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3.1.2 Counterparty risk impact on valuation
Moving from the previous section, the valuation equations (3.1) and (3.3) of a contingent claim of
final maturity T highlight the influence of the default of reference obligor i. Additionally, financial
claims, especially when designed as bilateral agreements, are exposed to default of the counterpart
entity adding an extra layer of defaultability even in equation (3.1), making it now default sensitive.
Conceptually, investing in default risky assets requires a risk premium as a reward for assuming
the default risk with the difference of the yield to the equivalent treasury bond being called the
credit spread. Thus, logically, the value of a generic claim traded with a counterparty subject to
default risk is always smaller than the value of the same claim traded with a counterparty having
a null default probability.
Motivated by the events of Asian crisis in 1998 which highlighted credit contagion default,
[Jarrow01] presented an interesting attempt to capture the influence of the counterparty riskiness
in the valuation of the contigent claims through a set “secondary firms”influencing the default
probability of “primary firms ”and thus the valuation of claims linked to those firms.
While [Jarrow01] focused on claims that can be categorised as non-defaultable, [Leung05] fo-
cused on the defaultable ones by assessing credit default swap valuation with counterparty credit
risk. [Leung05] highlighted the tendency of those claims to exhibit “wrong-way”risk, namely, the
fact that under credit risk dependency the higher risk of the counterpart not fulfilling its obligation
is also the moment the value of this obligation is the most valuable. In effect, that aspect should
also being considered in the original valuation of the claim.
[Brig06] established a link between the default-free valuation and the defaultable one called
Credit Value Adjustment (CV A). This adjustment will be central in valuing the effect of
credit contagion among a set of obligors especially for credit-basket sensitive claims like kth-to-
default (KTD) credit default swaps or Leveraged Super Senior (LSS) claims introduced earlier.
[Brig06] illustrated how the inclusion of counterparty risk in the valuation can make a payoff
model dependent by adding one level of optionality, use the risk neutral default probability for
the counterparty by extracting it from CDS data and account for the correlation between the
underlying of the contract and the default of the counterparty.
[Brig06] shows that “the derivative price in presence of counterparty risk is just the
default free price minus a discounted option term in scenarios of early default”. The
option underlying is the residual present value of the derivative at time of default.
Thus, even payoffs whose valuation is model independent become model dependent due to coun-
terparty risk in a way that does not destroy the default-free valuation models.
Moving back to our setting:
In the set of obligor E = {1, . . . ,m}, consider the two parties in a deal as the investor I and the
counterpart C with claims potentially encompassing reference obligors i with their associated de-
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fault process HIt , H
C
t and H
i
t ,∀i ∈ E\{I, C}. Thus, the filtration H = (Ht)t≥0 can be decomposed
as:
Ht = HIt ∨HCt ∨Hit, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
with the respective filtrations up to default time as Hi = σ(τi ≤ s, s ≤ t), ∀i ∈ E.
Comment: As it is common usage, we present the calculations form the view point of the
investor I.
We make also the following assumption regarding the default of obligors in E:
Assumption 3.1.1 (No simultaneous defaults). In the current setting in the set of obligors E we
rule out the case of simultaneous defaults, i.e.
∀i, f ∈ E, i 6= j, {τi = τj} = ∅
Two cases are possible for the valuation of counterpart credit risk:
• Unilateral case: only the counterpart C default time is taken into account in its impact
on claim valuation. This was mainly the case pre-2008 and the financial crisis where bank
where considered risk-free especially w.r.t their corporate clients.
• Bilateral case: the counterpart C and the investor I, both, can affect the valuation of
claims.
We now express the counterparty risk metrics defined in section 2.2.4, page 29, in our current
setting with first in the unilateral case and then in the bilateral case.
Counterparty risk metrics - Unilateral case:
Consider the filtration HCt = ({τC ≤ t}, t ∈ R) generated by default time τC of the counterparty
C. The filtration is thus, Gt = Ft ∨HCt . If we define X(τC) as the termination value based on fair
value (i.e entering a new contract), the metrics are
• ED: Exposure at default is a Gτ -measurable random variable with
ED(τ) := X(τC)− (RCX(τC)+ −X(τC)−) (3.4)
• CV A: Credit Valuation Adjustment. CV A process is killed at τC ∧ t defined as t ∈ [0, T ]
βtCV At := Et(1{t<τC}βτCED(τC)) (3.5)
• EPE: Expected Positive Exposure. EPE is the function of time defined as
EPE(t) := Et(ED(τC) | τC = t) (3.6)
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Typically, the equations (3.4) and (3.6) are used in a context of risk management under the P-
measure, while equation (3.5) is used in a context of pricing under the Q -measure.
Comment: Note that the claim X(τC) above corresponds to both the non-defaultable claim Xt
in equation (3.1) and to the defaultable claim in equation (3.3). We will in the reminder of the
document use the notation X as a general claim when there is no need to differentiate between
the two cases.
Counterparty risk metrics - Bilateral case:
Consider the filtration HCt = ({τC ≤ t}, t ∈ R) generated by default time τC of the counterparty
C and the filtration HIt = ({τI ≤ t}, t ∈ R) generated by default time τI of the investor I . The
filtration is thus, Gt = Ft ∨ Ht with Ht = HIt ∨ HCt . We excluded simultaneous defaults of the
Investor and the counterpart i.e. Q(1τI=τC ) = 0.
From the unilateral case, the equations (3.4) (3.5) and (3.6) and are rewritten
• ED: Exposure at default is a Gτ -measurable random variable where τ = min(τI , τC)with
ED(τ) := 1{τ=τC}(X(τC)− (RCX(τC)+ −X(τC)−))
+ 1{τ=τI}(X(τI)− (X(τI)+ −RIX(τI)−)) (3.7)
• CV A: Credit Valuation Adjustment. CV A process is killed at τC ∧ t defined as t ∈ [0, T ]
βtCV At := Et(1{t<τC}βτCED(τC)) (3.8)
• DV A: Debt Valuation Adjustment. DV A process is killed at τI ∧ t defined as t ∈ [0, T ]
βtDV At := Et(1{t<τI}βτIED(τI)) (3.9)
• EPE: Expected Positive Exposure. EPE is the function of time defined as
EPE(t) := Et(ED(τC) | τC = t) (3.10)
• ENE: Expected Negative Exposure. ENE is the function of time defined as
ENE(t) := Et(ED(τI) | τI = t) (3.11)
We those definitions we now express the defaultable and non defaultable claims adjusted for
their counterparty exposure by linking the Credit Valuation Adjustment with the counterpart-free
value
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Non defaultable claim - Unilateral case:
Consider a non-defaultable claim X under no counterparty risk but with τ a Ft-adapted stopping
time with τ ∈]t, T ]. In this case the filtrations are Gt = Ft with Ht = ∅
We express the non defaultable claim in equation (3.1) under counterparty credit risk as
βtX(t, T )
d =
∫ T∧τC
t
βudXu + 1{t<τC≤T}βτC (RCX(τC)
+ −X(τC)−)
=
∫ T
t
1{τC>u}βudXu + 1{t<τC≤T}βτC (RCX(τC)
+ −X(τC)−)
=
∫ T
t
βudXu +
∫ T
t
1{τC≤u}βuφudSu + 1{t<τC≤T}βτC (RCX(τC)
+ −X(τC)−)(3.12)
We have adjusted the claim where
• the first term is the risk-neutral valuation of the payoff if no early default or the payments
received before default occurs,
and in case of early default,
• the second term is the residual net present value if the expected exposure is positive and
adjusted for the recovery of the counterpart.
Note that X(τC) refers to the valuation of the claims as of equation (3.1) i.e. equivalent to
entering a new contract as of τC . The notation will be used across all the counterparty valuation
formula under all cases.
Proof. The proof can be find in [Brig06] where by taking the expectation under Gt
Et(βtX(t, T )d)
= E
(∫ T
t
βudXu +
∫ T
t
1{τC≤u}βudXu + 1{t<τC≤T}βτC (RCX(τC)
+ −X(τC)−)
∣∣∣∣Gt)
using f = f+ − f− and the law of iterated expectations we get
= E
(
(1{τC>T} + 1{t<τC≤T})
∫ T
t
βudxu
∣∣∣∣Gt)− E(1{t<τC≤T}βτCLGDCX(τC)+∣∣∣∣Gt)
The equation (3.1) is thus valued under unilateral counterparty risk as
Et(βtX(t, T )d) = E
(
(1{τC>T} + 1{t<τC≤T})
∫ T
t
βudXu
∣∣∣∣Gt)
− E
(
1{t<τC≤T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+
∣∣∣∣Gt) (3.13)
The value of a defaultable claim is then decomposed in a unilateral case as the value of the
corresponding default-free claim under the filtration Gt
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• plus a long position in a put position with a zero strike on the Expected Exposure if the
investor is the earliest to default before maturity,
As in [Brig06], we quote the non defaultable claim X defined in (3.1) under unilateral counter-
party credit risk as
Proposition 3.1.1 (Unilateral CVA for non-defaultable claim). Consider a FT -measurable de-
faultable claim X defined in (3.1) under counterparty credit risk as
X(t, T )d = Et(βtX(t, T )d) = E
(∫ T
t
βudXu
∣∣∣∣Gt)
− E
(
1{t<τC≤T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+
∣∣∣∣Gt)
= X(t, T )− CV At (3.14)
Thus,
CV At := X(t, T )−Xd(t, T )
with
CV At := E(1{t<τC≤T}βτCED(τC) | Gt) (3.15)
Note that the claim Note that X(t, T ) refers to the valuation of the claims as of equation (3.1).
However the valuation of the claim in the current case is under the filtration G while in (3.1) it
is under the filtration F. We will address this issue notably with (H)-hypothesis stated in proposi-
tion 4.1.5, page 58. We keep the notation X(t, T ) at the moment to highlight the non identity of
the formulae.
Proof. Using results form the previous proof and
CV At = E(1{t<τC≤T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+ | Gt)
= E(1{t<τC≤T}βτC (1−RC)X(τC)+ | Gt)
= E(1{t<τC≤T}βτC (X(τC)
+ −RCX(τC)+) | Gt)
= E(1{t<τC≤T}βτC (X(τC) +X(τC)
− −RCX(τC)+) | Gt)
= E(1{t<τC≤T}βτCX(τC)− 1{t<τC≤T}βτC (RCX(τC)+ −X(τC)−) | Gt)
= E(1{t<τC≤T}βτCED(τC) | Gt)
Non defaultable claim - bilateral case
Similarly in the bilateral case, we introduce the disjoints following events and excluding simulta-
neous defaults where Q(1τC=τI ) = 0
I1 = {τI < τC < T}, I2 = {τI < T ≤ τC}, I3 = {τC < τI < T} (3.16)
I4 = {τC < T ≤ τI}, I5 = {T ≤ τI < τC}, I6 = {T ≤ τC < τI} (3.17)
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with
II = I1 ∪ I2, IC = I3 ∪ I4, IO = I5 ∪ I6 (3.18)
and
τ = min{τI , τC} (3.19)
We define the non defaultable claim under bilateral counterpart credit risk adjusted for the
default of investor I as
βtX(t, T )
d =
∫ T∧τC∧τI
t
βudXu + 1ICβτC (RCX(τC)
+ −X(τC)−) + 1IIβτI (X(τI)+ −RIX(τI)−)
The proof is in [Brig06] and we can express the non defaultable claim X defined in equation
(3.1) under bilateral counterparty credit risk as
Proposition 3.1.2 (Bilateral CVA for non-defaultble claim). Consider an FT -measurable non-
defaultable claim X defined in (3.1) under bilateral counterpart credit risk as
X(t, T )d = Et(βtX(t, T )d) = E
(∫ T
t
βudXu
∣∣∣∣Gt)
− E (1IC (βτCLGDCX(τC)+) | Gt)
+ E
(
1II (βτILGDIX(τI)
−) | Gt
)
= X(t, T )−BCV At (3.20)
with
BCV At := CV At −DV At = X(t, T )−Xd(t, T )
:= E
(
1IC (βτCLGDCX(τC)
+) | Gt
)− E (1II (βτILGDIX(τI)−) | Gt)
:= E
(
1{t<τ≤T}βτ [ED(τ)] | Gt
)
(3.21)
and
CV At := E
(
1IC (βτCLGDCX(τC)
+) | Gt
)
(3.22)
and
DV At := E
(
1II (βτILGDIX(τI)
−) | Gt
)
(3.23)
So clearly, as mentioned earlier, the valuation of the counterparty impact in equation (3.22)
and of the investor impact in equation (3.23), require the joint knowledge of the future distribution
of the claim X and the ordered events detailed in equations (3.16).
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Defaultable claim - unilateral case
As defined previously in equation (3.2), consider a defaultable claim Π(t, T ) = (X,A, X˜, Z, τR, T )
where τR defines the default time of the claim reference entity R = Ref (Those reference could be
multiple but at the moment we consider a unique reference). The filtration is enlarged such that,
Gt = Ft ∨Ht (3.24)
with
Ht = HCt ∨HRt (3.25)
As previously, the claim under no counterpart risk is given by theorem 3.1.2 and equation (3.3)
Sn+1t = BtEQ
[∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR1{t<τR≤T} + βTX
d
t
∣∣∣∣∣Ft ∨HRt
]
(3.26)
In the filtration Gt, we introduce the disjoints following events of ordered defaults excluding
simultaneous defaults according to assumption 3.1.1 especially with Q(1τC=τR) = 0
I1 = {τR < τC < T}, I2 = {τR < T ≤ τC}, I3 = {τC < τR < T}
I4 = {τC < T ≤ τR}, I5 = {T ≤ τR < τC}, I6 = {T ≤ τC < τR} (3.27)
with the regroupment of events characterising first-to-default events
IR = I1 ∪ I2, IC = I3 ∪ I4, IO = I5 ∪ I6 (3.28)
Using the unilateral equation (3.5), the G-measurable defaultable claim Sn+1,dt under unilateral
counterpart risk is
βtS
n+1,d
t =
∫ T∧τR∧τC
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR1IR + βTX
d
t 1IO + 1ICβτC (RC(S
n+1,d
τC
)+ − (Sn+1,dτC )−) (3.29)
Proof. The proof is identical as in [Brig06] in terms of the flow and arguments but with a slight
difference due to the introduction of the reference early termination of the claim so we just outline
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the process. Thus, as previously, by taking the expectation under Gt
Et(βtSn+1,dt )
= E
(∫ T∧τR∧τC
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR1IR + βTX
d
t 1IO + 1ICβτC (RC(S
n+1,d
τC
)+ − (Sn+1,dτC )−)
∣∣∣∣Gt)
= E
(∫ T∧τR∧τC
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR1IR + βTX
d
t 1IO + 1IC (βτC (S
n+1,d
τC
) + (RC − 1)βτC (Sn+1,dτC )+)
∣∣∣∣Gt)
= E
(∫ T∧τR
t
(1IO + 1IC )βsdAs + βτRZτR1IR + βTX
d
t 1IO + 1IC (βτC (S
n+1,d
τC
) + (RC − 1)βτC (Sn+1,dτC )+)
∣∣∣∣Gt)
= E
(
1IO
∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR1IR + βTX
d
t 1IO
+ 1IC
(∫ τC
t
βsdAs + βτC (S
n+1,d
τC
) + (RC − 1)βτC (Sn+1,dτC )+
) ∣∣∣∣Gt)
= E
(
1IO
∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR1IR + βTX
d
t 1IO
+ 1IC
(∫ τC
t
βsdAs + E
(∫ T∧τR
τC
βsdAs + βτRZτR1I3 + βTX
d
t 1I4 | GτC
)
+ (RC − 1)βτC (Sn+1,dτC )+
) ∣∣∣∣Gt)
= E
(
1IO
∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR1IR + βTX
d
t 1IO
+ 1IC
(∫ τC
t
βsdAs +
∫ T∧τR
τC
βsdAs + βτRZτR1I3 + βTX
d
t 1I4 + (RC − 1)βτC (Sn+1,dτC )+
) ∣∣∣∣Gt)
= E
(
1IO
∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR1IR + βTX
d
t 1IO
+ 1IC
∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR1IC1I3 + βTX
d
t 1IC1I4 + 1IC (RC − 1)βτC (Sn+1,dτC )+ | Gt
)
= E
(
(1IO + 1IC )
∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR(1IR + 1I3) + βTX
d
t (1IO + 1I4) | Gt
)
− E (1ICLGDCβτC (Sn+1,dτC )+ | Gt)
using f = f+ − f− and the law of iterated expectations.
Remark: It is interesting to notice that the valuation of Defaultable claim will require the
identification of scenarios like the event I3 = {τC < τR < T}. This will need to identify an ordered
sequence of defaults in E and realise thus a multivariate simulation of obligors default and not
just the time of first default τ of the counterpart C or the investor I. Those sequence of defaults
will be the basis of financial stress scenario like in the Financial crisis in 2008 where credit default
contagion was at its peak.
We can express the defaultable claim Sn+1,dt defined in (3.3) under unilateral counterparty
credit risk as
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Proposition 3.1.3 (Unilateral CVA for defaultable claim). Consider a G-measurable defaultable
claim Sn+1,dt defined in (3.3) under counterparty credit risk as
Sn+1,dt = Et(βtS
n+1,d
t ) = E
(
(1IO + 1IC )
∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR(1IR + 1I3) + βTX
d
t (1IO + 1I4) | Gt
)
− E (1ICLGDCβτC (Sn+1,dτC )+ | Gt)
= Sn+1t − CV At (3.30)
Thus,
CV At := S
n+1
t − Sn+1,dt
with
CV At := E (1ICLGDCβτCED(τC) | Gt) (3.31)
Defaultable claim - Bilateral case
Since the Bilateral case is identical with longer proof and equations, we just state the results in
this case with an extended set of ordered events. The filtrations are enlarged such that
Gt = Ft ∨Ht (3.32)
with
Ht = HCt ∨HRt ∨HIt (3.33)
For the filtration Gt, we introduce the disjoints following events of ordered defaults without
simultaneous defaults Q(1τi=τj) = 0, ∀i, j ∈ {C, I,R}, i 6= j
I1 = {τR < τC < τI < T}, I2 = {τR < τC < T < τI}, I3 = {τR < τI < τC < T},
I4 = {τR < τI < T < τC}, I5 = {τR < T < τI < τC}, I6 = {τR < T < τC < τI}
I7 = {τC < τR < τI < T}, I8 = {τC < τR < T < τI}, I9 = {τC < τI < τR < T},
I10 = {τC < τI < T < τR}, I11 = {τC < T < τI < τR}, I12 = {τC < T < τR < τI}
I13 = {τI < τR < τC < T}, I14 = {τI < τR < T < τC}, I15 = {τI < τC < τR < T},
I16 = {τI < τC < T < τR}, I17 = {τI < T < τC < τR}, I18 = {τI < T < τR < τC}
I19 = {T ≤ τR < τC < τI}, I20 = {T ≤ τR < τI < τC}, I21 = {T ≤ τI < τC < τR},
I22 = {T ≤ τI < τR < τC}, I23 = {T ≤ τC < τI < τR}, I24 = {T ≤ τC < τR < τI} (3.34)
with the regroupment of events characterising first-to-default events
IR = I1 ∪ I2 ∪ I3 ∪ I4 ∪ I5 ∪ I6, IC = I7 ∪ I8 ∪ I9 ∪ I10 ∪ I11 ∪ I12
II = I13 ∪ I14 ∪ I15 ∪ I16 ∪ I17 ∪ I18, IO = I19 ∪ I20 ∪ I21 ∪ I22 ∪ I23 ∪ I24 (3.35)
We can express the defaultable claim Sn+1,dt defined in (3.3) under bilateral counterparty credit
risk as
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Proposition 3.1.4 (Bilateral CVA for defaultable claim). Consider a Gt-measurable defaultable
claim Sn+1,dt defined in (3.3) under bilateral counterparty credit risk as
Sn+1,dt = Et(βtS
n+1,d
t ) = E
(
(1IO + 1IC + 1II )
∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs + βτRZτR(1IR
+ 1I7 + 1I8 + 1I13 + 1I14) + βTX
d
t (1IO + 1I11 + 1I12 + 1I17 + 1I18)
∣∣∣∣Gt)
+ E
(
1ICβτC (RC − 1)(Sn+1,dτC )+ | Gt
)
+ E
(
1IIβτI (1−RI)(Sn+1,dτI )− | Gt
)
= Sn+1t −BCV At (3.36)
Thus,
BCV At := CV At −DV At := Sn+1t − Sn+1,dt
:= E
(
1ICβτC (RC − 1)(Sn+1,dτC )+ | Gt
)− E (1IIβτI (1−RI)(Sn+1,dτI )− | Gt)
:= E
(
1{t<τ≤T}βτED(τ) | Gt
)
(3.37)
and
CV At := E
(
1ICβτC (RC − 1)(Sn+1,dτC )+ | Gt
)
(3.38)
and
DV At := E
(
1IIβτI (1−RI)(Sn+1,dτI )− | Gt
)
(3.39)
The propositions 3.1.1, 3.1.2, 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 are central in calculating the Credit Valuation
Adjustment in the case of credit contagion between a set of obligors Ref,C, I (Note that Ref or R
are used interchangeably but with R identifying a reference obligor while Ref identifies references
that could also be multiple).
In terms of numerical analysis, the book [Brig10a] contains several papers where the impact of
credit dependence between the credit risk obligors and the state variables (notably interest rates).
A special attention is also put on so-called “wrong-way risk”, in [Brig08a]. However, most of those
contagion aspect are presented in a direct way with the drivers of credit risk of the parties in the
claim and/or the state variables of the claim. We aim to value contingent claims in a context
where the credit risk is impacted by other obligors in a more natural way with for example obligor
non related to the claim that default and still impact the counterparts of such claim. We will need
to express the Credit Valuation Adjustment in a multi-variate credit risk context.
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Chapter 4
Counterparty credit risk in multivariate
setting
4.1 Multivariate setting
Consider now the previous set of obligors E = {1, . . . ,m} and define the ordering of defaults such
as
τ(1) < τ(2) < . . . < τ(m)
with τ(i): the non-negative random variable of the i
th default. The set of n permutations of the
ordering of defaults is defined as Π which identifies the obligors within the ordering for a finite
number of obligor E with the finite cardinalities | Π |= n ∈ N and ∀pi ∈ Π , | pi |= m.
Definition 4.1.1. Let us define the set of event triggers in the case of a counterparty valuation as
the set containing the obligors among E such as the counterpart C, the investor I and the claim
reference Ref . In the case of non defaultable claims like equity, currencies or commodities claims,
the set Ref = ∅, while in the case of single-name credit default swap it is a single obligor and for
the index credit claims it is 125 names.
Thus, be T the set of event triggers, called the “trigger set”
T = {C, I,Ref} (4.1)
where the “trigger event”is the random variable
τ = min
i∈T
τi (4.2)
and all the permutations pi ∈ Π can be decomposed as∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)} (4.3)
with the sub-sets τ(pi−) being the ordering of all the obligors defaulting before the trigger τ =
τ(j), j ∈ T and τ(pi+) the sub-sets of all the obligors defaulting after the default time of the trigger
obligor.
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We have the properties
τ(pi−) ∩ τ(pi+) = ∅, τ(pi−) ∪ j ∪ τ(pi+) = E.
• In the non-defaultable case,
| τ(pi−) |= {0, . . . ,m− 2}, | T |= 2 and | τ(pi+) |= {1, . . . ,m− 1}
• In the defaultable case,
| τ(pi−) |= {0, . . . ,m− 3}, | T |= 3 and | τ(pi+) |= {2, . . . ,m− 1}
Remark: We consider in the reminder of the document for notational purposes that the car-
dinality of the trigger to be one and thus the remaining obligors in the trigger set T to be part of
the ordering partition τ(pi+) since the trigger event is hit by the first of the obligor in the set T to
default. This also includes multi-name reference sets Ref like kth-to-default swaps since the trigger
entity is always a unique obligor. However, index derivatives are claims that are characterised by
the fact that they are not ended when a default event occurred and thus might not fit the case of
a cardinality of one for the trigger event τ .
We extend the definition per trigger event again, assuming no simultaneous defaults in E as
per assumption 3.1.1, with
• the set of permutation Π C where the trigger is the counterpart C
Π C = Π ∩ {pi ∈ Π , τ = τC} (4.4)
(4.5)
• the set of permutation Π I where the trigger is the investor I
Π I = Π ∩ {pi ∈ Π , τ = τI} (4.6)
(4.7)
• the set of permutation ΠRef where the trigger is the obligor reference Ref ∈ E/{I, C} of
the valued claim under consideration
ΠRef = Π ∩ {pi ∈ Π , τ = τR} (4.8)
the decomposition property
Π = ΠRef ∪ Π I ∪ Π C , (4.9)
or
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)} =
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)} +
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)} +
∑
pi∈ΠRef
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}
and pairwise independence
ΠRef ∩ Π I = ∅, ΠRef ∩ Π C = ∅, Π C ∩ Π I = ∅,
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Decomposition of a measurable process per default time events: In order to value claims
represented by F -measurable random variableH along the time interval (t, T ], we have to make sure
that these claims are measurable across the filtration G stopped at each stopping time τpi(i),∀i ∈ pi
with pi ∈ Π. From the viewpoint of the filtration (Ft)t≥0, the valuation is similar to a case of
progressive enlargement with τ a finite random times and define the extended filtration as
F τt =
⋂
>0
{Ft+ ∨ σ(τ ∧ (t+ ))}
In multivariate case, we quote the following proposition:
Proposition 4.1.1 (Separability of measurable functions according to a sequence of stopping
times). Consider a G-predictable process H and ∀pi ∈ Π, τpi(i) permutations with i ∈ {1, . . . ,m} an
increasing sequence of honest times, ∃m+ 1 F-predictable process hi such that
Ht = E(H | Gt) = h1t1{t<τpi(1)} +
m∑
i=2
hit1{τpi(i−1)≤t<τpi(i)} + h
m+1
t 1{t≥τpi(m)}
with the process hi being ratios of F-predictable projection as
h1t =
E(Ht1{t<τpi(1)} | Ft)
P(t < τpi(1) | Ft) , h
i
t =
E(Ht1{τpi(i−1)≤t<τpi(i)} | Ft)
P(τpi(i−1) ≤ t < τpi(i) | Ft) , h
m+1
t =
E(Ht1{t≥τpi(m)} | Ft)
P(t ≥ τpi(m) | Ft)
Proof. First quote the definition of an honest time: A random time is honest if it is the end of a
predictable set i.e. τ(ω) = sup{t : (t, ω) ∈ Ω} where Ω is a F-predictable set. The honest time is
F∞-measurable.
The proof is an aggregation of the results from [Dellacherie92] about the decomposition across
honest times and [Jeulin80] about infinite sequence of honest times. From [Dellacherie92]
• Given L an honest variable, i.e the end of a predictable set, and since any stopping time is
honest [Protter90]. The sets of the form
C = (A ∩ {t < L}) ∪ (C = (B ∩ {L ≤ t}), A,B ∈ Ft
are a tribe on Gt and the family (Gt) is a filtration satisfying the usual conditions with L
being a stopping time.
• A process H is G-predictable if and only if it admits a representation such as
H = J1]0,L] +K1]L,∞[
where the processes J and K are F-predictable.
Additionally, in [Dellacherie92] p186, the process H is further decomposed as
Ht = E(H | Gt) = E(H1{t<L} | Ft)P(t < L | Ft) 1{t<L} +
E(H1{t≥L} | Ft)
P(t ≥ L) | Ft) 1{t≥L}
To expand to the multivariate case with a finite number of stopping times, [Jeulin80] page 88,
establishes infinite successive enlargement with Corollary 5.22 that states that given (Ln)n∈N an
increasing sequence of F-honest variables such that L0 = 0 and supn Ln = +∞, then F (Ln) is the
right continuous smallest filtration where F ⊂ F (Ln) and (Ln) are stopping times.
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Additionally, in our multivariate setting of order defaults, we can define successive filtrations:
Fτ(1) ( Fτ(2) ( . . . ( Fτ(m) ( F∞
With the separability of random variables, we can now value claims along the default permu-
tations pi ∈ Π and look for the impact of the Credit Valuation Adjustment.
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4.1.1 Counterparty Valuation Adjustement
Non defaultable claim - Multivariate Bilateral case
In the multivariate setting, with the condition of proposition 4.1.1 valid, enabling the existence of
a measurable process along any permutation pi, we define a non defaultable claim as
βtX(t, T )
d =
∫ T∧τC∧τI
t
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}βudXu
+
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1{τC<T}βτC (RCX(τC)
+ −X(τC)−)
+
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1{τI<T}βτI (X(τI)
+ −RIX(τI)−) (4.10)
Thus, from the viewpoint of the company facing counterparty risk, i.e. the investor I, the value
can be decomposed as:
• the first term is the risk-neutral valuation of the payoff under the scenario of no early default
or the payments received before default occurs, default being either the counterpart C or the
investor I. This equivalent to all set of permutations Π.
• the second term is the residual net present value of the expected exposure in case of pi ∈ ΠC ,
and,
• the third term is the residual net present value of the expected exposure in case of pi ∈ ΠI .
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Proof. Thus, by taking the expectation under Gt, using the same technique as in [Brig06] with the
separability of the FT -measurable process X along the stopping times τi, i ∈ E of any permutation
pi ∈ Π, we have
Et(βtX(t, T )d)
= E
(∫ T∧τC∧τI
t
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}(1{τ<T} + 1{τ≥T})βudXu
+
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1{τC<T}βτC (RCX(τC)
+ −X(τC)−)
+
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1{τI<T}βτI (X(τI)
+ −RIX(τI)−)
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
= E
(∫ T
t
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}1{τ≥T}βudXu
+ 1{τC<T}
(∫ τC
t
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}βudXu +
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}βτC (RCX(τC)
+ −X(τC)−)
)
+ 1{τI<T}
(∫ τI
t
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}βudXu +
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}βτI (X(τI)
+ −RIX(τI)−)
)∣∣∣∣Gt
)
= E
(∫ T
t
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}1{τ≥T}βudXu
+ 1{τC<T}
(∫ τC
t
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}βudXu +
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}βτC (RC − 1)X(τC)+
+
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}E
(∫ T
τC
βudXu | GτC
))
+ 1{τI<T}
(∫ τI
t
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}βudXu +
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}βτI (1−RI)X(τI)−
+
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}E
(∫ T
τI
βudXu | GτI
)) ∣∣∣∣Gt
)
= E
(∫ T
t
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}βudXu
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
− E
(∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1{τC<T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
+ E
(∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1{τI<T}βτILGDIX(τI)
−
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
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using f = f+ − f−, the law of iterated expectations and proposition 4.1.1.
Thus we can restate the non-defaultable claim X defined in 3.1 under bilateral counterparty
credit risk as
Proposition 4.1.2 (Bilateral CVA for non-defaultble claim in multivariate setting). Consider an
FT -measurable non-defaultable claim X defined in (3.1) under bilateral counterpart credit risk as
Et(βtX(t, T )d) = E
(∫ T
t
βudXu
∣∣∣∣Gt)
− E
(∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1{τC<T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
+ E
(∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1{τI<T}βτILGDIX(τI)
−
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
= X(t, T )−BCV At (4.11)
with
BCV At := CV At −DV At = X(t, T )−Xd(t, T )
:= E
(∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1{τC<T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
− E
(∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1{τI<T}βτILGDIX(τI)
−
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
:= E
(
1{t<τ≤T}
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}βτ [ED(τ)] | Gt
)
(4.12)
We similarly now process the case of the defaultable claim.
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Defaultable claim - Multivariate Bilateral case
Similarly from equation (3.3) and in the multivariate setting, a defaultable claim is defined as
βtS
n+1,d
t =
∫ T∧τR∧τC∧τI
t
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}βsdAs
+
∑
pi∈ΠR
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τR<TβτRZτR
+
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τ≥TβTX
d
t
+
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τC<TβτC (RCX
+
τI
−X−τC )
+
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τI<TβτI (X
+
τI
−RIX−τI ) (4.13)
Thus, from the viewpoint of the company facing counterparty risk, i.e. the investor I, the value
can be decomposed as:
• the first term is the risk-neutral valuation of the acrued payments under the scenario of
no early default or the payments received before default occurs, default being either the
counterpart C, the investor I or the reference Ref . This equivalent to all set of permutations
Π.
• the second term is the residual net present value of the recovered payment in case of pi ∈ ΠRef ,
and,
• the third term is the residual net present value of the payment at maturity in case of no
early defaults, and,
• the fourth term is the residual net present value of the expected exposure in case of pi ∈ ΠC ,
and,
• the fifth term is the residual net present value of the expected exposure in case of pi ∈ ΠI .
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Proof. Thus, by taking the expectation under Gt again with the separability of the FT -measurable
processes that compose the defaultable claim Π = (A,Z,X, τ, T ) we have,∫ T∧τR∧τC∧τI
t
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}βsdAs
=
∫ T
t
(∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1τC≥T +
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1τI≥T +
∑
pi∈ΠR
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τR≥T
)
βsdAs
+
∫ τI
t
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1τI<TβsdAs
+
∫ τR
t
∑
pi∈ΠR
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τR<TβsdAs
+
∫ τC
t
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1τC<TβsdAs
We can extract from the integral all the permutations and identifiant functions that do not influence
the integration result∫ T∧τR∧τC∧τI
t
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}βsdAs
=
∫ T
t
(∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1τC≥T +
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1τI≥T +
∑
pi∈ΠR
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τR≥T
)
βsdAs
+
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1τI<T
∫ τI
t
βsdAs
+
∑
pi∈ΠR
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τR<T
∫ τR
t
βsdAs
+
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1τC<T
∫ τC
t
βsdAs
Those partial integral with respect to the interval of the claim [t, T ] will be completed with the
corresponding defaulted event for each trigger identifier. In the case of the counterpart C under
E(· | Gt) ∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1τC<TβτC (RCX
+
τI
−X−τC )
=
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τC<TβτC (RC − 1)X+τI +
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τC<TβτCXτC
We decompose XτC as
E
(∫ T∧τR
τC
βsdAs +
∑
pi∈ΠR
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τR≥TβτRZτR +
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}1τ≥TβTXdt | GτC
)
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and with the law of the iterated expectation, we can aggregate in the E(· | Gt) general term by
dropping the two last terms since Π C ∩ ΠR = ∅ and {Π C ∪ {τC < T}} ∩ {Π C ∪ {τC ≥ T}} = ∅
leaving the term ∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1τC<T
∫ T∧τR
τC
βsdAs
to add to reconstruct the counterpart-free default claim.
We repeat the same approach with investor I and Reference R and we can reconstruct the
counterparty-free valuation formula with∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs
=
∫ T
t
(∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1τC≥T +
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1τI≥T +
∑
pi∈ΠR
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τR≥T
)
βsdAs
+
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1τC<T
∫ T∧τR
τC
βsdAs
+
∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1τI<T
∫ T∧τR
τI
βsdAs
+
∑
pi∈ΠR
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τR<T
∫ τR
t
βsdAs
Thus we can express the defaultable claim Sn+1t defined in 3.3 under bilateral counterparty
credit risk as
Proposition 4.1.3 (Bilateral CVA for defaultble claim in multivariate setting). Consider an FT -
measurable defaultable claim Sn+1t defined in (3.3) under bilateral counterpart credit risk as
Et(βtSn+1,dt ) = E
(∫ T∧τR
t
βsdAs
+
∑
pi∈ΠR
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τR<TβτRZτR
+
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τ≥TβTX
d
t
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
− E
(∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1{τC<T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
+ E
(∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1{τI<T}βτILGDIX(τI)
−
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
= Sn+1t −BCV At (4.14)
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with
BCV At := CV At −DV At
:= E
(∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1{τC<T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
− E
(∑
pi∈Π I
1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1{τI<T}βτILGDIX(τI)
−
∣∣∣∣Gt
)
:= E
(
1{t<τ≤T}
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}βτ [ED(τ)] | Gt
)
(4.15)
As pointed in [Jarrow01] and [Brig10a], the defaultable claim is the sum of the value of the
corresponding of the counterpart-free and investor-free claim adjusted by
• a call option with zero strike on Expected Exposure when {τC < T},∀pi ∈ ΠC , i.e if the
counterparty is the earliest to default before maturity.
• a put option with zero strike on Expected Exposure when {τI < T},∀pi ∈ ΠI , i.e. if the
investor is the earliest to default before maturity.
We can make the same remark as mentioned in the numerical part of [Brig10a] where any claim
priced in a model-free fashion will be now model dependent due to the embedded optionality in
counterpart or investor term.
The propositions 4.1.2, and 4.1.3 will be central in expressing the counterparty valuation ad-
justment in the case of credit contagion between a set of obligors. It will be necessary in an
expression like ∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1{τC<T}
to built marginal distribution knowledge of the obligors in T out of the multivariate distributions
represented by the permutations. We need, thus, to make sure that the probability space (Ω,G,Q)
we work-in is embedded with such distributions.
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4.1.2 Additional Hypothesis
In order to realise computation of the claim under successive default scenarios where obligor un-
dergo default contagion, it is necessary to specify some other properties of the probability space.
As stated before, the filtration F does not contain default-related information. The extra
information due to the enlargement modify the predictions of future events implying that F-
martingales might not stay G-martingales. The main assumption from [Bremaud78], ensures that
F-martingales stay G-martingales
Proposition 4.1.4 ((H)-hypothesis). Every square integrable F-martingale is a G-martingale
Alternatively, the filtration F is said to be immersed inG, if any square integrable F-martingale
is a G-martingale and is also equivalent to the following propositions with proof in [Jeanblanc10] p
316 or conditions (G1), (M1) and (M2) under the Martingale Invariance Property in [Bielecki01]
p141 and p 166.
Proposition 4.1.5 ((H)-hypothesis equivalence). The (H)-hypothesis is equivalent to any of the
following properties.
• (H1) ∀t ≥ 0, the σ-fields F∞ and Gt are conditionally independent of Ft
• (H2) ∀t ≥ 0, ∀Gt ∈ L1(Gt) E(Gt | F∞) = E(Gt | Ft)
• (H3) ∀t ≥ 0, ∀F ∈ L1(F∞) E(F | Gt) = E(F | Ft)
The (H)-hypothesis implies that in the case of the non-defaultable claim the expectation under
Gt is the same as the exprectation under Ft. This implies in reality that the valuation of ex-credit
desks are still valid to be integrated into a CVA desks where the default simulations are done.
Although, this requires that the time-grid discretised simulations are consistent across desks as
covered in [Cesari09].
With the martingale property is conserved in the enlarged filtration, it is also necessary to verify
that the (H)-hypothesis holds for a change of probability measure. Since some exposure metrics
are computed under the risk-neutral measure Q like CV A and the real world measure P under
regulatory requirements, it would be of interest to have conservation of the immersion property
under such change. The following proposition in [Jeanblanc10] demonstrates the conservation
Proposition 4.1.6 (Immersion property and change of probability measure). Assume that the
filtration F is immersed in filtration G under the probability measure P and define Q |Gt= LtP |Gt
where the Radon-Nikodym density L is assumed to be F-adapted. Then F is immersed in G under
the probability measure Q
Proof. Let Nt be a (F,Q)-martingale, then (NtL−1t ) is a (F,P)-martingale and since F is immersed
in G under P, (NtL−1t ) is a (G,P) martingale which implies that Nt is a (G,Q)-martingale.
We have earlier mentioned that the fact of traded defaultable securities completed the market
by ensuring the uniqueness of the attained price in (G,Q). However, in the case of non-defaultable
claims the completeness of MarketM has been established under (F,Q) and should be conserved
with the (H)-hypothesis under (G,Q).
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Proposition 4.1.7 ((H)-hypothesis and Arbitrage). Assume that there exist a probability Qˆ equiv-
alent to P on GT = FS ∨ HT such that (Stβt, 0 ≤ t ≤ T ) is a G-martingale under probability Qˆ.
Then (H) hold under Qˆ and the restriction Qˆ to FST is equal Q.
Proof. Let the random variable X ∈ L2(Q,FT ) define a contingent claim with Xˆ = βTX its
discounted value. Since the same claim exists in the larger market, which is assumed to be
arbitrage-free, the discounted value of that claim is a (G, Qˆ)-martingale. From the uniqueness of
the price for a hedgeable claim, for any contingent claim X ∈ FST and any G-equivalent martingale
measure Qˆ
EQ(XβT | FST ) = EQˆ(XβT | Gt)
which yields that Qˆ = Q on FT .
Morever since every square integrable (FS,Q) can be written as
EQˆ[βTX | Ft] = EQˆ[βTX | Gt]
which is equivalent to (H). Thus in this setting (H) holds under Qˆ and the restriction of Qˆ to FST
is Q.
With this set of properties, we can now turn to value credit risk modelling in a multivariate
setting. After reviewing the different univariate and multivariate credit models, we will focus on
multivariate models that can integrate credit risk contagion and at the same time provide marginal
distributions notably for obligors in the event trigger set T .
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Chapter 5
Credit risk modelling
5.1 Review of Credit risk models
Credit modelling is categorised in two families: structured-form and reduced-form.
• Structural papers are based on the work of [Merton74], in which a firm life is linked to its
ability to pay back its debt. The model states that a firm issues a bond to finance its ac-
tivities and also that this bond has a maturity T . At final time T , if the firm is not able to
reimburse all the bondholders there has been a default event. In this context, default may
occur only at final time T and is triggered by the value of the firm being below the debt level.
Formally, suppose there is a debt maturity T , face value L and the company defaults at final
maturity (and only then) if the value of the firm VT is below the debt L to be paid. The
debt value at time t < T is
Dt = Et[D(t, T ) min(VT , L)]
= Et[D(t, T )[VT − (VT − L)+]]
= P (t, T )L− Put(t, T ;Vt, L)
with D(t, T ) = B(t)/B(T ) where B(t) = exp(− ∫ t
0
rudu) denotes the bank account nume´raire
and r the instantaneous short interest rate. The equity value can be derived as the difference
between the value of the firm and the debt:
St = Vt −Dt = Vt − P (t, T )L+ Put(t, T ;Vt, L)
= Call(t, T ;Vt, L)
So the equity can be interpreted as a call option on the value of the firm and debt investor
write a put on the assets.
An immediate limitation of the Merton model is the fact that the driver of the value is the
firm value process Vt which is not observable and also that default can only happen at ma-
turity.
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[Black76] introduces a more realistic and sophisticated model called the first-passage time
models. In the Black and Cox model, default can also happen before the maturity with safety
covenants in place force the firm to reimburse as soon as its asset value Vt hits a low enough
“safety level”Hˆ(t). The choice of that safety level is not easy as it could be the present value
of the final debt value P (t, T )L or incorporate also some slack to the counterparty such as
“grace period”. If τ defines the first time where the process hits the barrier from above, the
price of this down-and-out digital option/bond is given by:
DOB(0, T ) = E{D(0, T )1 {τ>T}}
and with the assumption of deterministic rates:
DOB(0, T ) = P (0, T )E{1 {τ>T}} = P (0, T )Q{τ > T}
with Q{τ > T} being the risk-neutral probability of never touching the barrier before T or
survival probability. [Bielecki01] gives an the explicit formula for barrier option with asset
process following a geometric Brownian Motion:
Q{τ > T} =
[
Φ(d1)−
(
V0
Hˆ
)1−2(r−q)/σ2
Φ(d2)
]
(5.1)
with d1,2 =
(
± log V0
Hˆ
+ (r − q − σ2
2
)
)
/(σ
√
T ), V0 the asset value at time 0, q the continuous
dividend yield, r the instantaneous interest rate, σ the volatility of the asset value process
Vt and Φ the cumulative normal distribution.
In [Bielecki01] similar formulas can also be obtained for a barrier that is not necessarily
constant in time but with a particular exponential shape. When relaxing the assumption of
constant parameters in the V dynamics, the situation becomes much more complicated and
it is not possible to find closed-form formulas even if [Brig04] shows that survival distribu-
tion closed-form formulas are achievable in the case of time dependent parameters with a
particular curved shape .
In first-passage time models, the default time is thus the first instant where the firm value
hits from above either deterministic (possibly time varying ) or stochastic barrier. This firm
value follows a random process that is similar to the one used to describe generic stock in
equity markets. In this case, the filtrations are Ft = Gt and the default of the firm can be
seen as a predictable process. However standard barriers have few parameters and cannot
be calibrated exactly to structured data such as CDS quotes. Interestingly however [Brig04]
introduces time-varying exponentially-shaped barriers with calibration identical to reduced-
form models.
• Reduced-form models (also called intensity models when a suitable context is present) de-
scribe default through an exogenous jump process: more precisely, the default time τ is
the first jump time of a Poisson process with deterministic or stochastic (Cox processes)
intensity. Thus, default is not triggered by basic market observables, Ft adapted processes,
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but by an exogenous component independent of all the default free market information, Ht-
adapted process. Monitoring the default free market does not give complete information on
the default process and there is no economic rationale behind the default by opposition to
the structural models.
Using the description in [Bremaud81] and [Daley02], the classical intensity model is designed
as a non-explosive univariate point process (Tn)
∞
n=0 on the positive real line [0,∞[ describing
a strictly increasing sequence of positive random variables such that.
T0 = 0 a.s
lim
n→∞
Tn =∞
with the corresponding counting process Nt related to the point process Tn identified as
Nt =
∞∑
n=1
1{Tn≤t}
In [Bielecki01] and Theorem 4 p25 in [Bremaud81], The Wanatabe’s Characterisation
provides the definition of the intensity process associated with the counting process as:
Definition 5.1.1 (Intensity Definition). Let Nt be a point process adapted to the filtration
(Ft)t≥0 and let λt be a non-negative Ft-progressive process such that for all t ≥ 0∫ s
0
λsds <∞ Q− a.s
Then if for all non-negative Ft-predictable process Ct
E
[∫ ∞
0
CsdNs
]
= E
[∫ ∞
0
Csλsds
]
we say that Nt admits the (Q,Ft) intensity λt, or for short Nt admits the Ft-intensity λt
In [Bremaud81], the intensity λs of point processes is introduced as a Ft-progressive and
Ft-predictable process as
Theorem 5.1.1. Let Nt admits the Ft-intensity λt which satisfies∫ s
0
λsds <∞ Q− a.s
Then the process Mt given by
Mt = Nt −
∫ t
0
λsds
is a Ft-martingale.
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where the process At =
∫ t
0
λ˜sds is called the compensator of Nt.
In [Bremaud81] and [Bielecki01], the link between the intensity λs and the survival probability
Q[τ > t] is presented in property as
Proposition 5.1.1. Let τ be a positive random variable linked to the first jump T1 and
(Ht)t≥0 a default filtration to information until time t. Define Nt as
Nt = 1{τ≤t}
and let Nt admit the Ht intensity λt where λt is ca`dla`g. Then
−
(
∂
∂T
Q[τ > T |Ht]
)
|T=t = λt
where ∂
+
∂T
denotes differentiation from the right.
Thus, with λt a non-negative Ht-adapted process, τ is defined as
τ = inf
{
t :
∫ t
0
λsds ≥ e
}
where e= exp(1), and thus the survival distribution is defined as:
Q[τ > t] = E
[
exp
(
−
∫ t
0
λsds
)]
Thus, the distribution of Nt or equivalently, the distribution of τ is completely determined
by the intensity λt for point processes.
5.1.1 Valuation in a reduced-form context
In order to value non-defaultable contingent claim (3.1) and defaultable contingent claim (3.3),
reduced-form models of the jump process Ht are either incorporated via the Hazard process or via
the martingale characterisation of the intensity λt in counterpart adjusted formulas (3.13), (3.20),
(3.30) and (3.36) or in multivariate equations (4.11) and (4.14).
Valuation via the Hazard process
The hazard process of the default time given the flow of information represented by the filtration
F is defined as
Definition 5.1.2. The F-hazard process of τ under Q denoted by Γ is defined through the formula
1− Ft = e−Γt or Γt := − lnGt = − ln(1− Ft), ∀t ∈ R+
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with default process Ft = Q{τ ≤ t | Ft} and the survival process Gt = 1−Ft = Q{τ > t | Ft} of
the random time τ with respect to the reference filtration F. Since {τ ≤ t} ⊆ {τ ≤ s}, ∀0 ≤ t ≤ s
and
EQ(Fs | Ft) = EQ(Q{τ ≤ s | Fs} | Ft)
= Q{τ ≤ s | Ft} ≥ Q{τ ≤ t | Fs} = Ft
the process F (the survival process G, resp.) follows a bounded, non-negative F-submartingale
(F-supermartingale, resp.) under Q.
Multivariate context: In the multivariate setting, the occurrence of default time τi isHi = (H it)t>0
and generated by the default indicator process with H it = 1{τi≤t}.
We also define the occurrence in the case of permutation of the ordered default time as ∀pi ∈
Π, τ(i) = τpi(i) with the filtration
H(i) = (H(i)t )t>0
with H
(i)
t = 1{τ(i)≤t}.
The processes H i, H(i) are G-adapted but not F-adapted (τi and τ(i) are G stopping times but
not F stopping times).
Define the associated F-survival processes
Git := Q(τi > t | Ft) = EQ[1{τi>t} | Ft]
G
(i)
t := Q(τ(i) > t | Ft) = EQ[1{τ(i)>t} | Ft]
and F-default processes
F it := 1−Git = Q(τi ≤ t | Ft)
F
(i)
t := 1−G(i)t = Q(τ(i) ≤ t | Ft)
The processes Gi, G(i) are non-negative F-super martingale. (F i, F (i) submartingles)
Proof. ∀s < t
EQ[G(i)t | Fs] = EQ[1{τ(i)>t} | Fs] ≤ EQ[1{τ(i)>s} | Fs] = G(i)s
With identical proof for Gi.
We assume that ∀t ∈ R+, F it < 1 and F (i)t < 1 and are continuous decreasing process thus
enabling the existence of F-progressively measurable processes F it =
∫ t
0
f isds, marginal distribution
of obligor i and F
(i)
t =
∫ t
0
f
(i)
s ds marginal distribution of the ith obligor to default in set E
Similarly, the definition of the F-hazard process of τi, τ(i) under Q denoted Γi,Γ(i) is given by
Git := e
−Γit or Γit = − lnGit
G
(i)
t := e
−Γ(i)t or Γ(i)t = − lnG(i)t
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Introducing permutations: Considering the permutation pi ∈ Π with the associated event
indicator function of ordered defaults 1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}, we define the multivariate F-survival process
and F-default process
Gt := Q(τ1 > t, . . . , τm > t | Ft) = EQ[1{τ1>t,...,τm>t} | Ft] (5.2)
Ft := Q(τ1 ≤ t, . . . , τm ≤ t | Ft) = EQ[1{τ1≤t,...,τm≤t} | Ft]
However, we assumed that the set of obligor E can be ordered according to their default times,
under no-simultaneous default assumption, into a set of permutations with the corresponding
processes per permutation pi or for all permutations Π
Gpit := Q(t < τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+) | Ft) = EQ[1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)} | Ft] (5.3)
GΠt := Q(
∑
pi∈Π
t < τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+) | Ft) = EQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)} | Ft] (5.4)
and their corresponding F-default processes F pit and FΠt . In this case we have the equality
GΠt = Gt
and due to the separability of the events of each permutations pi
GΠt =
∑
pi∈Π
Gpit (5.5)
We now need to express the density of the default time τ associated with the trigger event in
the context of the permutations pi. Similarly, we define the F-survival processes
Gpi,τt := Q({τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+)} ∩ {t < τ} | Ft) = EQ[1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}}∩{t<τ} | Ft]
Gτt := Q(
∑
pi∈Π
{τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+)} ∩ {t < τ} | Ft) = EQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}}∩{t<τ} | Ft]
with the associated F-default processes F pi,τt , F τt and again due to the separability of the events
of each permutations pi, we have the relation:
Gτt =
∑
pi∈Π
Gpi,τt (5.6)
Although the processes Gpi,τt and G
τ
t seem to be multivariate processes, they are univariate
processes. We use the default time τ of the trigger in the notation Gpi,τt , G
τ
t as the default event
of the trigger that is modelled and thus, is univariate although the defaults τpi(−) will be reflected
in the default event τ through credit dependence. Its associated density need to express the sur-
vival probability of τ associated with the trigger event. This will in the following sections being
expressed in closed-form through a Markov chain called a multivariate phase-type distribution.
Since, in reduced-form models of credit risk, the hazard process Γ• is postulated to have ab-
solutely continuous sample paths with respect to the Lebesgue measure, it admits the following
integral representation
Γ•t :=
∫ t
0
γ•udu, ∀t ∈ R+
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for some non negative F-progressivey measurable stochastic process γ• with integrable sample
paths. In terms of notation in the literature, the process γ• is called the F-hazard rate or F-
intensity of τ• or stochastic intensity. It is called intensity function of τ• when the intensity of a
default time is non-random and written γ•(t) implying the trivial filtration as the reference filtra-
tion F so that G = H.
The continuity of processes F it , F
(i)
t , F
pi,τ
t , F
τ
t introduces the corresponding hazard rate of τ
(i), τ i, τpi, τ
under Q (as F-intensity of random times) as non-negative F-progressively measurable processes
γi, γ(i), γτ,pi, γτ given by
γis = f
i
s/1− F is
γ(i) = f (i)s /1− F (i)s
γτ,pi = f τ,pis /1− F τ,pis
γτ = f τs /1− F τs
Moreover, the hazard process is continuous if and only if the submartingale F • follows a con-
tinuous processes. For simplicity, we will always consider the Hazard process as continuous.
Under the (H) hypothesis in proposition 4.1.4
∀t,P(τ ≤ t | F∞) = P(τ ≤ t | Ft) := F •t
and F • is increasing and supposed continuous, then the predictable increasing process of the
Doob-Meyer decomposition of G• = 1− F • is equal to F and
M•t = Ht −
∫ t∧τ
0
dF •s
G•s
is a G-martingale
Other useful martingales as in [Bielecki01] are
Lit = (1−Ht)eΓ
i
t is a G−martingale
L
(i)
t = (1−Ht)eΓ
(i)
t is a G−martingale
and the following proposition to value survival claims:
Proposition 5.1.2. Suppose X F-martingale and XL• is Q-martingale then XL• is a G-martingale
EQ[XtL•t | Gs] = XsL•s
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Back to our multivariate setting, in order to express credit dependence among obligors, we
need to link the definitions of processes F • with credit risk contagion. In the multivariate setting,
∀pi ∈ Π the first default τpi(1) will potentially have a contagion effect on the default time of the
trigger event τ = τC ∧ τI ∧ τRef . This will also imply that the valuation of contingent claims Xt
will have to start from the conditional of the event 1{τpi(1)>t} typically
EQ[1{τpi(1)>t}Xt | Gt]
In conclusion, we will need to find ways to express F i as a function of F (i) or link multivariate
distribution with marginal distributions. Alternatively this dependence can also be expressed as a
functional of martingales M•.
Valuation via the Martingale Approach
From the Wanatabe Characterisation, in [Bremaud81], the default process H•t = 1{τ•≤t} admits
the F-martingale intensity process λ• under the spot martingale measure Q. With Martingale
Characterisation of Intensity theorem page 29 in [Bremaud81], the F-martingale intensity λ• of τ•
is an F-progressively measurable process such that the compensated process M• is given by
M•t := H
•
t −
∫ t∧τ•
0
λ•udu = H
•
t −
∫ t
0
λ¯•udu, ∀t ∈ R+
follows a G-martingale under Q with λ¯•t := 1{τ•≥t}λ•t .
The counterparty equations (4.11) and (4.14) of the price process can be adjusted w.r.t the
Jump processes with the integration with respect to the associated intensity measure λ¯•tdt of the
different obligors. We will however focus on the Hazard process approach since to is more difficult
to construct correlation of martingales rather than correlate Hazard processes.
5.1.2 Conditional Expectations under multivariate case
Having now introduced how the probabilities associated with identities are represented either
through martingales or hazard process, we return to our multivariate framework to specify, using
the hazard processes defined in the previous section and rewrite the Credit Valuation Adjustment
in propositions 4.1.2 and 4.1.3, page 53-56.
Equations (4.11) and (4.14) require that we express the conditional expectations based on the
default or survival of the trigger event T . From Lemma 5.1.2 in [Bielecki01], page 143,
Lemma 5.1.1. For any G-measurable and Q-integrable random variable X we have
EQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T}X | Gt]
=
∑
pi∈Πτ
1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T}
EQ[1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T}X | Ft]
Q(1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T} | Ft)
(5.7)
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Proof. We can establish the proof for a permutation pi and generalise with the linearity of expec-
tation for disjoints events for all permutations pi ∈ Π.
First, we consider the the indicator function of the event 1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)} and the associated
event set C = {t < τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+)} related to the observation of all the default events of oblig-
ors in E. From the decomposition property measurable variable, if Yt is Gt-measurable random
variable then there exists yt an Ft-measurable random variable such that
Yt1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)} = yt1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}
This
G∗t = {A ∈ G : ∃B ∈ Ft, A ∩ {t < τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+)} = B ∩ {t < τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+)}} (5.8)
is a σ-algebra and
• for Ht =
∨m
i=1Hit ⊂ G∗t : A = {τi ≤ u,∀i ∈ E} for u ≤ t and B = ∅, and
• For Ft ⊂ G∗t : A = B.
so that Gt ⊂ G∗t . Using the monotone class theorem and if Yt = 1A with A ∈ Gt,∃B ∈ Ft such that
1A∩{τ>t} = 1B∩{τ>t}.
Second, we take the expectation of Y under Gt∫
A
1CY P(C | Ft)dP =
∫
A∩C
Y P(C | Ft)dP =
∫
B∩C
Y P(C | Ft)dP
=
∫
B
1CY P(C | Ft)dP =
∫
B
E(1CY | Ft)P(C | Ft)dP
=
∫
B
E(1CE(1CY | Ft) | Ft)dP =
∫
B∩C
E(1CY | Ft)dP
=
∫
A∩C
E(1CY | Ft)dP =
∫
A
1CE(1CY | Ft)dP
which gives the above formula.
The equation (5.7) with the event {t < τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+)} will be of interest in the Credit Val-
uation Adjustment to express the claim represented by the random variable X under the filtration
Ft weighted by the probability Q(1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T} | Ft). We can consider that from a valu-
ation point of view that at the beginning of the simulation this probability weight is equal to one.
Additionally, the same reasoning can be applied to the event {τ1(pi(−)) < t < τ2(pi(−)) < τ < τpi(+)}
where the pre-trigger permutation τpi(−) is split according to the event t as τ1(pi(−)) < t < τ2(pi(−)).
This, will enable to express the Credit Valuation Adjustment under the filtration Ft and the prob-
ability weight Q(1{τ1(pi(−))<t<τ2(pi(−))<τ<τpi(+)} | Ft) < 1. Note that in this case the defaults in the
permutation τ1(pi(−)) will have impacted though dependence models the default events posterior to
time t.
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Or expressed in the case where the random variable defines a defaultable claim like (3.3),
page 36, using the separability of measurable processes along the permutation of defaults.
EQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T}βτLGDτ
∫ T
t
βuD
d,n+1
u | Gt]
=
∑
pi∈Πτ
1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T}
EQ[
∫ T
t
1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T}βuD
d,n+1
u du | Ft]
P(1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T} | Ft)
The equation (5.7) adjusted for the different permutations and occurring events within a permu-
tation enables to decompose the Credit Valuation Adjustment with a simulation of the discounted
value of the claim in the future under filtration Ft and weighted by the probability of the default
event under consideration.
Moreover, the previous Lemma 5.1.1 can be expressed using the hazard processes for a random
variable X that is FT -measurable as in the case of vulnerable claims. Thus,
Lemma 5.1.2. For any FT -measurable and Q-integrable random variable X we have
EQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>T}X | Gt] = 1{τ>t}
EQ[
∑
pi∈Π 1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>T}X | Ft]
Q(
∑
pi∈Π 1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>t} | Ft)
= 1{τ>t}EQ[Xe−
∫ T
t γ
τ
udu | Ft]
The lemma 5.1.2, typically, will be used in the context of the CVA formula with the random
variable X representing counterparty exposure and an expression of the default of the trigger under
a multivariate framework.
Proof. Since 1{τ>t} ⊂ 1{τ>T}, we have
EQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>T}X | Ft] = EQ[XEQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{t<τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>T} | FT ] | Ft]
= EQ[XGτ (T ) | Ft]
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The Hazard processes introduced for a multivariate context in the previous section 5.1.1,
page 63, can express the probability event of defaults and, thus, we can adjust the expectation
in (4.11) and (4.14).
Lemma 5.1.3. If h is a F-predictable bounded process, then ∀t ≤ s < ∞ where τ represents the
trigger event with f the corresponding marginal density function
EQ[hτ1{s≥τ>t} | Ft] = EQ
[∑
pi∈Π
∫ s
t
huf
τ,pi
u du | Ft
]
=
∑
pi∈Π
EQ
[∫ s
t
huf
τ,pi
u du | Ft
]
Proof. We can prove by approximating h by using a stepwise bounded F-predictable processes.
Consider a permutation of defaults ∀pi ∈ Π such as
t < τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+)
and τ(1) ∈ τpi(−) with time s ≥ τ . We can break the time interval (t, s] according to the time of
successive defaults for the permutation pi. According to proposition 4.1.1 each measurable function
hi on the sub intervals (τpi(i), τpi(i+1)] can be further approximated via a partition.
∀i ∈ pi define a partition ni = {ti−1n = τpi(i) = ti0, . . . , tin = τpi(i+1)} and independent of τpi(i) and
thus
hiu =
n−1∑
j=0
hiti1tij<u≤tij+1 (5.9)
Then
EQ[hτ1{s≥τ>t} | Ft] = EQ
[∑
pi∈Π
n−1∑
i=0
hτ(i)1τ(i)<u≤τ(i+1) | Ft
]
= EQ
[∑
pi∈Π
n−1∑
i=0
hiu1τ(i)<u≤τ(i+1) | Ft
]
= EQ
∑
pi∈Π
n−1∑
i=0
nin−1∑
j=ni0
hju1tj<u≤tj+1 | Ft

= EQ
∑
pi∈Π
n−1∑
i=0
nin−1∑
j=ni0
EQ[hju1tj<u≤tj+1 | Ftj ] | Ft

= EQ
[∑
pi∈Π
n−1∑
i=0
EQ
[∫ τj+1
τi
hufudu | Fτi
]
| Ft
]
= EQ
[∑
pi∈Π
EQ
[∫ s
t
hufudu | Ft
]
| Ft
]
= EQ
[∑
pi∈Π
∫ s
t
hufudu | Ft
]
=
∑
pi∈Π
EQ
[ ∫ s
t
hufudu | Ft
]
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This requires that the impact of prior defaults to τ impact fu, u ∈ R+ instantaneously and that
the density function of any trigger obligor (and by extension any other obligor in E) is defined on
the interval (t, s],∀pi ∈ Π. We use as well the linearity of expectation under the separability of the
permutation of the obligors.
This formula will be of interest in the case of the valuation of non-defaultable claims under
counterpart credit risk with the trigger event being either a counterpart C default or the investor
I default and their corresponding marginal density function.
We define τ as the default time related to the trigger event in our multivariate setting.
[Protter90] in theorem 11, page 159, demonstrate using the Dominated Convergence theorem
that
Theorem 5.1.2. Let X be a square integrable martingale and H be a predictable bounded process.
Then H ·X is a square integrable Martingale.
In the multivariate setting, we state that,
Proposition 5.1.3 (Martingale Representation theorem). The martingale
Mht = EQ[hτ | Gt] = EQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}hτ | Gt]
where h is an F-predictable process such that EQ[| hτ |] <∞ admits the following decomposition
Mht := m
h
0 +
∫ t
0
(1−Hu)eΓudmhu +
∫
(0,t]
(hu −Mhu−)dMu (5.10)
where
mht = EQ[
∫ ∞
0
hufudu | Ft]
Proof. Again, given the trigger event and its associated default event τ = min{τC , τI , τRef}
∀pi ∈ Π,∃τ ∈ pi, hτ is a stopped F -predictable process under the proposition 4.1.1
Mht =
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}hτ1{τ≤t} + E
Q[hτ
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>t} | Gt] (5.11)
with hτ Gτ -measurable and 1{τ≤t}hτ Gτ -mesurable. The second term can be rewritten as
EQ[hτ
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>t} | Gt] = 1{τ>t}
EQ[
∑
pi∈Π 1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>t}hτ | Ft]
Q(
∑
pi∈Π 1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>t} | Ft)
= 1{τ>t}
EQ[
∑
pi∈Π 1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>t}hτ | Ft]
Gτt
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The previous equation can be expressed using the lemma 5.1.3 as
1{τ>t}eΓ
τ
tEQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ>t}hτ | Ft] = 1{τ>t}eΓ
τ
tEQ[
∫ ∞
t
huf
τ
udu | Ft]
with hu
∑
1{u>t} being an F -predictable process.
Set
Jt := e
ΓτtEQ[
∫ ∞
t
huf
τ
udu | Ft] = eΓ
τ
tEQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}
∫ ∞
t
huf
τ,pi
u du | Ft]
= eΓ
τ
t
(
Mht −
∫ t
0
huf
τ
u
)
since F τt =
∫ t
0
f τudu =
∑
pi∈Π 1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}
∫ t
0
f τ,piu du.
Thus,
dJt = e
Γτt dmht + Jtγ
τ
t dt− eΓ
τ
t htf
τ
t dt
= eΓ
τ
t dmht + Jtγ
τ
t dt− γτt htdt
= eΓ
τ
t dmht + (Jt − ht)γτt dt
Moreover, from equation (5.11)
Mht = htdH
τ
t + d((1−Hτt )Jt)
= htdH
τ
t + (1−Hτt )dJt − JtdHτt
= htdH
τ
t + (1−Hτt )eΓ
τ
t dmht + (1−Hτt )(Jt − ht)γτt dt− JtdHτt
On the event {τ > t} we have the equality Jt = Mht , thus
Mht = htdH
τ
t + (1−Hτt )eΓ
τ
t dmht + (1−Hτt )(Mht − ht)γτt dt− JtdHτt
= (1−Hτt )eΓ
τ
t dmht + (ht −Mht )dM τt
with M τt = H
τ
t −
∫ t
0
(1−Hτu)γτudu
Those previous proposition will enable the valuation of non defaultable claim under counter-
party credit risk under the multivariate framework with the (H)-hypothesis enabling the valuation
of the risk-free part under the filtration F. (i.e not requiring the input of credit desks.) Now,
turning to the case of the defaultable claim, we need first to consider the case of survival claims.
Survival Claims We consider the payoff X1τ>T at maturity T where X is a FT -measurable
Q-integrable random variable. Under the multivariate setting,
EQ
[∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}e
− ∫ Tt rsdsX1τ>T | Gt
]
= 1τ>tEQ[e−
∫ T
t rs+γ
τdsX | Ft]
= 1τ>t(G
τ
t )
−1EQ[βTGτTX | Ft] (5.12)
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General Defaultable Claims
Proposition 5.1.4. Consider the (H)-hypothesis holds and define the claim Π(t, T ) = (X,A,Z, τ)
as before with τ defining the default event of the reference in the trigger set T , X a FT -measurable
random variable paid at T , A a F-predictable dividend process and Z a F-predictable recovery pro-
cess paid at default time.
The dividend process decomposed as
Dt =
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}X1{τRef>T}
+
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}
∫ t∧T
0
(1−HRefu )dAu
+
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}
∫ t∧T
0
1{τRef<u}Zudu
with
Sn+1t = β
−1
t EQ[
∫
]t,T ]
βudDu | Gt]
can be expressed as
Sn+1t = 1{τRef>t}β
−1
t (G
Ref
t )
−1EQ[βTGRefT X + βTYTG
Ref
T +
∫ T
t
Ruf
Ref
u du | Ft] (5.13)
Proof.
Sn+1t = β
−1
t EQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}(βTX1{τRef>T} + YT1{τRef>T} +RτRef1{t<τRef≤T}) | Gt]
where
Yu =
∫ u
t
βsdAs
and
Ru = βuZu + Yu
The first two terms can be valued with the survival claim equation (5.12), the last term is given
by
EQ[
∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}RτRef1{t<τRef≤T} | Gt] = 1{τRef>t}(GReft )−1EQ[
∫ T
t
Ruf
Ref
u du | Ft]
Thus, the formula of the defaultable claim can be rewritten in the multivariate context as
Sn+1t = 1{τRef>t}β
−1
t (G
Ref
t )
−1EQ[βTGRefT X + βTYTG
Ref
T +
∫ T
t
Ruf
Ref
u du | Ft]
Note that at valuation time t, β−1t = 1
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Single-name credit default swaps in multivariate context: Now, we can express directly
the single-name credit default swap in the multivariate framework with X = 0, dAt = κdt and
Z = LGD. the value of the payer CDS is thus
St(κ) = 1{τRef>t}(G
Ref
t )
−1EQ[−
∫ T
t
βuG
Ref
u κdu+
∫ T
t
βyZuγ
Ref
u G
Ref
u du | Ft] (5.14)
The market spread is the spread quoted such that St(κ(t, T )) = 0, thus by definition the
pre-default market spread CDS at time t is given by
κ(t, T ) =
EQ[
∫ T
t
βyZuγ
Ref
u G
Ref
u du | Ft]
EQ[
∫ T
t
βuG
Ref
u du | Ft]
After inception the simulated value of the price St(κ) of market CDS of maturity T initiated
at 0 at rate κ is given by
St(κ) = 1{τRef>t}(κ(t, T )− κ)EQ[
∫ T
t
βsG
Ref
s ds | Ft]
This equation will enable by simulating the single-name CDS spread to compute the Market
value of the position entered at inception and generate the metrics such as EPE and PFE. The
alternative is to simulate the survival probability of the reference of the CDS an infer the “fair
spread”of the claim.
The CDS price process dynamics of the claim can be expressed as
Proposition 5.1.5 (CDS price dynamics). The (ex-dividend) CDS price process is
dSt(κ) = −St−(κ)dMReft + (1−HReft )(rtSt + κ− γReft LGDRef (t))dt+ (1−HReft )(βtGReft )−1dmReft
with mReft an F-continuous martingale with
mReft = EQ[
∫ T
0
βsG
Ref
s (LGD
Ref (s)γRefs − κ)ds | Ft]
Proof. We have
St(κ) = L
Ref
t β
−1
t
(
mReft −
∫ t
0
βsG
Ref
s (LGD
Ref (s)γRefs − κ)ds
)
using the product rule
dSt(κ) = L
Ref
t β
−1
t
(
dmReft − βtGReft (LGDRef (t)γReft − κ)dt
)
+ rtβtL
Ref
t
(
mReft −
∫ t
0
βsG
Ref
s (LGD
Ref (s)γRefs − κ)ds
)
dt
− βtLReft
(
mReft −
∫ t
0
βsG
Ref
s (LGD
Ref (s)γRefs − κ)ds
)
dMReft
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In the case of a CDS we can also value under the case F = ∅ thus, G = ∨mi=1Hi. This is equiv-
alent to the Hazard function approach in the litterature and where most of the implied default are
extracted for CDS.
kth-to-default swaps in multivariate context: Similarly, we can value the kth-to-default swap
where the protection seller is exposed to the kth entity to default within a portfolio of credit sensitive
instruments. Note at this point that in the multivariate framework, the ith default in E is not
necessiraly the ith default in our kth-to-default swap. For simplicity we assume that the ith default
in E corresponds to the kth default triggering the event set T . In this case the defaults prior to
i will have an impact on ith propensity to default. The contract is unwound immediately after
the ith credit event (Recall that this is not the case of indices or CDO.) Then if 1{τ(i)=τRef≤T} the
payments is made on the name j ∈ E with τ(i) = τj under the permutation pi that is realised.
Thus, in the multivariate framework with X = 0, dAt = κ(i)dt and Z = LGD. the value of the
payer CDS is thus
St(κ
(i)) = 1{τRef>t}(G
Ref
t )
−1EQ[−
∫ T
t
βuG
Ref
u κ
(i)du+
∫ T
t
βyLGD
Ref (u)γRefu G
Ref
u du | Ft] (5.15)
with the notation
(GReft ) = (G
(i)
t ) = Q(
∑
pi∈Π
{τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+)} ∩ {τ = τ(i) > t})
(ZReft ) = (Z
(i)
t )
Now, having expressed conditional events in the equations (4.11) and (4.14) and the claims
under no-counterparty exposure in a multivariate context, it is necessary to focus on the multi-
variate aspect of the Hazard processes of obligors in E and try to express the inherent dependence
of credit default that is contained in the permutations.
Finally, those previous formulas can be used to value the CVA part of the claims when time t
is inside the permutation i.e. all the events of the type∑
pi∈Π
1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T}
where some of the defaults have happened but the default time of the trigger event is yet to happen.
This will be useful for the valuation of the CVA through Monte-Carlo simulations. This knowledge
is required for Expected Positive Exposure (EPE) as this metric is built on the distribution of the
claim at each point in the future.
To complete the valuation of equations (4.11) and (4.14) we need now to review the models of
credit risk dependence to express the probability of the permutations Π.
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5.1.3 Counterparty Credit Risk under multivariate case
The next two proposition of valuing the two categories of claims, non defaultable and defaultable,
will be used in the reminder of this document as the equations that link the multivariate frame-
work hazard processes with credit risk dependence and assess its impact on the Credit Valuation
Adjustment in case the obligors in E exhibit credit risk contagion.
Non defaultable claim
We rewrite the proposition 4.1.2, page 53, of non defaultable claim in a multivariate setting using
the hazard processes defined in equation 5.2 and under the (H)-hypothesis and the separability
hypothesis:
Proposition 5.1.6 (Bilateral CVA for non-defaultble claim in multivariate setting). Consider an
FT -measurable non-defaultable claim X defined in (3.1) under bilateral counterpart credit risk as
Et(βtX(t, T )d) = E
(
1{τ>t}
∫ T
t
βudXu
∣∣∣∣Ft)
− 1{τC>t}
E(
∑
pi∈ΠC 1{τpi(−)<τC<τpi(+)}1{τC≤T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+ | Ft)
E(
∑
pi∈ΠC 1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τC<τpi(+)} | Ft)
+ 1{τI>t}
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI 1{τpi(−)<τI<τpi(+)}1{τI≤T}βτILGDIX(τI)
− | Ft)
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI 1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τI<τpi(+)} | Ft)
= X(t)−BCV At (5.16)
with
BCV At := CV At −DV At
:= 1{τC>t}
E(
∑
pi∈ΠC 1{τpi(−)<τC<τpi(+)}1{τC≤T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+ | Ft)
E(
∑
pi∈ΠC 1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τC<τpi(+)} | Ft)
− 1{τI>t}
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI 1{τpi(−)<τI<τpi(+)}1{τI≤T}βτILGDIX(τI)
− | Ft)
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI 1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τI<τpi(+)} | Ft)
:= 1{τ>t}
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI∪ΠC 1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T}βτ [ED(τ)] | Ft)
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI∪ΠC 1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τ<τpi(+)} | Ft)
(5.17)
Note that the event 1{τ>t} in simulation started at time t is not relevant.
Defaultable claim
We rewrite the proposition 4.1.3, page 56, of defaultable claim in a multivariate setting using the
hazard processes defined in equation 5.2
Proposition 5.1.7 (Bilateral CVA for defaultble claim in multivariate setting). Consider an FT -
measurable non-defaultable claim X defined in (3.1) under bilateral counterpart credit risk as
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Et(βtSn+1,dt ) = 1{τRef>t}(E(
∑
pi∈ΠRef
1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τRef<τpi(+)} | Ft))−1
E
(∫ T
t
∑
pi∈ΠRef
1{τpi(−)<τRef<τpi(+)}1{τRef≤s}βsdAs
+
∑
pi∈ΠRef
1{τpi(−)<τRef<τpi(+)}1{τRef≤T}βτRZτR
+
∑
pi∈ΠRef
1{τpi(−)<τRef<τpi(+)}1{τRef>T}βTX
d
t
∣∣∣∣Ft
)
− 1{τC>t}
E(
∑
pi∈ΠC 1{τpi(−)<τC<τpi(+)}1{τC≤T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+ | Ft)
E(
∑
pi∈ΠC 1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τC<τpi(+)} | Ft)
+ 1{τI>t}
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI 1{τpi(−)<τI<τpi(+)}1{τI≤T}βτILGDIX(τI)
− | Ft)
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI 1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τI<τpi(+)} | Ft)
= Sn+1t −BCV At (5.18)
with
BCV At := CV At −DV At
:= 1{τC>t}
E(
∑
pi∈ΠC 1{τpi(−)<τC<τpi(+)}1{τC≤T}βτCLGDCX(τC)
+ | Ft)
E(
∑
pi∈ΠC 1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τC<τpi(+)} | Ft)
− 1{τI>t}
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI 1{τpi(−)<τI<τpi(+)}1{τI≤T}βτILGDIX(τI)
− | Ft)
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI 1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τI<τpi(+)} | Ft)
:= 1{τ>t}
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI∪ΠC 1{τpi(−)<τ<τpi(+)}1{τ≤T}βτ [ED(τ)] | Gt)
E(
∑
pi∈ΠI∪ΠC 1{τpi1(−)<t<τpi2(−)<τ<τpi(+)} | Ft)
(5.19)
The propositions 5.1.6 and 5.1.7 above require the expression of the dependence modelling of
credit risk through GτC· , G
τI· and G
τRef· among the ordering of defaults with the identification of the
default probability of obligors in the trigger set T . Those propositions highlight a fact mentioned
in [Brig12], that the CVA and the BVA parts cannot be valued separately and combined to form
the BVCA formula due to the first-to-default time that triggers the valuation in BCVA. Thus, we
believe that the equations 5.17 and 5.19 contain naturally the ordering of the defaults in the set
T . (Note that in a full contagion setting even defaults in τpi will influence the first-to-default time)
Note: Similarly the reference to Sn+1t accounts to a difference with the probability G
τRef· post-
pones the default time of C and I after the default time of Ref . This is different from a classic
valuation of non-defaultable claim which only considers the set Reg = f.
Typically, the models of GτC· , G
τI· and G
τRef· tend to be not of closed-form formulas type except
in the case of the Gaussian copula and tend to rely on numerical analysis. We will first review
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models of dependency and how this dependence is realised in a dynamic or a static way. Then we
will introduce dependency models that use Markov chains with a presentation of a Markov chain
model called the multivariate phase-type distribution.
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5.2 Modelling credit risk dependence
As figures 5.1 , 5.2 and 5.3, page 80-82 illustrate, the US Senate Committee on Finance [Senate10]
analysed the protection selling and buying of Goldman Sachs w.r.t AIG. This content highlights
a net protection buying of $+1,711m with 148 different counterparties and, thus, is a natural and
direct example of the level of interdependence and preferential channels for contagion in the case
of insolvability of a protection seller after a default of the reference entity AIG.
Interestingly, [Vitali11], a recent study using network topology, assessed the structure of the
control network of transnational corporations (TNCs) to unveil its effects on global market com-
petition and financial stability. [Vitali11] found that similar to the world wide web, the TNCs
network of control has a bow tie structure with its core very small compared to the other sections
of the bow-tie and holding collectively a large fraction of the total network control. Nearly 4/10
of the control over the economic value of TNCs in the world is held via a complicated web of
ownership relations, by a group of 147 TNCs in the core which has almost full control over itself.
Implication for the financial stability is that 3/4 of this core are financial intermediaries.
The dependency structure is also presenting the interesting feature of always evolving as the
2011 article [Xydias11] about Synthetic Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) shows: “ETFs that use
swaps to clone stock, bond or currency returns have been criticised by regulators and firms including
Fidelity Investors, which say clients risk losing money should the banks writing the derivatives be-
come insolvent.” Due to the European sovereign bond crisis and its impact of the credit worthiness
of European based banks, investors pulled the most money in at least two years from European
Exchange-Traded Funds that use derivatives to track asset performance, moving record amounts
into ETFs backed by physical bonds and shares instead. The rise of those “synthetic”exposure
claims represent an ever changing landscape of credit contagion and justify the rationale of mod-
elling dependence structures.
Thus, Counterparty credit risk through Credit Valuation Adjustment imply the necessity of
modelling credit risk dependence among obligors entity such as the investor I, the counterpart C
and the reference obligors Ref .
5.2.1 Dependence modelling
Structured-form models
Dependence modelling with structural models is either expressed in the correlation of the barriers
or the correlation of the geometric Brownian motion of the underlying firm process Vi, i = 1, 2.
[Haworth06] proposes an analytical model for corporate bond yields in presence of default contagion
and two-firm credit default swap baskets. Extending to a basket of three firms [Haworth06] es-
tablishes the joint probability distributions as a function of the running minimum i.e. the first to
default name as a Bessel process. Additionally, [Lipton09] proposes a structural numerical method
for computing the Credit Valuation Adjustment by introducing jumps in the evolution of the asset
value Vt. However most of the structural models are limited in their ease of calibration from market
data and in their handling of an increase of obligors under consideration in the contagion obligor
sets.
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Figure 5.1: Exposure of Goldman Sachs through CDS Counterparties with the company AIG as a
reference name - Page (1/3) - Source: [Senate10]
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Figure 5.2: Exposure of Goldman Sachs through CDS Counterparties with the company AIG as a
reference name - Page (2/3) - Source: [Senate10]
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Figure 5.3: Exposure of Goldman Sachs through CDS Counterparties with the company AIG as a
reference name - Page (3/3) - Source: [Senate10]
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Figure 5.4: Corporate Network Dependence Illustration through cross capital exposure-
Source: [Vitali11]
Reduced-form models
Multivariate point process A first way of realising dependence modelling in a reduced-form
setting requires introducing dependence inside multivariate point process.
From the previous univariate point process, let (Tn)
∞
n=0 be a univariate point process and let
(Zn)
∞
n=1 be a sequence of random variables with Zn ∈ {1, . . . ,m}. For i = 1, . . . ,m we define N it
as
Nt =
∞∑
n=1
1{Tn≤t}1{Zn=i}
the process N it is also a point process, which have been obtained by thinning the univariate process
(Tn)
∞
n=0 by picking out those jumps Tn where Zn = i. We call the m-dimensional stochastic process
(N1t , N
2
t , . . . , N
m
t ) a m-variate point process (Tn, Zn)
∞
n=1. This is sometimes called a marked point
process, MPP , with mark space {1, 2, . . . ,m} with mark space E as introduced in Chapter 8
in [Bremaud81] and is defined as:
Theorem 5.2.1. Let (Tn, Zn)
∞
n=1 be a MPP with mark-space {1, . . . ,m} and define (N1t , . . . , Nmt )
as previously. Let Ft be the filtration given by
Ft = F0 ∨ FNt
where
FNt =
m∨
i=1
σ(N is; s ≤ t)
Assume that N it admits the Ft intensities λit for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Then the processes λit for i =
1, 2, . . . ,m is uniquely determine by the distribution (Tn, Zn)
∞
n=1
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In the case of an m-variate point process (N1t , . . . , N
m
t ) where Λ
i
t is the compensator to N
i
t for
i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and if Nt =
∑m
i=1N
i
t then it is easy to show that Λt =
∑m
i=1 Λ
i
t is the compensator
to Nt. [Norros86] uses the compensator to generate a set of correlated default times through the
“total hazard”method. Consider N it = 1{τi≤t} a ca´dla´g and increasing sub-martingale process. By
the Doob-Meyer decomposition theorem, there exists an increasing FNt -predictable compensator
processes Λit where Λ
i
t = 0 and uniformly integrable martingale M
i
t such that
N it = Λ
i
t −M it
Suppose now that the probability space is large enough to endow the i.i.d random variables
E1, E2, . . . , Em with E1 =
d Exp(1) and defined as
Ei = Λ
i
τi
, i = 1, . . . ,m
With FNt generated by (Nn, Tn)mn=1, [Norros86] defines Λit in recursive form
Λit =
m−1∑
n=0
1{Tn<t≤Tn+1}Λ
i
t(n;T1, Z1, . . . , Tn, Zn)
with the simulation of a random time τ linked to the inverse functions
(Λit)
−1(x) = inf{t ≥ 0 : Λit ≥ x}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, x > 0
Using this framework, [Shaked87] presented an algorithm called the total hazard construction
that linked the compensators Λit, ∀i ∈ E and the multivariate random times τ1, . . . , τm
τˆjk = τˆjk−1 + Λ
−1
jk
(Ejk − Λiτj1 −
k−1∑
n=2
Λiτjn−τjn−1 (τJn−1 = tJn−1) | τjk−1 = τˆjk−1)
where jk is the ordering of default in the set E per simulation and τˆjk its associated simulated
default time.
Furthermore, let Xt = (X
1
t , . . . , X
d
t ) be a d-dimensional stochastic process generated by observ-
able market quantities, such as interest rates with the associated filtration FXt = σ(X1s , . . . , Xds ; s ≤
t), then a direct way of expressing dependence is through the correlation of intensity processes.
For example, [Duffie99] and [Duffie03] introduce dependence among m obligors by assuming that
the processes λit are correlated as in
λit = λˆ
i
t +Xc
with λˆit, Xc being respectively an independent process and a basic process containing some macroe-
conomic factors that affect all the obligors. However, the default correlations that are obtained
in this setting are too low. Other studies contend that this is wrong and that enough correlation
may be obtained if one makes a proper choice of the underlying factors that drive Xc. A further
natural extension, is to had common jump process to achieve higher correlation like in [Duffie03]
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and [Duffie01]. This method is particularly used for “correlation ”sensitive products like collat-
eralised debt obligation as in [Chapovsky06]. Another approach in the intensity family, is found
in [Lindskog] where instead of allowing for correlation or jumps in obligor intensities, the authors
consider the possibility of simultaneous defaults and allowing those “block ”defaults specific in-
tensities. This framework called the Common Poisson Shock (CPS) results in a Markshall-Olkin
copula linking the first default times of single-names. This model leads to portfolio loss dynamics
that are consistent with traded index products but at the expense of repeated defaults of obligors
accross defaulted groups of obligors.
The Copula approach: A common way to introduce dependence in credit risk is to use copu-
las as introduced in [Li00]. Copulas is a well-known concept from multivariate statistics and used
for example in survival analysis and actuarial statistics. By definition, a copula is a multivariate
distribution function such that its marginal distributions are uniformly distributed U[0,1].
Let X1, X2, . . . , Xm be m real valued random variables with distribution functions Fi(x) =
P[Xi ≤ x] for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. and X be the m-dimensional vector X = (X1, X2, . . . , Xm) with
the associated the joint distribution F (x) = P[X1 ≤ x1, X2 ≤ x2, . . . , Xm ≤ xm] where x =
(x1, x2, . . . , xm).
The main reason for using copulas in applied multivariate analysis is that the copula com-
pletely describes the joint distribution of X1, X2, . . . , Xm , via the marginal distributions Fi, i =
1, 2, . . . ,m. This is done using the following theorem in [Nelsen99]
Theorem 5.2.2 (Sklars Theorem). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xm be m real valued random variables Fi(x) =
P[Xi ≤ x] for i = 1, 2, . . . ,m with distribution functions and joint distribution F . Then there exists
an m-dimensional copula C such that
F (x) = C(F1(x1), F2(x2), . . . , Fn(xn))
where x = (x1, x2, . . . , xm). If Fi are continuous for all i = 1, . . . ,m then the copula C is unique.
In a portfolio context, static dependence is classically modelled trough a covariance matrix using
a copula framework for tractability with the value of the correlation being represented by a single
number. C is called a Archemidean “gaussian”copula with F the bivariate normal distribution with
correlation parameter ρ. A commonly used alternative is the t-copula with F being a t-Student
distribution. In general, joint distributions and copulas have some “contagion”already built into
the copula concept but the likelihood of simultaneous credit events tends to be underestimated
due to the ”fat tail”behaviour of the normal distribution. The coefficient of lower tail dependence
is defined, for a bivariate random variable X = (X1, X2), as
λ = lim
α→0
Q[X2 < q2(α)|X1 < q1(α)] = lim
u→0
C(u, u)
u
(5.20)
where qi(α) is the α’th quantile of Xi. However, the gaussian Copula has zero tail dependence λ = 0
independently of the correlation and thus fails to capture contagion at the lower tail distribution.
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In risk management applications, the t-Student distribution is often preferred because of its tail
dependence properties given by
λ = 2tν
(
−
√
(ν + 1)(1− ρ)
1 + ρ
)
(5.21)
with ν degrees of freedom.
While copula-based models are widely used, they are essentially restricted to a one-period set-
ting but even within a one-period setting copulas have some drawbacks: for example, the copula
changes in a none-too-easily understood way when moving from initial joint default distribution
to a conditional distribution given survival up to some time t. When the density function F is
known, the related copulas can just be obtained by means of the formula
Q[U1 ≤ u1, . . . , Um ≤ um] = C(u1, u2, . . . , un) = F (F−11 (x1), F−12 (x2), . . . , F−1n (xn))
with the latent variables U1, U2, . . . , Um ∈ [0, 1].
Conditional independence: It should be clear that there are some risk factors common to
obligor i = 1, 2, . . . ,m such as interest rates, inflation etc. Those factors are defined as exogenous
risk factors. However every firm i is also subject to individual risk factors, not necessarily shared
with the other firms j, for j 6= i. These are called idiosyncratic risk factors. The concept of
conditional independence states that once we have conditioned on the common information Gt,
then the idiosyncratic risk factors are independent, i.e. τ1, . . . , τm are independent. More formally
as defined in [Bielecki01]:
Definition 5.2.1. Let τ1, τ2, . . . , τm be the default times for obligor i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. Then τ1, τ2, . . . , τm
are said to be conditionally independent with respect to the filtration (Gt)t≥0 if for any T > 0 and
any t1, . . . , tn ∈ [0, T ]
P[τ1 > t1, . . . , τm > tm | GT ] =
m∏
i=1
P[τi > ti | GT ]
If it is assumed that the default times are independent with respect to some suitably choosen
filtration Gt, it is rather straightforward to derive risk neutral prices for different kind of credit
derivatives of basket types such as first-to-default swaps or more generally n-to-default swaps on
a credit portfolio. Example of this method can be found in [Kijima00] and [Lando00].
So far, most of those methods of dependency are characterised by a structural feature that tries
to replicate a credit risk link between the m obligors in E. This has led studies to categorise that
link between a static vs dynamic divide line.
Dynamic dependence modelling:
According to [Davis09] and [Scho˝nbucher03], these models are in three categories for modelling
the dependence structure: factor models, frailty models and contagion models.
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• A factor model is one where the hazard rate
hi(t) = hi(Xt, t, w)
is a function of some common factor Xt. This factor is observable or not and typically repre-
sents the macro-economy or a specific sector. To some extent, it is similar in logic with CAPM
or Fama-French factor models to express excess returns with factors like market returns, small
capitalisation - big capitalisation distinction. The factors tend to have a connection with haz-
ard rate or return they tend to explain. This was the case of [Duffie99] and [Duffie03] quoted
earlier.
• A frailty model is similar in form to a factor model but some of the factors are abstract
statistical factors that are not related to economic variables. Those type of models were
introduced in [Scho˝nbucher03] but the lack of economic link of some factors limit the field
of applications. They tend typically to be used in augmented factor VAR where several
factors each having a limited by non negligible explanatory power are merged into on single
parameters like PCA usually with dummy values.
• A contagion models is one where the hazard rate of obligor i :
hi(t)1 {τi>t} = hi(S
i
t , t, w)
where
Sit = {τj : τj < t ∧ τi}
is directly affected by defaults of other obligors. This is the category that represents the
most dynamic aspect of dependence.
Transition from factor models to contagion models has been introduced first by [Davis99] with an
extension of correlation effects to the Binomial Expansion Technique (EBT) used by Moody’s
to evaluate Credit portfolio structure like in CBO/CLO claims. The key element in conta-
gion models is the definition of the evolutionary structure of the relationship between obligors.
[Davis99] and [Zheng10] present structures that model default interaction in intuitively credible
ways where Markov chain provide an effective modelling framework because of computational ef-
ficiency. Building on this concept, [Crepey09] , [Bielecki09] and [Bielecki07] consider a Markovian
model of credit risk in which simultaneous defaults are possible.
At this point, we could mention that we have mainly focused on so-called “bottom-up”models
where each obligor in a portfolio is modelled and the portfolio is modelled through the specificities
of its constituents. That is mainly because we are interested in contagion in kth-to-default basket
products where reference name are typically less than a dozen. However, another class of models,
called “top-down”models tend to models the portfolio properties as a whole and then isolate sin-
gle entity behaviour. Those products are mainly designed in modelling credit dependency among
large portfolio and are used in the case of index credit derivatives or collateralised debt obligations.
The book [Brig11c] provides an interesting account of those dependency issues in portfolio
context beyond the previously mentioned Copula model. In a nutshell, the “top-down”models try
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to model parameters based on the loss distribution Lt used in valuing the index credit derivatives
products in section 1.1.2 and 1.1.2. Instead of being the results of the single obligors defaults in the
“bottom-up”models, the process Lt is more viewed as an input. This input aspect is described in
[Brig07b] through the “Expected Tranche Loss”which represented the process Lγt for a tranche γ.
Along a better dynamics process, the challenge is to recoup the evolution of the identified obligors
default time to enable hedging through single-name CDS, [Brig07b] and [Brig07c], use a frame-
work called Generalised-Poisson Loss that is close to [Lindskog] but identify which obligors have
defaulted in cluster thus avoiding the repeated default and assigning to each cluster an independent
intensity. The process modelled is the loss Lt rather than default counting process in [Lindskog].
Alternatively, another approach in [Bielecki13] establishes the top to down link by conserving the
markovian property of the multivariate process to the markovianity of the single obligor processes
via a constraint called the “Markov copula ”property as introduced in [Bielecki06b] thus limiting
the complexity of the model. However, the rationale of the loss process is not so much the topic
of this document. We are more interested in identifying the specific obligor that is impacted by
other obligor default time. The main reason being that we identify the counterparty C and the
investor I specifically as well as the reference obligors in defaultable claims. Under this constraint,
the “bottom-up”contagion models presented above seem to be the correct modelling way.
Introduced in [Davis99], the concept of default contagion or infectious default is central in the
rest of this document. Previously, we have shown how to introduce dependence, for example by
using affine process, or through copulas. These concepts are direct results of the intuitive idea that
obligors are subjected to common underlying so called exogenous risk factors, such as the vector
Xt. Furthermore, we also studied the concept of conditionally independent default times which
lead to tractable formulas for many important basket credit derivatives. However, it is commonly
believed that at the default of one firm, say firm j, the intensity λit for say i 6= j will jump, normally
upwards (like in [Jarrow01]).
The Jarrow-Yu model: In order to solve the problems of how to simulate i, compute Q[i > t]
when the obligors i = 1, 2, . . . ,m undergo default contagion, [Jarrow01] postulate the information
structure is asymmetric.
Definition 5.2.2. Let the some of the obligors {1, ...,m} undergo default contagion. Then there
exists disjoint sets S1 = {1, . . . , k}, S2 called the set of primary firms and the set of secondary
firms, such that S1 ∪ S2 = {1, . . . ,m} and
• for any firm from the set S1 of primry firms, the default intensity depends only on F
• the default intensity of each firm from the set S2 of secondary firms may depend not only on
the filtration F but also on the status (defaulted or not) of the primary firms.
The intuitive idea is that the default-intensity for primary obligors is only dependent of the
common macroeconomic market variables Xt while the default intensity for secondary obligors
could depend on Xt as well as the default status of the primary firms.
Thus, with G = F ∨ H the enlarged filtration, the filtration generated by the macroeconomic
factors and the observations of default of the secondary firms is
F˜ = F ∨Hk+1 ∨ . . . ∨Hm
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Additionally, in intensity processes λi, i = k + 1, . . . ,m are now given the “contagion intensity
process”
λit = µ
i
t +
k∑
l=1
νi,lt 1{τl≤t}, (5.22)
where µit, ν
i,l
t are F-adapted stochastic processes. Then
• the default times τ1, . . . , τk of primary firms are no longer conditionally independent when
we replace the filtration F by F˜,
• the intensity of default for a primary firm with respect to F˜ differs from the corresponding
intensity with respect to F,
[Jarrow01] establishes in a 2 obligor setting the closed-form solutions for the arbitrage-free price
of defaultable bonds, and default swaps when the intensities are set constant. The equation (5.22)
will be used in this document as it is a excellent way to link dependence between obligors in a
natural way of “contagion ”.
We now focus on a class of process called “markov chains”that could handle dependency mod-
elling in a multivariate framework.
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Chapter 6
Modelling dependence through Markov
chains
As presented in [Davis99] and in the previous section, the need to express credit contagion will
requite to built models that incorporate a dynamical aspect in their sensitivity to other obligor de-
fault and also macro risk factors driving the value of contingent claims. A Model class that exhibit
such behaviour are using Markov jump processes to express the contagion between the obligors.
We provide first the presentation about Markov jump process as in [Bielecki01] based on [Last95]
and [Rogers00]. Additionally, [Asmu03] provides an introduction to a Markov jump process called
phase-type distribution that can provide a flexible framework for generating dynamic credit risk
evolution. We will apply this methodology to the valuation of Credit Valuation Adjustment to the
financial claims of interest, defaultable and non-defaultable ones.
6.1 Markov Jump Process definition
As previously, we assume the underlying probability space (Ω,G,Q) as well as a finite set K =
{1, . . . , K} which plays the role of the state space for a Markov chain of interest. Since the state
space is finite, it is clear that any function h : K → R is bounded or measurable provided that we
endow the state space with the σ-field of all its subsets.
In credit risk setting, the states of obligor in the set E will be represented in the state space K
of the Markov jump process. Thus the cardinality of the permutations or ordering from E has to
correspond to the maximum number of states K of the Markov chain. Thus,
K =| E |
Let Ct, t ∈ R+ be a right continuous stochastic process on (Ω,G,Q) with values in the finite
set K and let FC be the filtration generated by this process. Also let G be some filtration such
that FC ⊆ G. we provide here the general context definitions w.r.t the Markov chain and its
associated probability matrix:
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Definition 6.1.1. A process C is a continuous time G-Markov chain if for an arbitrary function
h : K → R ∀s, t ∈ N we have
EQ(h(Ct+s) | Gt) = EQ(h(Ct+s) | Ct) (6.1)
A continuous time G-Markov chain C is said to be time-homogeneous if, in addition, ∀s, t, u ∈ N
we have
EQ(h(Ct+s) | Ct) = EQ(h(Cu+s) | Cu) (6.2)
Definition 6.1.2. A two-parameter family P(t, s), t, s ∈ R+, t ≤ s of stochastic matrices is called
the family of transition probability matrices for the G-markov chain C under Q if ∀t, s ∈ R+, t ≤ s,
Q{Cs = j | Ct = i} = pi,j(t, s) ,∀t, s ∈ K (6.3)
In particular the equality P(t, t) = Id is satisfied ∀i ∈ R+
6.1.1 Time-homogeneous markov chain
Definitions
For a time-homogeneous Markov chain, the transition probability matrix (6.3) is defined as
Definition 6.1.3. The one parameter family P(t), t ∈ R+ of stochastic matrices is called the
family of transition probability matrices for the time-homogeneous G-markov chain C under Q if
for every t, s ∈ R+
Q{Cs+t = j | Cs = i} = pi,j(t) ,∀i, j ∈ K (6.4)
If P(t), t ∈ R+ is the family of transition matrices for C then for any subset A ⊆ K we have
Q{Cs+t ∈ A | Ct} =
∑
j∈A
pCt,j(s) ,∀t, s ∈ R+ (6.5)
Properties
Moreover, the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation is satisfied, namely,
P(t+ s) = P(t)P(s) = P(s)P(t) ,∀t, s ∈ R+ (6.6)
Equivalently, ∀i, j ∈ K and ∀t, s ∈ R+
pi,j(t+ s) =
K∑
k=1
pi,k(t)pk,j(s) =
K∑
k=1
pi,k(s)pk,j(t) (6.7)
Let the K-dimensional row vector µt = [µt(i)]1≤i≤K = [Q{Ct = i}]1≤i≤K denote the probability
distribution at time t of the G-markov chain C under Q. The probability distribution at time t+s
is given by
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µ(t+ s) = µ0P(t+ s) = µtP(s) = µsP(t) ,∀t, s ∈ R+ (6.8)
An important condition on the family P(·) that it is right-continuous at time t = 0 and thus
with the Chapman-Kolmogorov equation this implies that
lim
s↓0
P(t+ s) = P(t) ,∀t > 0
and thus,
lim
s↓0
Q{Cs+t = j | Cs = i} = δi,j ,∀i, j ∈ K, t > 0
It is a well known fact that the right continuity of the family P(·) at time t = 0 implies the
right-hand side differentiability at time t = 0 of this family (Theorem 8.1.2 in [Rolski98] ). The
following finite limits exists at time t = 0
λij := lim
t↓0
pi,j(t)− pij(0)
t
= lim
t↓0
pi,j(t)− δij
t
, ∀i, j ∈ K (6.9)
with λij > 0 and λii = −
∑K
j=1,j 6=i λij for every i 6= j.
The matrix
Λ := [λi,j]1≤i,j≤K
is called the infinitesimal generator matrix for a Markov chain associated with the family P .
Since each entry λi,j of the matrix Λ can be shown to represent the intensity of a transition from
the state i to the state j the infinitesimal generator matrix Λ is also called the intensity matrix.
Invoking the Chapman Kolmogorov equation and the limit of the transition intensity, one may
derive the backward Kolmogorov equation
dP(t)
dt
= ΛP(t), P(0) = Id (6.10)
the forward Kolmogorov equation
dP(t)
dt
= P(t)Λ, P(0) = Id (6.11)
where at time t = 0 we take the right-hand side derivatives. As detailed in [Last95] and [Rogers00],
it is well known that both these equations have the same unique solution through en exponential
matrix
P(t) := etΛ :=
∞∑
n=1
Λntn
n!
, t ∈ R+ (6.12)
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We say that a state k ∈ K is absorbing for a time homogeneous G-Markov chain Ct, t ∈ R+
if the following holds
Q{Cs = k | Ct = k} = 1,∀t, s ∈ R+, t < s
If a state k ∈ K is absorbing λkj = 0 for every j = 1, . . . , K. We will postulate K is absorbing,
representing default of obligors. We associate τ the random variable of absorption at K, i.e.,
τ = inf{t > 0 : Ct = K}. Assume that τ < ∞,Q- a.s. thus implies that the state K is the only
state recurrent state for C.
Martingale characterisation
The following important result provides a martingale characterisation of a time-homogeneous
Markov chain C in terms of its infinitesimal generator.
For any state i ∈ K and for any function h;K → R we denote
(Λh)(i) =
K∑
j=1
λijh(j)
Proposition 6.1.1. A process C is a time-homogeneous G-Markov Chain under Q, with the initial
distribution µ0 and the infinitesimal generator matrix Λ, if and only if the following conditions are
satisfied:
• Q{C0 = i} = µ0(i) for every i ∈ K,
• for any function h : K → R the process Mh defined by the formula
Mht = h(Ct)−
∫ t
0
(Λh)(Cu)du, t ∈ R+ (6.13)
follows a G-martingale under Q.
Typically, we take h(·) = 1i(·), thus
Mht = H
i
t −
∫ t
0
λCu,idu, t ∈ R+ (6.14)
follows a G-martingale under Q.
The proof of this proposition can be found in [Rogers00], [Last95] or [Daley02]. The Mar-
tingale characterisation of the Markov chain Ct in proposition 6.1.1, page 93, is similar to the
Martingale characterisation of the default process H•t = 1{τ•≤t} in section 5.1.1, page 67. Thus,
the default time τ of can be represented by a Markov chain with default occurring when the chain
exhibits a particular jump.
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Probability Distribution of the Absorption Time
More explicit formulae for the conditional expectations with respect to the σ-field can be obtained
if the knowledge of conditional laws of C. For every 0 ≤ t ≤ s
Q{τ > s | Ct = i} = 1−Q{Cs = K | Ct = i} = 1− piK(s− t)
or
Q{τ > s | Gt} = 1{s≤t}1{τ>s} + 1{s>t}
K−1∑
i=1
H it(1− piK(s− t))
Martingales Associated with Transitions
(Covered in [Bielecki01] with details in [Bremaud81], [Last95] and [Rogers00])
We quote here important examples of martingales associated with the absorption time τ and
with the number of transition. Those will be of particular interest to capture obligor defaults in
the case of a multivariate setting and will be central in valuing credit derivatives with multiple
obligor references.
For any fixed i 6= j ∈ E, let H ijt stand for the number of jumps of the process C from i to j in
the interval (0, t]. Formally for any i 6= j we set
H ijt =
∑
0<u≤t
H iu−H
j
u, ∀t ∈ R+ (6.15)
Lemma 6.1.1. For every i, j ∈ K, i 6= j the processes
M ijt = H
ij
t −
∫ t
0
λijH
i
udu = H
ij
t −
∫ t
0
λCujH
i
udu
and
HKt = Ht −
∫ t
0
K∑
i=1
λiKH
i
udu = H
ij
t −
∫ t
0
λCuj(1−Hu)du
follow G-martingales (and FC martingales)
Change of a Probability Measure
(Covered in [Bielecki01] with details in [Bremaud81], [Last95] and [Rogers00])
Since counterparty credit risk is valued in pricing context with CVA adjustments and in a risk
context with EPE metrics, we need to ask how the Markov property and the generator Λ of the time
homogeneous Markov chain C are affected by a change of the reference probability measure Q to an
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equivalent probability measure Q∗ on (Ω,GT ) for some fixed T . (We do not need K absorbing here.)
Consider a family κ˜kl, k, l ∈ K, k 6= l of bounded FC-predictable, real-valued processes such
that κ˜kl > −1 and κ˜kk = 0. Let us define an auxiliary G−martingale M (which is also an FC
martingale) by setting
Mt =
∫
]0,t]
K∑
k,l=1
κ˜klu dM
kl
u
and a G-martingale ηt, t ∈ [0, T ] with
ηt = 1 +
∫
]0,t]
K∑
k,l=1
ηu−κ˜klu dM
kl
u
[Last95] establishes the following proposition for κ˜klt = κkl(t) : R+ → (−1,∞) a Borel measur-
able and bounded function with κkk = 0 that provides sufficient conditions for a G-markov chain
C to remain a (time-inhomogeneous in general) G-markov chain under Q∗
Proposition 6.1.2. Let the probability measure Q∗ be defined before with the Radon-Nikodym
density ηT given earlier. Then
• the process Ct, t ∈ [0, T ] is a G-markov chain under Q∗
• the infinitesimal generator Λ∗(t) = [λ∗i,j(t)]1≤i,j≤K for C under Q∗ satisfies for i 6= j
λ∗i,j(t) = (1 + κij(t))λi,j, ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
and
λ∗i,i(t) = −
K∑
j=1,i 6=j
λ∗i,j(t), ∀t ∈ [0, T ]
• the two parameter family P∗(t, s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t ≤ T of transition matrices for C relative to Q∗
satisfies the forward Kolmogorov equation
dP∗(t, s)
ds
= P∗(t, s)Λ∗(s), ;P∗(t, t) = Id (6.16)
and the backward Kolmogorov equation
dP∗(t, s)
dt
= Λ∗(t)P∗(t, s), ;P∗(s, s) = Id (6.17)
Note that equations (6.16) and (6.17) are defined as the “Peano-Baker series”or “Magnus
expansion”with convergence and existence rules defined in [Higham05] and [Dacunha05]. Let’s now
review the existence of the solution (6.12) of the Kolmogorov equation (6.10) and its application
to credit risk modelling.
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Markov jump in a credit risk context
Existence of probability distribution: To ensure that the family P(·) associated with its
infinitesimal generator Q defines a probability distribution like equation (6.8), page 92, such as
µ(t+ s) = µtP(s), ∀t, s ∈ R+ will requite that Q is a non-negative square matrix.
For non-negative square matrices, the main result is the theorem of Perron-Frobenius which
states that a non-negative square matrix has a maximal non-negative eigenvalue which is not
exceeded in absolute value by any other eigenvalue and corresponding to which there is a non-
negative eigenvector. In [Cox77], the Perron-Forbenius theorem states that
Theorem 6.1.1 (Perron-Frobenius theorem). Suppose A ≥ 0 (positive matrix) and irreductible
then
• A has a real positive eigenvalue λ1 with the following properties:
• corresponding to λ1 there is an eigenvector x all of whose elements may be taken as positive
i.e. there exists a vector x > 0 such that
Ax = λ1x
• if α is another eigenvalue of A then
α ≤ λ1
• λ1 increases when any element of A increases
• λ1 is a simple root of the determinental equation
| λ1I−A |= 0
Remark: If λ1 itself is the only eigenvalue of modulus λ1 then A is said to be primitive.
This theorem ensures that the limiting behaviour of An is defined by its eigenvectors and is
positive. Applied to Markov chain it helps specify the conditions of the ergodicity of finite Markov
chains.
If the Markov chain is ergodic then its transition matrix is primitive and irreducible, i.eP ∈ P(·)
has a simple eigenvalue 1 which exceeds all other eigenvalues in modulus. Conversely, if P is
primitive and irreducible then the system is ergodic. The eigenvalue λ1 = 1 is simple and all other
eigenvalues are strictly less than 1 in modulus.
According to the theorem of Perron and Frobenius there is a positive row eigenvector pi = (pij)
satisfying piP = pi and we can normalise this vector so that
∑
pij = 1. From [Cox77] we have the
property
Proposition 6.1.3. If P is primitive and irreductible then the system is ergodic and
lim
n→∞
p
(n)
jk = pik > 0
the limit being approached geometrically fast and uniformly for all j and k. Conversely if the
system is ergodic then P is primitive and irreducible.
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The case of Markov processes in continuous time for processes with a finite number m of states
can be found in [Bellman60], page 192. For a fixed initial state i the probabilities pij(t)(j =
1, . . . ,m) satisfy a set of m simultaneous linear differential equations with constant coefficients de-
termined by Q known as the Chapman Kolmogorov equations presented earlier. It is well known
that the solution of such equations is given by the linear combinations of exponential terms, the
coefficients of t in the exponents being the eigenvalues of Q. There are minor complications if
Q has multiple eigenvalues. We already know that Q has a zero eigenvalue and it is extremely
plausible that the remaining eigenvalues have negative real parts. We, then, have an equilibrium
distribution determined as a limit as t tends to infinity from the contribution of the zero eigenvalue
plus a transient part dying away exponentially as t increases.
Thus with the spectral resolution of Q we have
Q = Bdiag(λ1, . . . , λm)C
t
where λ1, . . . , λm are the eigenvalues of Q and λ1 = 0 and BC
t = I. The matrices B and Ct
are respectively formed from the right and left eigenvalues of Q. The representation requires that
the eigenvalues are distinct, which we assume for simplicity. Then, we have
P(t) = Bdiag(eλ1t, . . . , eλmt)Ct
We assume that all states ofQ inter-communicate. Thus, the diagonal matrix tends to diag(1, 0, . . . , 0),
the rate of approach to the limit being exponential at a rate governed asymptotically by the largest
non-zero eigenvalue of Q. Further, the limiting form of P(t) is
bct = (b11, . . . , bm1)
t(c11, . . . , c1m)
(corresponding to λ1 = 0).
Computation of the exponential matrix: Since the Perron-Frobenius theorem is mainly a
way to express the ergodicity of the Makov jump process as a function of its eigenvalues, the
probabiltity vector
P(t) := etQ :=
∞∑
n=1
Qntn
n!
, t ∈ R+
will still require the compute easily etQ along time t. The paper [Moler03] famously presents the
methods to compute the exponential matrix which are detailed in appendix B.4, page 167. We
present here the methods that might apply in our context of multivariate credit risk i.e. when the
matrix Q exhibit an upper triangular structure. Also, it will be required to scale up and down
in dimension easily as the inclusion of several obligors in the case of valuing different kth-to-default
swaps.
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The exponential matrix is mainly found in Control theory, for the following state equation
∂x(t)
∂t
= Qx(t)
with Q a given fixed, real or complex n-by-n matrix, x(t) a column vector and the initial condition
x(0) = x0
The solution is given by
x(t) = eQtx0
with the exponential matrix eQt defined by the power series
exp(Qt) = I+ tQ+
Q2t2
2!
+
Q3t3
3!
+ ...
There main ways to compute the exponential of a matrix are :
• Series methods revolving around the Taylor series expansion or the characteristic polynomial
of Q: The main problem with those approaches is the error that is due when raising power
of the elements of the matrix Q might produce rounding errors.
• Ordinary Differential Equations methods by solving iteratively,
f(x, t) =
∂x(t)
∂t
−Qx(t)
using numerical optimisation methods with initial condition x(0) = x0. The process is
cumbersome with dimension greater than 2 with the possibility of eigenvalues that can turn
complex in the iterative process.
• The second Series method is the Pade Approximation based on the ratio of two rational
functions of the matrix Q. [Higham05] explains the method of Pade approximation which
is based on a limited polynomial exponential to approximate the matrix exponential. The
(p, q) Pade Approximation to exp(Qt) is defined by
Rpq[Q] = [Dpq[Q]]
−1Npq[Q]
with
Npq[Q] =
p∑
j=0
(p+ q − j)!p!
(p+ q)!j!(p− j)!Q
j
and
Dpq[Q] =
q∑
j=0
(p+ q − j)!q!
(p+ q)!j!(q − j)!Q
j
where non-singularity of Dpq[Q] is assured if p and q are large enough or if the eigenvalues
λi of Q are negative. This method is the method of choice in widely popular vector software
like Matlab or R.
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• Matrix decomposition methods using the properties of the matrix. The matrix decomposition
methods are likely to be most efficient for problems involving large matrices and repeated
evaluation based on factorisations and decompositions of the matrix Q.
If Q happens to be symmetric, the matrix decomposition are based on the transformation
of the form
Q = SRS−1
thus,
eQt = SeRtS−1
The natural decomposition is to take S to be the matrix whose columns are eigenvectors of
Q with
eQt = VeDtV−1
in case V is non singular and D is the diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues. The difficulty
in that case is that Q may be close to singular which means leading to non convergence.
[Golub83] describes the case when the matrix Q is upper-triangular. Thus, the product
of upper-triangular matrices is an upper triangular and the power series, i.e the exponential
is upper triangular. Furthermore, the eigenvalues of an upper triangular matrix are the
values on the diagonal. If none of the diagonal value is zero the matrix is also invertible.
Additionally the exponential of a diagonal matrix is also a diagonal matrix with the value
being the exponential of diagonal value. Thus, if Q = UDU −1 where matrix D is a diagonal
matrix with the eigenvalues of matrix Q and matrix U is an upper matrix representing the
eigenvectors of Q then expT t = U expDtU −1. The computation of the matrix U is obtained
with the iterative process called the backward substitution for upper triangular or forward
substitution for lower triangular matrices.
The preferred choice of the algorithm in terms of stability and efficiency will typically be a
function of the distribution of the eigenvalues (confluent or not, situated in the left pane) and the
structure of the matrix Q. Numerically, the Pade Approximation is scalable and can be applied
in general case while the decomposition method can be applied only when the structure is upper
triangular.
Having conditions on the infinitesimal generator Q, we now move to a Markov jump process
called phase-type distribution that we believe presents interesting feature to capture credit conta-
gion in a multivariate setting. We transpose the main previous results to this model and then will
apply it to credit modelling in the next chapter.
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6.1.2 Phase-type distribution structure in credit contagion setting
Phase-type distribution definition
A class of Markov chain that presents an interest in credit risk modelling is the so-called phase type
distribution introduced by [Neuts78] as an homogeneous Markov jump process and characterised
by a unique absorption state that is accessed through an exit vector positioned at right-hand side
of the transition matrix. Thus, under those specificities, all previous results about Markov jump
process (Ct)t≥0 are still valid. Recalling the presentation in [Asmu03], consider a phase-type dis-
tribution (Yt)t≥0, being a Markov jump process based on the finite space K = E ∪∆ where ∆ is
an absorbing state and E consist of K − 1 different transient states with (| E |) = K − 1.
The phase-type distribution introduces the following definitions from Chapter 2.2 page 44
in [Neuts78]:
Definition 6.1.4 (Phase-type distribution). Consider (Yt)t≥0 a Markov jump process defining a
phase-type distribution on R+ as in [Neuts78]. The following points characterise the chain Yt:
• Let α be the initial distribution m-dimension vector and define τ as the time to absorption,
that is
τ = inf{t > 0 : Yt = ∆} (6.18)
• Fα(t) be the cumulative distribution function of the time to absorption τ given the initial
distribution α
• Let Q be the intensity matrix of (Yt)t≥0 such that
Q =
 T | t−− | −−
0 | 0
 (6.19)
where T is a K − 1×K − 1 intensity matrix for transition between the states in E and t is
the absorption vector towards ∆. The matrix T is called the phase generator and t the exit
vector.
Typically, the chain starts in a non-absorbing state, so that P[Y0 = ∆] = 0 and as, for Markov
jump processes, all rows in Q must sum to zero and thus t = −T1.
By definition the absorbing state ∆ is the only recurrent state all the other states being transient
states. This lead to the important Lemma 2.2.1 page 45 in [Neuts78]:
Lemma 6.1.2. The states 1, . . . , K − 1 are transient if and only if the matrix T is non singular.
[Neuts78] originally defined the triplet (E, α,T) as a phase-type distribution where F is the
distribution of the time to absorption τ with the following closed-form formula properties from
Lemma 2.2.2 in [Neuts78]:
F (t) = P[τ < t] = 1− αeTt1 (6.20)
f(t) = αeTt1
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with
eTt =
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
Tntn
where f(t) is the density of F (t) and 1 = (1, . . . , 1)t ∈ RK−1. eTt is the matrix exponential which
has a closed-form expression in terms if the eigenvalue decomposition of T.
Credit obligor definitions
[Herb10] builds on the work of [Asmu03] and extends the work of [Assaf84] by using multivariate
phase-type distribution in a context of credit contagion in a set of m obligors. As we will also
focus on the multivariate aspect of the phase-type distribution where we detail here some key
aspects. The markov chain Yt describes per each state the status vector of the m obligors being
either defaulted or not. [Assaf84] identifies that in the multivariate context, the distribution F of
the time to absorption τ designates the time where all obligors would have defaulted. Thus, by
identifying all the states where obligor i has defaulted with ∆i the final absorbing state for Yt is
defined as:
∆ =
m⋂
i=1
∆i, ∆ ∈ K, ∆i ∈ K (6.21)
[Asmu03] and [Herb10] build on this property to express multivariate probability default in a
closed-form formula format using formula (6.20) and identifying with state corresponds to defaults
of any particular obligor.
Thus, consider m obligors in E and τi be the time of default for obligor i, with i ∈ E =
{1, 2, . . . ,m}, and the corresponding default point processes
H it = 1{τi<t}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
contain any information regarding the default times τ1, . . . , τm with the filtrations
Hit = σ(H it ; s ≤ t)
Ht =
n∨
i=1
Hit
From [Asmu03], extending the work of [Assaf84],
Proposition 6.1.4. There exists a markov Jump process (Yt)t≥0 with infinitesimal generator Q :=
[λi,j]1≤i,j≤K on a finite state space E and a family of absorption sets {∆i}mi=1 such that the stopping
times
τi = inf{t > 0 : Yt ∈ ∆i}, i ∈ E,∆i ∈ K
define a joint distribution of default times (τ1, . . . , τm)
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The joint distribution of (τ1, . . . , τm) is called a multivariate phase-type distribution or
MPH.
We can now connect the states set K of the chain Yt in a multivariate setting to the obligors in
E and their default ordering as presented in section 4.1, page 47. Since the state ∆ represents all
obligors having defaulted, from the initial state, each state Yt corresponds to a set of consecutive
defaulted obligors that defined at time t a part of the permutation {τpi(−) < τ < τpi(+)}. Thus,
the filtration Ht representing the observation of the default times of the permutations pi ∈ Π is
characterised by the observation of the states of the Markov chain Yt with
Ht = FYt = σ(Yt, t ∈ R+)
We will in the reminder of the document when quoting the filtration Ht imply its equivalent
one FYt .
Additionally, since the states of the markov chain Yt represent the evolution of the credit status
of the multivariate obligors (X1, . . . , Xm), starting from a non defaulted status represented by the
initial vector α = (1, 0, . . . , 0) and the states will be ordered such that the infinitesimal generator
Q will exhibit an upper-triangular structure.
Markov copula Property in a phase-type setting
Since the multivariate phase-type distribution (α,E,T) represented by the Markov chain Yt has
the markovian property (6.1), page 91, for the vector (X1, . . . , Xm), it will be interesting to have
the same property for each the marginal vectors Xi, i ∈ E.
Historically, as mentioned before, two major families of dynamic models have been developed:
one is known as bottom-up and the other is known as top-down. Bottom-up models describe the
evolution of each individual default process and are therefore driven by the information generated
by the underlying pool of obligations. Top-down models describe the evolution of the portfolio
loss process (or functionals) and can be viewed as reduced information models since only the in-
formation about the sum of the defaults and functionals is used. Top-down are computationally
efficient by fail to incorporate the marginal information that could produce sensible hedging re-
sults. The idea of the Markov copula approach is to combine the advantage of a copula model
with a dynamic bottom-up approach.
We assess this potentiality through the concept of Markov Copula introduced first in [Bielecki08]
(A more general account of the theory of the copula can be found in [Bielecki15a] and [Bielecki15b])
with example for markov jump processes and Markov jump diffusion processes. [Bielecki08] study
the dependence between components of multivariate processes and the conditions such that the
multivariate process and its embedded marginal ones share the markovian property. Most of the
applications in [Bielecki08] has been focused on Markov Jump diffusion processes representing
the intensity modulated by the chain values. By enabling simultaneous default and ensuring the
Markov Copula properties, [Bielecki08] and [Bielecki13] can calibrate separately each obligors to
CDS and then simulate loss processes Lt to replicate CDO or index Credit derivatives. Another
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approach in Markov copula is presented in [Bielecki11] is to construct a multivariate chain with
components that are given Markov chain. This approach is directly linked to the Markov copula
property of the MPH. The property linking the intensity of default of each obligors with the multi-
variate intensity is found in Theorem 1.1 and Theorem 1.2 in [Bielecki11] that we will quote below
and use in our framework.
Consider a multivariate Markov Chain Z = (X1, . . . , Xm) of dimension | E | which is a finite
Markov chain w.r.t its natural filtration FZ =
∨m
i=1 FXi . Xi is defined as chain representing the
states of obligor i ∈ E. The conditions linking the infinitesimal generators and Markov chains of
Z with Xi’s can be expressed in both ways.
• Condition 1: Sufficient and necessary conditions on the infinitesimal generator of Z so that
the components Xi are markov chains with respect to their natural filtrations FXi .
• Condition 2: Conditions on the construction of a mutlivariate markov chain Z whose compo-
nents Xi’s are themselves markov chains w.r.t their natural filtrations FXi and have desired
infinitesimal characteristics.
The conditions are stated in the case of two dimensions:
Consider S and mathcalO a finite sets, with the markov chain Z = (X, Y ) defined on Z = S×O
with generator function AZ(t) = [λihjk(t)]i,j∈S,k,h∈Om .
The condition 1 is equivalent to
∑
k∈O
λihjk(t) =
∑
k∈O
λih
′
jk (t), ∀h, h
′ ∈ O,∀i, j ∈ S, i 6= j
and ∑
j∈S
λihjk(t) =
∑
j∈S
λi
′
h
jk (t), ∀i, i
′ ∈ S,∀h, k ∈ O, h 6= k
with
f ij(t) :=
∑
k∈O
λihjk(t)i, j ∈ S, i 6= j, f ii (t) := −
∑
j∈S,i 6=j
f ij(t)∀i ∈ S,
and
ghk (t) :=
∑
j∈S
λihjk(t)k, h ∈ O, h 6= k, ghh(t) := −
∑
k∈O,h6=k
ghk (t)∀h ∈ O,
where X , Y are Markov Chains with generator AX(t) = [f ij(t)]i,j∈S and A
Y (t) = [ghk (t)]h,k∈O
respectively
In Addressing Condition 2, [Bielecki11] states the following constraints on intensities:
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Proposition 6.1.5. two Markov chains X and Y and their filtrations and generator AX(t) =
[αij(t)]i,j∈S and A
Y (t) = [βhk (t)]h,k∈O. Define System of equations in unknowns λ
ih
jk(u) where i, j ∈
S, h, k ∈ O, (i, h) 6= (j, k) ∑
k∈O
λihjk(t) = α
i
j(t), ∀h ∈ O,∀i, j ∈ S, i 6= j
∑
j∈S
λihjk(t) = β
h
k (t), ∀i ∈ S,∀h, k ∈ O, h 6= k
Suppose system of equations admits solutions such that the matrix function A(t) = [λihjk(t)]i,j∈S,h,k∈O
with
λihih(t) = −
∑
(j,k)∈S×O,(j,k)6=(i,h)
λihjk(t)
properly defines an infinitesimal generator.
Condition 1 and Condition 2 in order to build a MPH Markov copula are equivalent to the
following proposition:
Proposition 6.1.6 (No simultaneous default Markov copulae). Under the no-simultaneous default
assumption, the Markov copulas conditions either when Z is a Markov chain or when all Xi are
Markov chains imply a no-contagion condition between those obligors identified by any Xi.
Proof. We consider Markov chains with an absorption state and in a credit risk context i.e.
S = {0, 1}. Under the assumption of no-simultaneous default and an upper-triangular struc-
ture of the infinitesimal generator (post non-default impossibility), the above conditions imply
Condition 1:
λ0p = λ
|1|
|1|,p = λ
|2|
|2|,p = . . . = λ
|m−1|
∆ (6.22)
where | k |, k ∈ E represents the number of obligor having already defaulted in Z with the
exception of p ∈ E, {| k |, p} identifies Z with k + 1 defaults including p
Comment: With this condition, obligor p default is insensitive with the previous defaults and .
an the intensity of default of obligor p is equal to,
α01 = λ
0
p + λ
|1|
|1|,p + λ
|2|
|2|,p + . . .+ λ
|m−1|
∆
Condition 2: The condition starting from the markov chain Z is equal to
α01 = λ
0
p = λ
|1|
|1|,p = λ
|2|
|2|,p = . . . = λ
|m−1|
∆ , (6.23)
Both structure either starting from Z or starting for Xi imply that under no-simultaneous de-
fault it is impossible to add credit contagion and build a Markov copulae structure for multivariate
chains. [Crepey09] uses the 2 obligors Markov jump process with a Markov copulae structure to
value the counterparty risk of a CDS. Under the previous Markov consistency joint defaults were
necessary. Since our multivariate setting in section 4.1 does not allow for simulatenous default as
per assumption 3.1.1 we will not work under the Markov Copula framework. Thus, we need to
express multivariate probability distribution linked to the intensity matrix Q.
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Probability distribution definitions
[Herb10] established the following results for probability distributions under a phase-type distri-
bution framework:
In the setting with m obligors, the probability of reaching the sequence j = {j1, .., jm} repre-
senting the ordering of default of obligors with the | K − 1 | × | K − 1 | transition matrix is given
by
P(Yt = j) = α expQt ej for ej ∈ R|K−1| (6.24)
with j ∈ E and ej denote a column vector in R|E| where the entry at position j is 1 and the other
entries are zero.
We now list some of the closed-form formula for multivariate default and survival distributions,
marginal distributions.
The joint survival distribution: The following proposition was stated in [Assaf84]
Proposition 6.1.7. Consider m obligors and the ordered vector (t1, . . . , tm) ∈ Rm+ with ti1 < . . . <
tim its ordering where (i1, . . . , im) is permutation of (t1, . . . , tm), Then the joint survival distribution
is given by
Q[τ1 > t1, ..., τm > tm] = α
(
m∏
k=1
eQ(tik−tik−1 )Gik
)
where ti0 = 0 (6.25)
with the status matrix Gi be | K − 1 | × | K − 1 | diagonal matrix (Recall E= K − 1), i.e.
(G i)j,j′ = 0 for j 6=j
′
and
(Gi)j,j′ =
{
1 if j ∈ Ei
0 if j
′
/∈ Ei (6.26)
where Ei describes the state in matrix Q where obligor i is non-defaulted.
The framework in [Assaf84] and expanded in [Herb10] enables to formulate multivariate prob-
ability distributions via Markov theory and equation (6.24) through the identification of Status
matrices like (6.26) are used to identify the permutation cases that are in relation with the various
distributions expressing default or survival ordering scenarios.
We state the expressions from [Herb10] for the marginal survival distributions Q(τi > t),
Q(τ (k) > t), and Q(τ (k) > t, τ (k) = τi) using the ordered sequence of defaults (τ (k))mk=1 for a set of
m obligors that corresponds to our permutation setting like in section 4.3.
τ (0) = 0 (6.27)
τ (k) = inf{τi : 1 ≤ i ≤ m; τi > τ (k−1)}, k = 1, . . . ,m (6.28)
The marginal survival distributions Q(τi > t) are needed to compute single-name CDS while the
ordered marginal survival distributions and related quantities, Fk(t) = Q[τ (k) > t] and Fk,i(t) =
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Q[τ (k) > t, τ (k) = τi] for i = 1, . . . ,m, are needed to price basket default swaps such as kth-to
default swaps.
The marginal survival distributions:
Lemma 6.1.3. Consider the m obligors in E whose default time τi are defined as in proposi-
tion 6.1.4. Then the marginal survival distribution and the ordered marginal survival distribution
are given by,
Q[τi > t] = αeQtg(i) and Q[τ (k) > t] = αeQtm(k) (6.29)
where the column vectors g(i),m(k) of length | K | are defined as
g(i)j = 1{j∈(∆i)C} and m
(k)
j = 1{j∈∪k−1n=0En} (6.30)
where (∆i)
C is the set in which obligor i is not defaulted and En is the set consisting of n elements
of {1, . . . ,m}havingdefaulted.
In this case the status matrix of the marginal survival distribution g(i) represents an iden-
tification of all the states in K where obligor i is non defaulted. The ordered marginal survival
distribution status matrix m(k) represents the states in K where there has been less than k defaults.
The marginal ordered kth survival distribution: The marginal kth survival distribution
will be of interest for the multi-name credit derivatives products since those products are more
exposed to the contagion impact by being more senior in the capital structure and having embedded
leverage. However it will be of interest to identify which obligor i ∈ E is the kth entity to default.
Thus, the closed-form formula Q(τ (k) > t, τ (k) = τi) will be key to capture cases of wrong-way risk
and kth-to-default spreads where the interest of having credit protection is increasing at the same
time the counterparty credit default becomes more likely.
Lemma 6.1.4. Consider the m obligors in E whose default time τi are defined as in proposi-
tion 6.1.4. Then the the marginal ordered kth survival distribution which is the probability that the
kth default is identified by obligor i and does not occur before t is expressed as,
Q(τ (k) > t, τ (k) = τi) = αeQt
(
k−1∑
l=0
(
k−1∏
p=l
Gi,pP
)
hi,k
)
= αeQt
(
k−1∑
l=0
(
k−1∏
p=l
Gi,pP
)
Hi,k1
)
= αeQtRi,kHi,k1 (6.31)
for k = 1, ...,m, where
Pj,j′ =
Qj,j′
Σk 6=jQj,k
j, j′ ∈ E
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and
Ri,k =
k−1∑
l=0
(
k−1∏
p=l
Gi,pP
)
with hi,kj = 1{j∈(∆i)∩Ek} and G
i,k
j,j = 1{j∈(∆i)C∩Ek} and G
i,k
j,j′ = 0 if j 6= j′
and Hi,kj,j = 1 if j ∈ ∆ik ,Hi,kj,j = 0 if j 6= ∆ik and Hi,kj,j′ = 0 if j 6= j′
where hi,k is a column vectors of length | K | and Gi,k,Hi,k are | K | × | K | diagonal matrices.
The status matrix Hi,kj,j′ or h
i,k
j represent an identification of all the states in K where k obligors
have defaulted and obligor i is not defaulted. The status matrix Gi,k is similar in structure but
represent the case where obligor i has defaulted
Proof. The proof in [Herb10] is established by regrouping the states of Q by considering a sub-
Markov Chain (Yn)t≥0 representing the progress of a chain representing the number of obligors
having defaulted. Using the conditional probabilities of transition properties
Q{Ctn = j | Ctn−1 = i} = pij := −
λij
λii
, ∀i, j ∈ K, i 6= j
the intensity of states are rewritten according to the matrix of probabilities
Pj,j′ =
Qj,j′
Σk 6=jQj,k
j, j′ ∈ E
With the above distributions, we derive now the closed-form solutions for single-name CDS
spreads and kth-to-default swaps.
The kth-to-default swap spread and the single-name CDS spread: For the obligor set
E, the fair spread κ(k)(T ) at time 0 of a kth-to-default swaps of maturity T is defined for n − 1
payment dates over [0, T ], for m obligors as
κ(k)(T ) =
∑m
j=1 LGDj
∫ T
0
βsdFk,j(s)∑n
j=1
(
D(0, tj)θjQ[Tk > tj] +
∫ tj
tj−1
βs(s− tj−1)dFk(s)
) (6.32)
using the previous expressions for marginal distributions:
Fk(s) = Q[τ (k) > t] = αeTtMk1
and
Fk,j(t) = Q[τ (k) ≤ t, τ (k) = τi] = αeQtRi,kHi,k1
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[Herb10] expressed the following integrals∫ T
0
Qe(Q−rI )tdt and
∫ T
0
tQe(Q−rI )tdt
in the multivariate phase type distribution, leading to the proposition
Proposition 6.1.8. Consider the m obligors in E whose default time τi are defined as in propo-
sition 6.1.4 and assume that the interest rate r is constant, then κ(k)(T ), the kth to default swap
premium, is expressed in the multi-variate phase type distribution framework as :
κ(k)(T ) =
α(A(0)−A(T ))Φk1
α
(∑n
j=1
(
θje(Q−rI)tj +C(tj−1, tj)
))
Mk1
(6.33)
where
Φk =
m∑
i=1
(LGDi)R
i,kHi,k
C(s, t) = s(A(t)−A(s))−B(t) +B(s) for A(t) = V(I+ rW)−1)eWtV−1
B(t) = V(W+ rI)(tI−W−1)W−1eWtV−1
and
e(Q−rI)t = VeWtV−1
where W is a diagonal matrix where the diagonal elements are the eigenvalues of Q− rI and
the columns of the matrix V are the corresponding eigenvectors.
Similarly since the single-name CDS is a kth-to-default swaps with k = 1 we can rewrite the
status matrix
Proposition 6.1.9. Consider the m obligors in E whose default time τi are defined as in propo-
sition 6.1.4 and assume that the interest rate r is constant. Then Si(T ), the k
th to single-name
credit default swap spread for obligor i, is expressed in the multi-variate phase type distribution
framework as :
Si(T ) =
(1− φi)α(A(0)−A(T ))g(i)
α (
∑nT
n=1 (θne
Qtne−rtn +C(tn−1, tn))) g(i)
(6.34)
where
C(s, t) = s(A(t)−A(s))−B(t) +B(s)
A(t) = eQt(Q− rI)−1Qe−rt
B(t) = eQt(tI+ (Q− rI)−1)(Q− rI)−1Qe−rt
The propositions 6.1.8 and 6.1.9 will be useful in extracting from quoted spreads in the mar-
ket the matrix Q where the intensities [λi,j]1≤i,j≤K will be structured to identify the ordering of
defaulted obligors. Let’s review now how to encompass credit dependency in the λi,j such that
obligors exhibit credit contagion.
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Credit contagion definitions
Until now, we haven’t made any specific assumptions on the functional aspect of the intensities
[λi,j]1≤i,j≤K of Q except the upper-triangular shape due to the fact that Yt evolves from no de-
fault to the absorption state ∆. Going back to section 5.2.1, page 79, on dependence modelling,
[Jarrow01] introduced a contagion intensity model that seems the most interesting in capturing
credit contagion in a credit basket claim. In a identical approach as [Jarrow01], [Herb10] categorises
the obligors into infector and infected sets with the difference that each obligors can be in both
sets. We say that the obligors i = 1, 2, . . . ,m undergo default contagion if for every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
at least one of the following conditions holds
• ∃ set Ii 6= ∅ and Ii ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}/{i}, ∆λi{t=τj} 6= 0 ∀j ∈ Ii
• ∃ set Fi 6= ∅ and Fi ⊆ {1, . . . ,m}/{i}, ∆λj{t=τi} 6= 0 ∀j ∈ Fi
where Ii is the i-infector set and Fi is the i-infected set.
This will fit well our permutation model. Let Π(m) be the set of permutation {pi1, . . . , pim} of
{1, . . . ,m} that will identify the order of the defaults of the entities of the obligor set while the
Markov Jump process (Yt)t≥0 evolves towards the absorption state ∆.
Each identified permutation pi ∈ Π(m), pi = {pi1, . . . , pim} with the set of corresponding ordered
defaults {τpi1 < τpi2 < . . . < τpim} will correspond to the multiple defaults event
1{τpi1<τpi2<...<τpim}
Note that simultaneous defaults in the set E are also excluded.
Ordered versus non-ordered default contagion: We say that the obligors i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
undergo ordered default contagion if they undergo default contagion and if the following conditions
hold, for at least one obligor i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
∃ pi, pi′ ∈ Π(m),∃ j ∈ Ii, ∆λi{t=τj}1pi 6= ∆λi{t=τj}1pi′
The intuitive meaning of ordered default contagion for a set of obligors is that the obligors not only
affect each other through their defaults, but also the order in which the obligors default. Equiv-
alently, obligors undergo simple default contagion if the order of defaults of obligors is irrelevant,
thus reducing the combinatronics of the permutation set Π(m).
It is commonly believed that at the default of one firm, say firm j, the intensity λit, i 6= j will
jump, normally upwards. It is this feature that is captured in the default intensity definition:
The typical cardinality of phases will be
• K = ∑m−1n=0 n!Cmn for inhomogeneous portfolio with ordered defaults,
• K = 2m − 1 for inhomogeneous portfolio with unordered defaults,
• K = m+ 1 for an homogeneous portfolio.
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Default intensity definitions
The model studied in [Herbert05] is specified by requiring that the default intensities have the
following form:
λt,i = ai +
∑
j 6=i
bi,j1 {τj≤t}, t ≤ τi, i, j ∈ E (6.35)
with
• λt,i = 0 ∀t > τi, and,
• ai, bi,j ≥ 0 constant such that λt,i is non negative.
The financial interpretation of (6.35) is that the default intensities are constant, except at the
times when default occur: then the default intensity for obligor i jumps by an amount bi,j if it is
obligor j which has defaulted. bi,j represents the contagion aspect by encapsulating the impact on
the default intensity of i of an earlier default of obligor j. Thus, a positive bi,j means that obligor
i is put at higher risk by the default of obligor j, while a negative bi,j means that obligor i in fact
benefits from the default of j, and finally bi,j=0 if obligor i is unaffected by the default of j. This
framework was first developed in [Assaf84] and [Herb08b] . In the remainder of the thesis,
• ai will define the base intensity,
• bi,j will define the jump intensity.
We will consider the same intensities as in equation (6.35) since this model captures well the
contagion with a distinct contagion parameter through the jump intensities bi,j,∀i, j ∈ E. Thus,
the states identified along the matrix Q with [λi,j]1≤i,j≤K have to be identified along the chain Yt
with the corresponding intensity in equation (6.35) as a function of the obligors.
Q = [λi,j]1≤i,j≤K =

−a1 − a2 a1 a2 0
0 −(a1 + b1,2) 0 a1 + b1,2
0 0 −(a2 + b1,2) a2 + b1,2
0 0 0 0

Computation of the Exponential matrix having further specified the intensities according
to equation (6.35), we can adjust accordingly the conditions on the computation of the Exponential
matrix. In the case of the multivariate phase type distributions presented earlier, the construction
of an upper triangular matrix T with negative elements on the diagonal will ensure that all
the eigenvalues are thus negative. The Pade-Approximation method will thus be non singular.
Numerically, the choice of p and q will determine prescribed accuracy with
cond(Dpq[Q]) ' cond(eQ/2) ≥ e(λ1−λn)/2
with λ1 = 1 > ... ≥ λn are the real part of the eigenvalues Q. This will be the method used in
the computation of the exponential matrix for the calibration to default probability embedded in
credit derivatives claims. The functions is implemented in Matlab as ’expm()’.
Additionally, the multivariate phase-type distribution introduced earlier presents non confluent
eigenvalues (Confluent eigenvalues occurs when the matrix Q does not have linearly independent
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vectors.) and are a good cases for matrix decomposition methods. Another improvement can
be obtained with the use of triangular estimation of the matrix V of eigenvectors using the QR
algorithm. This is the method used in [Herb10].
We will use the Pade-Approximation method since the eigenvalues ensure the convergence
of the polynomials and the implementation in vector-type software like Matlab ensures model
flexibility. For example, since the calibration is done typically by a numerical optimisation (see
next section), the parameter vector and objective function are given by handle functions (usually
using a pointer address) and thus allowing to try several models of intensity Q = [λi,j]1≤i,j≤K ],
time-series calibrations or concurrent calibrations. Finally, in section 6.3, page 128, we will model
a non upper triangular infinitesimal generator Q, thus loosing the capacity of implementation
provided by the decomposition method.
Calibration
From the equations (6.33) and (6.34), page 108, all the parameters including the contagion pa-
rameters bi,j of the intensity in equation (6.35), page 110, determine the marginal distributions
Q(τi > t),Q(τ (k) > t),Q(τ (k) > t, τ (k) = τi) in a single calibration process. By opposition, in the
widely used copula model the probability distributions Q(τi > t) are modelled by idiosyncratic
parameters unique for each obligor. Then, the joint dependence is introduced by the copula and
its parameters, which are separated from the parameters describing each individual default distri-
bution. Thus, the MPH model presents the functionality of calibrating the idiosyncratic intensity
parameter ai and the dependence or contagion intensity bi,j with i, j ∈ E.
Single name credit default swaps in equation (6.34) provide a direct link between the marginal
distribution Q(τi > t), and the intensities parameters ai and bi,j. Thus, as it is common practice,
that the quoted CDS spreads are viewed as proxy of market implied default intensity, thus enabling
the extraction of parameters ai and bi,j under the risk-neutral probability measure Q.
In order to “calibrate”the parameters ai and bi,j, [Cont10] encyclopaedia provides a good
overview of all the calibration methods applied in finance, from the typical formula inversion
of Black-Scholes formula to iterative numerical minimisation methods. For the matrix analytical
closed-form formula in the multivariate phase type distribution framework, numerical minimisa-
tion techniques will be required to establish the base intensities ai and the jump intensities b{i,j}
that equates the market spread quotes with the model. Most of the methods are presented in
[Nocedal06], [Fletcher63],[Berndt74],[More77] and [Marquardt63], and are multivariate versions of
the steepest descent method where the direction is set by the Jacobian matrix.
Using the Levenberg-Marquardt non-linear least squares minimisation (Matlab function “lsqnon-
lin”), we need to estimate the vector θ = (a, b) from CDS quoted spreads for a portfolio of inho-
mogeneous obligors.
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The intensities in a m obligors set, will be computed with:
θ = argminθˆ
m∑
j=1
[Sjt (κ, T ; θˆ)− Sjt (κ, T )]2 (6.36)
with Sjt (κ, T ) being the value of the quoted CDS with spread κ of obligor j and maturity T and
Sjt (κ, T ; θˆ) being the value of the CDS with the computed spread κ of obligor j and maturity T
obtained using the MPH model with parameters θˆ according to equation (6.34), page 108.
However we can point here that the dimension of vector θ is greater than m leading to an
overspecified model where some the parameters have to be fixed or other quoted products have
to be included such as a time-series calibration or the calibration process has to be broken or
“cascaded”into different steps.
[Herb08b] contains a calibration for a non-homogeneous portfolio in the case of 15 obligor names
but the model is “semi-calibrated”for that portfolio. The calibration assumes that the relative
dependence structure bi,j in (6.35) are exogenously given, hence the term “semi-calibration”and
thus only the base intensities ai are then obtained by individual calibration to the market CDS
spreads. The reason for the “semi-calibration”is that the minimisation technique with a high level
of depend parameters ai and b{i,j} take times and is very sensitive to the starting point. The
calibration process (6.36) is thus rewritten
a = (a1, ..., am) = argminaˆ
m∑
j=1
[Sjt (κ, T,b; aˆ)− Sjt (κ, T )]2 (6.37)
where the m component of vector a are calibrated to m CDS spreads. This calibration is imple-
mented in Matlab as previously presented for a set of single-name credit default swaps. We list
the results of the “semi-calibrated”calibration in the appendix B.1, page 157. The reproduced
spreads of the 10 year tenor are in a range of error negligible (≈ 10−6%) of the quoted spread with
intensities typically of the order of 5 10−3 − 5 10−2 .
In order to avoid the “semi-calibration”issue, the calibration can be structured to extract
more information from market implied data and use time-series of spreads (5-yr and 10-yr quotes
for example) instead of one spread (5-yr) quotes per obligor. The main reason is to enable the
calibration of the base intensity ai and the jump intensity b{i,j} at the same time. The calibration
process (6.37) is thus rewritten
θ = argminθˆ
m∑
j=1
[Sjt (κ, T1; θˆ)− Sjt (κ, T1)]2 + [Sjt (κ, T2; θˆ)− Sjt (κ, T2)]2 (6.38)
with T1 and T2 two maturity date. (5-yr and 10-yr quotes in our case).
We implement several variations of equation (6.38), with
• a simultaneous calibration of a and b,
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• an alternate calibration between a and b at each iteration,
• a successive calibration starting with a for a pre-fixed b, then calibrate b keeping a constant.
In terms of numerical errors in the fitting process of all those approaches, the time-series calibra-
tion provides a difficult calibration in terms of residual errors and most of the time fails to converge
and thus should not be used to calibration base ai and jump bi,j intensities instead of using the
“semi-calibration”process even if the choice of the jump intensity bi,j in the “semi-calibration”will
have an impact on the obtained base intensity ai. The time series calibration is also very difficult
for flat or inverted CDS curve and then generate high error of calibration. Conditional to numerical
implementation error in our part, we believe one of the main reason of the failure of convergence
is linked to the “exponential shape ”of the MPH and thus, while this shape is not important in
calibrating a single tenor it is a problem in calibrating two tenors at the same time especially if the
CDS market curve exhibits a flat or inverted shape. Thus, a time-series calibration would require
a piecewise constant intensity vector a but would still provide no information about the vector b.
Another way of estimating b from quoted quotes is to use index credit derivatives like ITRAXX.
[Herb08a] adapted the MPH framework where the obligors are homogeneous and, thus, cannot be
identified. In this case, the markov chains (Yt)t≥0 represents the number of obligors having de-
faulted towards an absorption state ∆ that still represents the state in which all the obligors in
E have defaulted. [Herb08a] is able to calibrate a vector b = (b1, . . . , b6) representing an homo-
geneous contagion across each tranche of the Index. This method could provide some idea about
the contagion level b to use in “semi-calibration”process.
Credit dependence via MPH
Since it is difficult to calibrate θ = (a,b) simultaneously, it is still possible from the range of values
of vector a calibrated with equation 6.37 to simulate the impact on the marginal distributions
Q(τi > t),Q(τ (k) > t) and Q(τ (k) > t, τ (k) = τi) for a range of values of vector b. Thus, the
dependency of ai and bi,j of a set of obligors E can be analysed in a credit contagion with the
probability distributions presented in appendix B.2, page 159. This credit dependence will be used
in a Counterparty Credit Risk context in the next section.
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6.2 Counterparty Credit Risk with Phase type distribu-
tion
6.2.1 Credit Valuation Formula
multivariate hazard processes in phase-type distribution
We try now turn to the expression of the probability Q[
∑
pi∈Π 1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}1{τ<T} | Ft] for the
trigger set T in a closed-form format using the previously introduced multivariate phase-type dis-
tributions presented from section 6.1.2, page 100. Additionally, we consider in the reminder of
document the loss given default LGD and its associated recovery value REC as constants for each
obligor i. Also the probability Q[
∑
pi∈Π 1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}1{τ<T} | Ft] is independent of the filtration
Ft as we can conceptually consider that interest rates or commodities state variables that are F -
measurable do not influence the observations of default times through the filtration H. However,
with this simplification it will not be possible to assess the impact of Counterparty Credit Risk of
claims under correlation between the interest rates and credit risk.
We know from the marginal survival distribution in equation (6.29), page 106, is a function of
the exponential of matrix Q and a status matrix.
P[τi > t] = P[Yt ∈ Ei] = αeTtGi1 = αeQtg(i)
with g(i) a status matrix identical toGi but incorporating the absorption state in the dimensionality
and Gi be |E | × |E | diagonal matrix, i.e. (G i)j,j′ = 0 for j 6=j
′
and
(Gi)j,j′ =
{
1 if j ∈ Ei
0 if j
′
/∈ Ei
where Ei describes the state in matrix Q where obligor i is non-defaulted.
For the non defaultable claim and the defaultable claim, we need to express in the multivariate
phase type distribution framework the probability distribution
Q[
∑
pi∈Π
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}1{τ<T}]
of the events in the trigger set T . It is interesting to note here that the event of the permutation
set 1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)} corresponds to a state in the matrix Q since the matrix states evolve through
communicating states according to an ordering of no-defaults towards absorption state ∆. We can
write in the case of the counterparty C
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Q[
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}1{τ>t}] = Q[τC > t]
= Q[Yt ∈ EC ]
= αeTtGC1 (6.39)
with the status matrix GC be |E | × |E | diagonal matrix, i.e. (G i)j,j′ = 0 for j 6=j
′
and
(Gi)j,j′ =
{
1 if j ∈ EC
0 if j
′
/∈ EC
where EC describes the state in matrix Q where obligor C is non-defaulted. Similar matrices GI
and GRef can be obtained. Thus, we have
Q[
∑
pi∈ΠC
1{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)}1{t<τC<T}] = Q[τC > t]−Q[τC > T ]
= Q[Yt ∈ EC ]−Q[YT ∈ EC ]
= αeTtGC1− αeTTGC1
with the probabillities Q[
∑
pi∈Π I 1{τ(pi−)<τI<τ(pi+)}1{τI<T}] and Q[
∑
pi∈ΠR 1{τ(pi−)<τR<τ(pi+)}1τR<T ]
defined in a same way. The probability Q[1{t<τ≤T}
∑
pi∈Π 1{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)}] will be identified with
the status matrix GC,I be |E | × |E | diagonal matrix, i.e. (GC,I)j,j′ = 0 for j 6=j
′
and
(GC,I)j,j′ =
{
1 if j ∈ EC,I
0 if j
′
/∈ EC,I
where EC,I describes the state in matrix Q where obligor C or I have non-defaulted.
We now express the propositions 5.1.6 and 5.1.7 for valuing the BCVA adjustments of non
defaultable and defaultable contingent claims. However to express the counterparty adjustment
part since we have closed-form formula for obligors of the set T for survival distribution but not
for its corresponding intensity, we approximate the formula by discretising the interval (t, T ] with
a time grid t0 = t, t1, . . . , tn = T . For simplicity, in line with numerical simulations, we present
the result from time t = 0.
Non defaultable claim CCR in phase-type distribution
We rewrite the proposition 5.1.6, page 76 of non defaultable claim in a multivariate setting using
the hazard processes defined in equation 5.2.
Proposition 6.2.1 (Bilateral CVA for non-defaultble claim in multivariate setting). Consider an
FT -measurable non-defaultable claim X defined in (3.1) under bilateral counterpart credit risk as
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X(0, T )d = E
(∫ T
0
βudXu
)
− LGDCE(
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GC1− αeTtiGC1)βτCX(τC)+)
+ LGDIE(
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GI1− αeTtiGI1)βτIX(τI)−)
= X(T )−BCV A (6.40)
with
BCV A = CV A−DV A
= LGDCE(
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GC1− αeTtiGC1)βτCX(τC)+)
− LGDIE(
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GI1− αeTtiGI1)βτIX(τI)−)
= E(
n∑
i=0
(αeTti−1GC,I1− αeTtiGC,I1)βτ [ED(τ)]) (6.41)
Remark that in the numerical simulation, the first term of equation (6.40) will also be discretised
according to t0, . . . , tn with discretisation scheme (Euler scheme, Milstein scheme, etc.) depending
on the claim X that is valued.
Defaultable claim CCR in phase-type distribution
We rewrite the proposition 5.1.7, page 76 of non defaultable claim in a multivariate setting using
the hazard processes defined in equation 5.2. We suppose here with the discretisation of the interval
[0, T ] that the processes A,Z and Xd can also be discretised with bucketing, i.e postponing the
payments Zτ or the accumulated payments As until τ to the first ti following τ .
Proposition 6.2.2 (Bilateral CVA for defaultble claim in multivariate setting). Consider a de-
faultable claim Sn+1t defined in (3.3) under bilateral counterpart credit risk as
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Et(βtSn+1,dt ) = E
(∫ T
t
G
τRef
s βsdAs
+
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GRef1− αeTtiGRef1)βτtiZτti
+ αeTTGRef1βTX
d
t
)
− LGDCE(
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GC1− αeTtiGC1)βτC (Sn+1τC )+)
+ LGDIE(
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GI1− αeTtiGI1)βτI (Sn+1τI )−)
= Sn+1t −BCV At (6.42)
with
BCV At = CV At −DV At
= LGDCE(
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GC1− αeTtiGC1)βτC (Sn+1τC )+)
− LGDIE(
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GI1− αeTtiGI1)βτI (Sn+1τI )−)
= E(
n∑
i=0
(αeTti−1GC,I1− αeTtiGC,I1)βτ [ED(τ)]) (6.43)
Remark that the typical non-defaultable claim like the single-name credit default swaps and
the kth-to-default will enable the discretisation of the first term in the equation (6.42). We leave
it here in its integral form.
To conclude, the propositions 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 above require the expression of the dependence
modelling since Gi are the status matrices of states in | E | where i ∈ T .
6.2.2 Numerical Results
Simulation process of Defaultable claims
The proposition 6.2.1, page 115, requires the simulation of value of the claims Xt over (t, T ] to
generate the pricing metric like CVA or the risk metrics like EPE, ENE and ES (39). The De-
faultable claims that we will value are the Interest rate swap and the cross currency swap. Let’s
first present how this will be implemented with more coding structure presented in appendix B.5,
page 174.
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QuantLib-based counterparty Monte-Carlo engine implementation We implement the
Defaultable products using QuantLib which is a C++ open source library for Quantitative Finance.
The main benefit is the object pointer in C++ enabling to call different classes of pricing engine
such as Finite Difference methods or Monte-Carlo engine. Thus, it is possible to build Factory
classes that will price a generic instrument and use the same code for different type of products.
Other functionalities include the time discretisation of the continuous stochastic processes, the
inclusion of Day count convention, and the generation of forward curves. Most of the implemen-
tation specificities are to be found in [Reiswich10a] [Reiswich10b], [Reiswich10c] and [Ballabio1].
In our context on the probability space (Ω,G,Q), the defaultable claims are valued using a
Ft-measurable interest rate state variable rt. The dynamics of the instantaneous short rate rt
under the risk-neutral measure will be given by a square-root process or CIR process,
drt = κ(µ− rt)dt+ σ√rtdWt
where the parameter vector β = (κ, µ, σ, r0) positive deterministic constants with κ is called the
mean-reversion speed, µ the long-term rate, and σ the instantaneous volatility. Wt designated the
driving Brownian motion. Additionally, r0 is set at the observed spot rate a time t = 0. (We will
use the value κ = 2.5, σ = 0.05, µ = 2, 5% and r0 = 1, 75%)
For simulation of the Brownian motion Wt we set a seed to a Mersenne-Twister random gener-
ator so that the state variables are replicated identically across time for all our product simulations.
We run 500K simulations (In the case of the CCS we run the foreign rate as well with different
parameters.) of the short rate. The main way of simulating products like the interest-rate swap is
to simulate in the future the value of the fair spread and compute the mark-to-market. However
due to the lack of accessibility of the volatility of swap spreads on Datastream, we have chosen
another approach. With Quantlib, the fair spread is obtained via the Monte-Carlo object that
outputs the fair spread using the curve simulated. Since the Time series object generates the
curve forward in time, we loop the pricing object in the future t on the forward discount curve to
generate a “synthetic fair spread”. This would be equivalent to entering a new interest rate swap
with maturity T − t. Typically the notional is set at 106 monetary units, with payment frequency
annual or semi-annual, 30/360 convention, and maturity either 7-yr or 15-yr.
Discretisation Scheme: A Monte-Carlo is used to value all the Defaultable claim payoffs con-
sidered with a discretisation with a Euler scheme and a weekly step.
The implementation of the CCR for Defaultable claims is presented in appendix B.3, page 161,
as it is not directly related to the credit contagion of parties entering a defaultable claim. The
numerical simulations behind the illustrations will be used as inputs in the next section when
counterparty C and investor I undergo default contagion as specified in equation 6.40, page 116.
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6.2.3 Effect of Contagion level on CVA and DVA of an Interest Rate
Swap
Having generated in section 6.2.2, page 117, through Monte-carlo simulations, the distribution of
interest rate swaps over the interval (t, T ], we are interested to assess the impact of the modelling of
credit contagion with the phase-type distribution on those claims. In order to do so, with replicate
the scenarios of credit contagion that we used in the marginal distribution (Q(τi > t)) illustrations
in section B.2, page 159, with the 6 following scenarios:
• counterparty C and investor I are low risk obligors i.e. aC = aI = 0.005
• counterparty 1 and investorI are normal risk obligors i.e. aC = aI = 0.015
• counterparty 1 and investorI are high risk obligors i.e. aC = aI = 0.03
• counterparty 1 is a low risk obligor and investor I is a high risk obligors i.e. aC = 0.005, aI =
0.03
• counterparty 1 is a high risk obligor and investor I is a low risk obligors i.e. aC = 0.03, aI =
0.005
• counterparty 1 is a very high risk obligor and investor I is a low risk obligors i.e. aC =
0.04, aI = 0.005
with aC , aI being the respectively the base intensity of counterparty C and investor I. The
variation of the contagion level through the jump intensity b{i,j} will be as varied on a range of
value to assess the impact of contagion between obligors.
We will consider a two payers 15-year and 7-year interest rate swap as in figure B.2, page 162.
The valuation using proposition 6.2.1, page 115 is considered under the assumption of indepen-
dence between the probability distributions Q(τi > t), i ∈ T = {I, C} and the FT -measurable
claim X. In this case, the CVA and DVA value in equation 6.41 is adjusted with the separation
of the probability and the valuation of the claim X in the future and the BVA are calculated
with the discounted distribution of the defaultable claim on the interval (τ, T ] weighted by the
probability of default in the trigger set T over the same interval. We assume also time bucketing
by postponing the default time τ to the first ti following τ .
In terms of implementation, as specified in [Cesari09], it is necessary when aggregating claims
with different underluyings into a credit risk systems that the discretisation steps are identical
in numbers and in time reference thus to enable consistent calculations and potential netting of
risk positions. In accordance with the discretisation in section 6.2.2 for the valuation of the non
defaultable claims, we use an identical n-step time-bucketing with a weekly step for the generation
of the probability distributions of Q(τ > t). Thus, we implement the following equations
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BCV A = CV A−DV A
= LGDC
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GC1− αeTtiGC1)E(βtiX(ti)+)
− LGDI
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GI1− αeTtiGI1)E(βtiX(ti)−)
=
n∑
i=0
(αeTti−1GC,I1− αeTtiGC,I1)E(βti [ED(ti)]) (6.44)
Thus, the figures 6.1 and 6.2 contain those CVA/DVA absolute values at t = 0 and immediately
show the sensitivity of the metrics as a function of the intersection of several features such as:
• the maturity of the financial claim,
• the structural exposure (payer vs receiver).
More importantly, the graphs 6.1 and 6.2 highlight the non-linear deterioration of both the DVA
and CVA values and, thus, the difficulty in quantifying the direction or the magnitude of the
change. However, in the multivariate phase-type as presented in the illustration in section B.2,
page 159, the contagion impact is feeding on maturity higher than 10 years thus justifying the
higher exposure of the 15-yr swap.
Additionally, the previous figures show that the impact of contagion-correlation or potential
wrong-way risk is far wider than the volatility adjustment of α = 1.4 required by Basel II.It also
confirms the limitation of this fixed volatility adjustment parameter α. This results are consis-
tent with previous work from [Brig07a] that investigates the CVA volatility behaviour through
the correlation of the default intensity and the underlying drivers like interest rate. However,
[Brig07a] encapsulates a wider contagion scenario describing the state of the world where empiri-
cally high period of defaults are consistent with higher interest rates. Same results for exotics like
bermudan swaptions and CMS spread options are obtained with [Brig07a] and similar aspects of
impact of volatility and correlation for credit and commodities derivatives can be found in [Brig06],
[Brig08b], [Brig10b] and [Brig08a].
We believe an overlooked problem in Counterparty Credit Risk is the case of “wrong-way
risk”where the credit contagion among a pool of obligor affects at the same time the value of
the claim, specifically defaultable ones, and the probability of defaults in the trigger set T in a
feedback loop. Most of the analysis use a correlation as previously of underlying drivers, we hope
that the current multivariate framework under permutations pi ∈ Π will highlight this feedback
effect as pointed in the articles [Braithwaite12] and [Carver11].
Comment: In the current section, the implementation is done using m = 2 obligors since
the probabilities Q[
∑
pi∈ΠC 1t<{τ(pi−)<τC<τ(pi+)} | Ft] is not different than Q[1t<τC} | Ft] since, by
assumption, the defaultable claim X is not impacted by prior defaults τ(pi−) and the impact on
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Figure 6.1: Contagion Illustration: CVA and DVA effect for a 15y-payer, semi-annual, interest-
rate swap as a function of the credit contagion bI,C for different scenarios of credit riskiness of the
counterparty C and the investor I.
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Figure 6.2: Contagion Illustration: CVA and DVA effect for a 7y-payer, semi-annual, interest-rate
swap as a function of the credit contagion bI,C for different scenarios of credit riskiness of the
counterparty C and the investor I.
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τC can be viewed as an arbitrary higher intensity aC . However, in the next section on defaultable
claims, this simplification is no longer possible in a multivariate setting.
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6.2.4 Effect of contagion level of CVA and DVA on credit derivatives
- Illustration of wrong-way risk effect
Credit derivatives transactions are particularly exposed to wrong-way risk when at the time of
default of a counterparty selling credit protection is typically a time of higher value of credit pro-
tection. With observed default clustering, at the time of default of the counterparty, there is a
positive probability of a high defaults spreads environment, in which case, the value of the CDS
for a protection buyer is close to the loss given default of the firm. In this setting, wrong-way risk
is thus represented in the model by the fact that at the time of default of the counterparty, there
is a positive probability that the firm on which the CDS is written defaults too, in which case the
loss incurred to the investor is the loss given default of the firm adjusted with the recovery on the
counterparty.
In order to value the CVA and DVA on defaultable claims as we did in section 6.2.3 for non
defaultable ones, we consider the single-name credit default swap valued in equation 5.14, page 74,
and kth-to-default swap valued in equation 5.15, page 75. The valuation of the CVA of those
claims will be done using proposition 6.2.2, page 116. Note that in this case the trigger set is
T = {C, I,Ref} with | Ref |= 6. We use the intensities ai calibrated over 10-yr spreads in
table B.2, page 158 with the reference set Ref being 6 industrials (Renault, Peugeot, Air Liquide,
Sanofi, Total, EDF)and the counteparty C and the investor I being banks i.e. BNP Paribas and So-
ciete Ge´ne´rale. The maturity T of the claims CDS and KTD will correspondingly be set at 10 year.
In accordance with the discretisation in section 6.2.2 for the valuation of the non defaultable
claims, we use an identical n-step time-bucketing for the valuation of the with a weekly step for
the generation of the probability distributions of Q[
∑
pi∈ΠC 1t<{τ(pi−)<τ<τ(pi+)} | Ft] for our trigger
set T . Thus, we implement the following equations
BCV At = CV At −DV At
= LGDCE(
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GC1− αeTtiGC1)βτC (Sn+1τC )+)
− LGDIE(
n∑
i=1
(αeTti−1GI1− αeTtiGI1)βτI (Sn+1τI )−)
= E(
n∑
i=0
(αeTti−1GC,I1− αeTtiGC,I1)βτ [ED(τ)]) (6.45)
where in this case the value of the claim X and the default probability GτT cannot be separated
as in equation 6.44 since they feed each other for any permutation pi ∈ Π. Note that in the multi-
variate framework, GC,I ,GC ,GI take into account the fact that Ref is not earlier since it belongs
to T .
Thus, the figure 6.3 and the figure 6.4, represents the effects on CVA of the jump intensity bi,j
for a single-name credit default swap and kth-to-default swap. The results are presented as the
cumulated basis point of the protection buying and not as the absolute value of the CVA since the
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Figure 6.3: Contagion Illustration: CDS spread contagion effect
contagion is located in the CVA value and the default probability weights. Globally, the impact of
contagion is much more important in magnitude (except for k = 1 as expected by definition) than
in the case of interest rate swaps as credit derivatives products are very sensitive to wrong-way risk.
Additionally, and as already covered in Basel II, the impact of contagion or wrong-way risk is ex-
ponential if the products embed structural credit leverage as k increases in the kth-to-default swaps.
This illustrates that the multi-variate phase-type distribution can provide a way to gauge
the impact of contagion for bilateral financial claims and is able to generate tails scenarios that
can be beneficial in a risk management concept. Recent press coverage in the financial press
in [Braithwaite12], have been focusing on ”gap option” risk which is the “chance that the
counterparty’s posted collateral would be wiped out and that the investors would walk away.”
[Braithwaite12] mentions the case of Deutsche Bank $130bn leveraged super-senior portfolio where
collateral posted wasn’t taking into account scenarios that were “economically unfeasible”. The
multivariate phase-type distribution applied to levered credit derivatives such as kth-to-default in
figure 6.4 captures a similar explosion spreads as the 2007 super-senior spread explosion. The
non-linear aspect of the curve for k ≥ 2 illustrates this strong sensitivity to extreme scenarios of
credit leveraged positions and the fact that situations arise when risk are fully non manageable in
terms of costs.
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Figure 6.4: Contagion Illustration: Kth-to-default spread contagion effect
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6.2.5 Limitation Phase
So far, the MPH formula for the marginal survival distribution Fi(t) = Q[τi > t] and the ordered
marginal survival distribution Fk,i(t) = Q[τ (k) > t, τ (k) = τi] provide easy calibration of base iden-
tity parameters a but prove difficult to calibrate at the same time the base and jump intensity
vector (a, b). It is also not clear where the information for calibration of vector b should come
from: CDS time-series, exogenous “semi-calibration”, credit derivatives index tranche spreads, etc.
Beside the calibration limitation for pricing, the MPH framework is useful in risk management
context to assess credit contagion scenarios for Counterparty Credit Risk metrics. Section 6.2.4
and section 6.2.3, page 119, highlight the range of variation of CVA and DVA values when coun-
terparties undergo credit risk contagion.
However, figure B.1, in section B.2 page 159, shows that the marginal survival distribution
Fi(t) = Q[τi > t] do not contain randomness parameters likely to generate credit volatility. As in
chapter 7 in [Brig10a] and in [Brig09], the computing of the counterparty risk adjustment in the
unilateral or the bilateral case is extremely sensitive to joint interaction of default correlation and
credit spread volatility. [Brig09] highlights the need of credit spread volatility to capture credit
contagion via the measurement of wrong-way risk. As mentioned in [Brig10a] this is necessary
to correctly account for the option term in the counterpart valuation formulae (6.41) and (6.43).
Moreover, in [Brig14], the Counterparty Credit Risk of a single-name CDS is evaluated in the case
of a netted exposure and re-hypothecation of collateral. In this case, the option term in the CCR
formaula is represented by the netted exposure on the defaulted exposure and the pre-defaulted
collateral account. The author using a doubly stochastic intensity default framework, show that
the option term although reduced by the collateral is still sensitive to credit spread volatility and
credit contagion. Contagion effects still manage to limit the effectiveness of collateralisation
We will try to keep the benefit of the phase tip framework, i.e identification of first to default
scenario among obligors and contagion structure, and account for the credit risk volatility. We do
this in the next section by exploring the mixture of phase-type distributions relating to different
volatility regimes.
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6.3 Regime-shifted Phase-type distribution
6.3.1 Introduction
Building on the concept of phase type distributions as presented in [Asmu03] and [Herb10], we
extend the Markov jump process (Yt)t≥0 by considering n different regime shifts, each representing
identical Markov jump process framework like in the previous Phase document.
Using the work of [Assaf82] and [Assaf85] about the closure properties of phase-type distribu-
tions mixtures and their properties, we can augment the dimension of time-homogeneous parameter
in order to avoid the deterministic aspect of the closed-form solutions of the phase-type distribu-
tion. Thus, we expect the increase of the dimensionality of model parameters to better capture
the dynamics of credit risk volatility in survival distribution when obligors undergo credit risk
contagion.
Previous similar approach has been attempted to include parameter extension to avoid the non
calibration capability of a limited dimension of time-homogeneous model parameters. For example,
[Brig05] extends a tractable structural model depending on a random default barrier. This is done
by imposing time-constant volatility scenarios where each single scenario imply loosing flexibility
in richness of default curves but regain calibration flexibility thanks to the multiple scenarios on
otherwise too simple time-constant volatilities.
Thus, in [Brig05], the risk neutral firm value Vt dynamics is expressed as:
dVt = (rt − qt)Vtdt+ νtVtdWt
with rt the risk-free rate, qt a payout ratio, νt the instantaneous volatility and a set of scenarios
linking asset barrier and volatility (H1, t→ σ1(t)),..., (HN , t→ σN(t)) with associated risk-neutral
Q probabilities p1, .., pN . The price of a payoff Π based on V is obtained through the price of each
scenario by weighted iterated expectation:
E[Π] = E{E[Π|H, ν]} =
N∑
i=1
pi{E[Π|H = Hi, ν = σi]}
Similarly, since the scenarios are independent, the CDS spread in [Brig05] can be written as:
CDSa,b(t, R,LGD) =
N∑
i=1
CDSa,b(t, R,LGD;Hi, σ
i)pi
This approach enables to identify scenario barriers that are associated with normal market condi-
tions and other barriers with extremely stressed situations while a time-varying barrier will never
be rich enough to encapsulates all the possible states of the world in the future. We will in this
section try to replicate a similar approach for multivariate phase type distributions.
6.3.2 Proposed Evolution
We define the Markov processes Xt with Xt ∼ Q(Yt) a phase-type distribution process with
Yt ∼ R(t) a hidden Markov chain defining regime shift Rt. Xt defines the previous Markov jump
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process - Phase-type distribution with transition between states defining the obligors defaulting or
regime change. Yt defines a hidden Markov chain that defines the n regimes. For example, in the
case of n = 2 regimes, we could identify R1 as a normal regime and R2 as a high regime. We could
expect with the closure properties of phase-type distributions to obtain a phase-type distribution
property for the regime phase-type distribution built on regime-independent phase-type distribu-
tion.
Conceptually, the Markov chain Yt expressing the regime chain can be dependent or not of the
phase-type transition intensities λi,j of Xt within a set regime. For example, several specificities
could define the relation between Xt and Yt.
• increased defaulted obligors in Xt could increase the probability of shifting the chain in a
higher regime in Yt,
• Yt can be defined as endogenously or exogenously to the states of Xt. This will result either
to the regime transition rate of Yt to be incorporated or not in the transition rate of Xt.
• possibilities off simultaneous phase transition in Xt and regime transition in Yt.
6.4 Regime phase-type model
6.4.1 Presentation
Structure of absorption vector t
As mentioned in [Neuts78] and in the multivariate case in [Assaf84], phase-type distribution identify
a unique absorption state ∆ leading to an absorption vector t on the right-hand side of matrix
Q in order to apply the Phase-type distribution methodology and obtain the closed-form formula
( 6.20), page 100. In the case of the multivariate obligors i ∈ E, in [Assaf84], an additional
requirement is that the absorbing state is defined as
∆ =
m⋂
i=1
∆i (6.46)
where ∆i defines the absorption state of obligor i.
In order to work in the same multivariate framework using the same notation as in section 6.1.2,
page 100, this condition requires that the absorbing state will be the intersection across obligors
and regime as well. Typically this will require to identify a unique absorption vector t on the
right hand side to the matrix T thus modifying some n− 1 absorption vector t of the matrix Ti.
This will rule-out all the mixture of phase-type distribution which are defined as successive phase
processes and not concurrent ones.
Usually the closure properties of the representation (αR,TR) as a function of all the representa-
tion (αi,Ti),∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n} is established though the Laplace Transform to express the transition
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matrix TR and exit vector tR as a function of the underlying phase. Theorem 2.2.2 and 2.2.4 in
[Neuts78] establish closure properties of TR for convolutions and finite mixtures as
Theorem 6.4.1 (Closure of multivariate phase-type distributions). Let T = (T1, . . . , Tn) and
S = (S1, . . . , Sm) be independent multi-variate phase-type random vectors. Then the conjunction
(T, S) = (T1, . . . , Tn, S1, . . . , Sm) is a multi-variate phase-type random vector.
However most of the applications are concerned with successive phases like theorem [?] instead
of alternating between phases. We will instead have to assess the singularity of the transition
matrix TR using Lemma 2.2.1 p45 in [Neuts78].
Lemma 6.4.1. The states 1, . . . ,m are transient if and only if the matrix T is singular.
We will construct the different multivariate phase between regimes using the closure theorem
2.2.1 of absorption state ∆i of multivariate phase-type distribution in [Assaf84] using communica-
tion between phases though regime shifts.
6.4.2 Model presentation
Consider a finite set E containing m obligors and a set R identifying n regimes.
For each regime j = 1, . . . , n the triplet (E, αj,Tj) is a phase type distribution where F is the
distribution of the time to absorption τ with the closed-form formula:
F (t) = P[τ < t] = 1− αeTjt1
f(t) = αeTjt1
with
eTjt =
∞∑
n=0
1
n!
Tj
ntn
Thus, consider m obligors which we label with i = 1, 2, . . . ,m. and τi be the time of default for
obligor i, with i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and the corresponding default point processes
H it = 1{τi<t}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m.
contain any information regarding the default times τ1, . . . , τm with the filtrations
Hit = σ(H is; s ≤ t)
Ht =
m∨
i=1
Hit
We also define the default times τ1, . . . , τm for obligors i = 1, 2, . . . ,m and λ
i
t their corresponding
default intensities w.r.t Ht. The filtration Ht does not contain information about the regime the
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chain Yt is into at time t. And the previous mathematical setting defined in section 4 and sec-
tion 6.2 is still valid with a Q matrix composed of n phase type matrices (αi, Ti)
Consider n regimes labeled j = 1, . . . , n, which defines the hidden Markov chain Yt that jumps
in the set R. The chain is defined purely a transient chain with no absorbing state. We state the
following assumption that
Assumption 6.4.1. No simultaneous regime jump and obligor default can happen at the same
time.
We define the hidden Markov chain Yt as
Definition 6.4.1. The one parameter family P t(t), t ∈ R+ of stochastic matrices is called the
family of transition probability matrices for the time-homogeneous G-markov chain Y under Q if
for every t, s ∈ R+
Q{Ys+t = j | Ys = i} = pti,j(t) ,∀i, j ∈ R (6.47)
From Theorem 8.1.2 in [Rolski98] the following finite limits exists at time t = 0
tij := lim
t↓0
pi,jt(t)− ptij(0)
t
= lim
t↓0
pti,j(t)− δij
t
, ∀i, j ∈ K (6.48)
with tij > 0 and tii = −
∑K
j=1,j 6=i tij for every i 6= j.
The matrix
R := [ti,j]1≤i,j≤n
is called the infinitesimal generator matrix for a Markov chain associated with the family P t.
Since each entry ti,j of the matrix R can be shown to represent the intensity of a transition from the
regime i to the regime j the infinitesimal generator matrix R is also called the regime-transition
intensity matrix., the following finite limits exists at time t = 0.
We provide illustrative example of the Matrix T associated with the Matrix Q for n regimes.
6.4.3 Example: m = 2 obligors and n = 2 regimes:
Considering the two representation (α1,T1) and (α2,T2). The matrix representing the case of two
regimes can be identified as the blocks:
T =
 T1 | R12−− | −−
R21 | T2

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Same as before, the matrix T1 and T2 represent respectively the jump matrix of Xt when Yt is
in state Yt = R1 and Yt = R2. The matrix R12 and R21 represent respectively the regime transition
matrix respectively, from regime 1 to regime 2 and vice versa.
As previously in, the obligor default set are identified as
{{0} = No defaults , {1}, {2}, {1, 2} = ∆.}
However, the status can also be identified according to Yt and their regime. Introducing the status
(i, j) = (obligor, regime) with i ∈ {1,m = 2} and j ∈ {1, n = 2}, the default set is expanded as
{({0}, R1), ({1}, R1), ({2}, R1), ({1, 2}, R1), ({0}, R2), ({1}, R2), ({2}, R2), ({1, 2}, R2)}
We now give detail of the matrices with the same assumption as in section 6.1.2, page 100 about
the intensity of obligors and their default contagion aspect. Thus, for obligor i ∈ E in regime R1
λit = ai +
∑
k ∈ Ii
bi,k1{τk≤t}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
and in regime R2
λit
′
= a
′
i +
∑
k ∈ Ii
b
′
i,k1{τk≤t}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
T1 =
({0}, R1) ({1}, R1) ({2}, R1) ({1, 2}, R1)
({0}, R1) | −a1 − a2 − t12|1 a1 a2
({1}, R1) | −a2 − b12 − t12|2 a2 + b12
({2}, R1) | −a1 − b21 − t12|3 a1 + b21
({1, 2}, R1) | 0
T2 =
({0}, R2) ({1}, R2) ({2}, R2) ({1, 2}, R2)
({0}, R2) | −a′1 − a′2 − t21|1 a′1 a′2
({1}, R2) | −a′2 − b′12 − t21|2 a′2 + b′12
({2}, R2) | −a′1 − b′21 − t21|3 a′1 + b′21
({1, 2}, R2) | 0
R12 =
({0}, R2) ({1}, R2) ({2}, R2) ({1, 2}, R2)
({0}, R1) | t12|1
({1}, R1) | t12|2
({2}, R1) | t12|3
({1, 2}, R1) | 0
R21 =
({0}, R1) ({1}, R1) ({2}, R1) ({1, 2}, R1)
({0}, R2) | t21|1
({1}, R2) | t21|2
({2}, R2) | t21|3
({1, 2}, R2) | 0
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Comment: t12|3 Defines the transition for Yt from regime 2 to regime 1 conditional we are in
default state 3 for Xt. Under assumption 6.4.1, in T1 and T1 there is either no extra default
(intensity on the diagonal of a matrix Ti), a default (intensity on the right side of the diagonal of
the matrix Ti) or a transition.
6.4.4 Example - General Case: m obligors n regimes
Thus for m > 2 obligors and n > 2 regime with representation (αi,Ti), i ∈ {1, . . . , n} : This
matrix can be identified as the blocks:
T =

TR1 R12 ... R1n
R21 TR2 ... R2n
... ... ... ...
Rn1 Rn2 ... TRn

Similarly, consider a set of intensities per regime
λit
′
= aRii +
∑
k ∈ Ii
bRii,k1{τk≤t}, i = 1, 2, . . . ,m
In case m = 2 obligors in order to have concise matrices with the generator matrix TRi in
regime Ri defined as:
({0}, Ri) ({1}, Ri) ({2}, Ri) ({1, 2}, Ri)
({0}, Ri) −aRi1 − aRi2 −
∑
j 6=i tij a
Ri
1 a
Ri
2
({1}, Ri) −aRi2 − bRi12 −
∑
j 6=i tij a
Ri
2 + b
Ri
12
({2}, Ri) −aRi1 − bRi21 −
∑
j 6=i tij a
Ri
1 + b
Ri
21
({1, 2}, Ri) 0
The Regime matrix Rkl shifting from regime k to regime l is defined as:
({0}, Rl) ({1}, Rl) ({2}, Rl) ({1, 2}, Rl)
({0}, Rk) | tkl|i={0}
({1}, Rk) | tkl|i={1}
({2}, Rk) | tkl|i={2}
({1, 2}, Rk) | 0
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6.4.5 Regime-phase type distribution existence
We loose the whole upper triangular structure of T for the phase type process to gain easy existence
and calculation for the exponential matrix through the eigenvalues on the diagonal axis. However
each of the sub matrix TRi has the upper triangular structure and the same of convergence criteria
for the exponential.
We need to proceed as in the document phase in [Neuts78] and show
• that T is singular so it is invertible and thus the absorption is certain.
• Using the Perron-Frobenius Theorem 6.5 p26 in [Asmu03] that the eigenvalues are negatives
and not null to have an ergodic markov jump process and thus that there exists a distribution.
Proposition 6.4.1. We consider the general matrix
T =

TR1 R12 ... R1n
R21 TR2 ... R2n
... ... ... ...
Rn1 Rn2 ... TRn

where TRi = [λi,j]1≤i≤j≤K define upper-triangular matrices with negative eigenvalues with modulus
lower than 1 and Rij == [ti,i]1≤i≤K define diagonal matrices with positive values and suppose that
ti,i << λi,i,∀i ∈ K then the matrix T is singular.
Remark: As we intend to demonstrate the existence of the phase property for the general case
of Markov jump process applied to credit modelling we consider the TRi = [λij]1≤i,j≤Kand is upper-
triangular. We make no specific assumption of credit contagion in the intensities. Addtionnally,
the condition ti,i << λi,i,∀i ∈ K in our context is equivalent to the fact that the regime shifts
occur less often than defaults which seems a sensible assumption.
In [Powell11], we find a method for recursively identify the determinant of a matrix based on
the determinant of its N2 blocks using the Schur complement structure. The theorem is as follows:
Theorem 6.4.2. Let S be an (nN) × (nN) complex matrix, which is partitioned into N2 blocks
each of size n× n
S =

S11 S12 ... S1N
S21 S22 ... S2N
... ... ... ...
SN1 SN2 ... SNN

Then the determinant det(S) =
∏N
k=1 det(α
(N−k)
kk ) where α
k are defined by
α
(0)
ij = Sij
α
(k)
ij = Sij − σti,N−k+1S˜−1k sN−k+1,j, k ≥ 1
and the vectors σtij and sij are
sij = (Sij Si+1,j . . . SN,j)
t, σtij = (Sij Si,j+1 . . . Si,N)
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and
S˜k =

SN−k+1,N−k+1 SN−k+1,N−k+2 ... SN−k+1,N
SN−k+2,N−k+1 S22 ... SN−k+2,N
... ... ... ...
SN,N−k+1 SN,N−k+2 ... SN,N

the paper [Powell11] also establishes this proof by induction instead of using the “Baniachewic
identity”
Lemma 6.4.2. Let S be a complex block matrix of the form
S =

S11 S12 ... S1N
S21 S22 ... S2N
... ... ... ...
SN1 SN2 ... SNN

and let us define the set of block matrices {α(0), α(1), . . . , α(N−1)} where α(k) is an (N−k)×(N−k)
block matrix with blocks
α
(0)
ij = Sij
α
(k+1)
ij = α
(k)
ij − α(k)i,N−k
(
α
(k)
N−k,N−k
)−1
α
(k)
N−k,j, k ≥ 1
Then the determinants of consecutive α(k) are related via
det(α(k)) = det(α(k+1)) det(α
(k)
N−k,N−k)
with the partition
α(k) =

α
(k)
11 . . . α
(k)
1,N−k−1 α
(k)
1,N−k
...
...
...
α
(k)
N−k−1,1 ... α
(k)
N−k−1,N−k−1 α
(k)
N−k−1,N−k
α
(k)
N−k,1 . . . α
(k)
N−k,N−k−1 α
(k)
N−k,N−k

Proof. From [Powell11], we can use the following theorem
Theorem 6.4.3. Given a complex block matrix of the form and the matrices α
(k)
11 the determinant
of S is given by
det(S) =
N∏
k=1
det(α
(N−k)
kk )
Since we know that by definition the matrices Rij,∀i, j ∈ R, i 6= j are diagonal matrices with
diagonal values representing the transition rate from regime i to regime j and Ti, i ∈ R is upper-
triangular with the transitions rate towards absorption when the Markov chain is in regime i.
Thus, we can recursively establish the singularity of matrix T based on its sub-components which
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determinants are defined as its diagonal values. Recursive Demonstration.
Case n = 1. T1 = T1 with T1 upper-triangular with non null eigenvalues on the diagonal.
Thus T1 non singular.
Case n = 2: Suppose
T2 =
(
T1 R12
R21 T
2
)
With Ti,∀i ∈ R upper-triangular non-null eigenvalue structure. All sub-matrices have same
dimension. We recall the result
• Block identical
det
(
A B
C D
)
= det(AD−BC)
• Block unidentical
det
(
A B
C D
)
= det(D) det(A−BD−1C)
with A a m×m matrix, D a n× n matrix, B a n×m matrix and C a m× n matrix. (This
is the “Baniachewic identity”).
Thus we have
det(T2) = det(T
1T2 −R12R21)
Which is a function of the eigenvalue produced by the product 2 upper-triangular matrices
minus the product of 2 diagonal matrices. We thus obtain a condition on the eigenvalue of non
singularity as
λ1iiλ
2
ii − t12ii t21ii 6= 0, ∀i ∈ 1, . . . ,m (6.49)
The matrix T2 is invertible.
Remark: This would be sufficient for our numerical applications in section 6.4.6, page 138,
since we will only consider High and low regime.
Case n = 3: Suppose
T3 =
 T1 R12 R13R21 T2 R23
R31 R32 T
3
 = ( T2 RX3
R3X T
3
)
with det(T2) 6= 0 as previously shown and
Tt3 =
(
(T3)t Rt3X
RtX3 T
t
2
)
(6.50)
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By application if the Baniachewic identity, we have
det(T3) = det(T
3) det(T2 −RX3(T3)−1R3X)
we have det(T3) 6= 0 but we do not have any specific information about the eigenvalues of the
matrix T2. However with
det(T3) = det(T
t
3) = det(T
t
2) det((T
3)t −Rt3X(Tt2)−1RtX3)
with det(T2) 6= 0 as shown previously with (6.49) valid. The transpose matrices are either lower
triangular or diagonal with eigenvalue being the inverse since with (6.49) valid none is null. Thus
the second determinant is a derterminant of lower triangular structure with the condition
λ3ii − t31ii t32ii (λ2ii)−1t13ii t23ii 6= 0,∀i ∈ 1, . . . ,m (6.51)
Suppose now that the case is valid for n with
det(Tn) = det(T
t
n) 6= 0
and none of its associated eigenvalue θii,∀i ∈ E are null. We need to show that Tn+1 is such that
det(Tn+1) = det(T
t
n+1) 6= 0
Tn+1 =
(
(Tn)
t RXn
RnX T
n+1
)
(6.52)
with Tn+1 being an upper triangular matrix representing regime n+1 and RXn,RnX transition
diagonal matrices. Or
det(Ttn+1) = det(T
t
n) det((T
n+1)t −RtnX(Ttn)−1RtXn)
Thus we need to find that none of the eigenvalues of det((Tn+1)t−RtnX(Ttn)−1RtXn) is null. The
matrix (Tn+1)t is lower-triangular and RnX ,RXn are diagonal matrices. As for our assumptions,
for all values in the matrix
(Tn+1)t −RtnX(Ttn)−1RtXn ≈ (Tn+1)t
thus
det((Tn+1)t) ≈ det((Tn+1)t −RtnX(Ttn)−1RtXn)
We have to condition the fact that
∀λii, i ∈ E,∀tiii ∈ E, tiiλii << λii (6.53)
We have thus established the non-singularity of T and thus the fact that all its states are
transient.
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Convergence
Having established the non-singularity of the matrix T, we need to review the condition that the
eigenvalues are lower than 1 to have the convergence of the exponential Matrix according to the
Perron-Frobenius theorem. However, the previous proof establishes that the eigenvalues are lower
than one albeit to the fact that might not be distinct due to the fact that several regimes might
have default intensities that might be identical. This will ensure the Markov chain is Ergodic and
thus that there exists a solution that is the probability distribution.
6.4.6 Distribution probabilities
We now specifically consider the case of 2 regimes for computation since the case of n regimes is
similar.
We consider the a phase type distribution as in section 6.4.2, page 130 in the case of 2 regimes.
The infinitesimal generator is defined as Q
Q =
(
T t
0 0
)
(6.54)
with
T =
 T1 | R12−− | −−
R21 | T2
 (6.55)
We suppose for simplicity that the transition between low and high volatility regimes are not
linked to the number of defaulted obligors from the set that have yet occurred, i.e
t12 = t12|1 = t12|2 = t12|3 and t21 = t21|1 = t21|2 = t21|3
with tij the transition intensity from regime i to j and tij|k the transition intensity from regime i
to j when Xt is in state k ∈ K.
Remark: In the observation of the time to absorption ∆ of the Markov chain (Xt)t≥0, regime
Yt = R1 or Yt = R2 is not relevant to observe the transition probabilities of Xt. Thus,
Q(Xt < t) = (1− α expQt 1) (6.56)
where α is the initial distribution.
Probability distribution definitions
Using the setting in phase type distribution with m obligors, the probability of reaching the
sequence i = {i1, .., im} representing the ordering of default of obligors with the |E|×|E| transition
matrix is given by
P(Xt = i) = α expQt ei for ei ∈ R|E| (6.57)
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where ei is the column vector representing the status having identified the states.
Each state is defined as a two dimension process (D,R) with :
• D defines a subset of defaulted (ordered or not) obligors in {1, ..,m},
• R defines the regime R ∈ {R1, R2} under which the obligors of D has been observed.
Note: Each subsets d ∈ D can be observed either in R1 low regime or R2: High regime.
Thus, In the general phase type setting T, by identifying the correct states in both regimes
(we are in dimension 2m compared to the classical phase.) we have
Q[τ1 > t1, ..., τm > tm] = α
(
m∏
k=1
eQ(tik−tik−1 )Gik
)
where ti0 = 0 (6.58)
Now for a time vector (t1,t2,..., tm) in Rm+ with the ordering of (t1,t2,..., tm) being
t i1 < t i2 < ... < t im
where i=(i1,i2,..., im) is a permutation of the obligor set (1, 2, ...,m), the multivariate survival
distribution is expressed as:
Q[τ1 > t1, ..., τm > tm] = Q[τi1 > ti1 , ..., τim > tim ]
= Q[Xi1 ∈ Ei1 , ..., Xim ∈ Eim ]
=
∑
i0∈E
Q[X0 = i0, Xi1 ∈ Ei1 , ..., Xim ∈ Eim ]
The set E of the states of Xt can be decomposed in a set belonging to regime R1 or to regime R2
E = E{Yt=R1} ∪ E{Yt=R2} = E[R1] ∪ E[R2] (6.59)
with E{Yt=R1} ∩ E{Yt=R2} = ∅. Thus,
=
∑
i0∈E[R1]∪E[R2]
Q[X0 = i0, Xi1 ∈ Ei1 , ..., Xim ∈ Eim ]
=
∑
i0∈E[R1]∪E[R2]
∑
ii1∈E
[R1]
i1
∪E[R2]i1
...
∑
iim∈E[R1]im ∪E
[R2]
im
Q[X0 = i0, Xi1 = ii1 , ..., Xim = iim ]
Since the time-homogeneous property and the Markov property used in the proof are not im-
pacted by the inclusion of regimes, the status matrix Gik is defined as previously but not is of
dimension 2m× 2m.
The states of defaults or regime transitions are distinct and perfectly identifiable, thus enables
to use the classical previously established framework by adjusting the status matrices or vectors.
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Thus, we can express the following survival probabilities:
The marginal survival distribution
Q[τi > t] = αeQtg(i) (6.60)
with g(i) of dimension n× | E | with i identifying states of i defaulting independently of regime.
Identically, by identifying the regimes, with j ∈ R
Q[τi > t, i ∈ Rj] = αeQtg(i,Rj) (6.61)
with g(i,Rj) of dimension n× | E | with i identifying states of i defaulted in regime j. Naturally,
the marginal probability is the same marginal probability in each regime,
Q[τi > t] =
∑
Rj
P[τi > t, i ∈ Rj] =
∑
Rj
αeQtg(i,Rj) = αeQt
∑
Rj
g(i,Rj) (6.62)
The ordered marginal survival distribution
We obtain the same equation for the kth marginal survival distribution with
Q[τ (k) > t] = αeQtm(k) (6.63)
with m(k) of dimension n× | E | with i identifying states of kth default independently of regime.
Identically,
Q[τ (k) > t, i ∈ Rj] = αeQtm(k,Rj) (6.64)
with m(k,Rj) of dimension nx | E | with i identifying states of kth default in regime j. Naturally,
Q[τ (k) > t] =
∑
Rj
P[τ (k) > t, i ∈ Rj] =
∑
Rj
αeQtm(k,Rj) = αeQt
∑
Rj
m(k,Rj) (6.65)
To illustrate the marginal survival distribution in equation 6.61 with 2 regimes to the same
marginal survival distribution under no regimes, we consider two obligors that exhibit both high
credit risk with base intensity ai = 0.02 and low jump intensity b = 0.003. Arbitrary we set a low
regime shift intensity t = 0.003 to a regime with high regime with parameters higher than set in
the regime case. Figure 6.5, page 141, shows that the regime-case survival curves are lower than
in the no regime case which is consistent with what is implemented.
With the same parameters as figure 6.5 the implementation of equation 6.64 can produce the
marginal survival distribution per regime. The result are reproduced in figure 6.6, page 142. Note
that by convention the markov chain Xt is always started in a low regime position.
Additionally, we can highlight the fact that the regime construction should no impact in terms
of the marginal distribution Q[τi > t]. For example, consider the previously high credit risk
m = 2 obligor set with the same intensity in all regimes, and set a high number of regimes, for
example n = 40, one should expect that the marginal distribution of each obligor to be identical
with or without the introduction of the regime structure. Figure 6.7, page 143, shows that both
curves are identical and thus that the regime construction is not technically inconsistent with the
multi-variate phase type distribution. This equality will be useful in the case of single-name CDS
time-series calibration to extract the intensities vector (a, b, t) for each regime.
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Figure 6.5: Marginal survival distribution Q[τi > t] for 2 obligors with or without regime shift.
141
Figure 6.6: Marginal survival distribution Q[τ1 > t, i ∈ Rj] per regime j for obligor 1 in case of
m = 2 obligors and n = 2 regimes.
142
Figure 6.7: Marginal survival distribution Q[τi > t] for 2 obligors with or without regime shift
with identical intensities. Case of n=40 regimes.
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
We hope that this thesis has proved useful in addressing the issue of credit risk contagion with
the benefit of developing a multivariate method with closed-form formulas to capture the counter-
party credit risk under credit risk contagion scenarios. An interesting feature is the capacity to
identify and isolate that contagion risk for the benefit of pricing and risk management and should
be applicable to all the range of the financial products and major asset classes that are traded by
financial institutions.
The model has demonstrated an ease of calibration to extract jump and base intensities thanks
to numerical methods that are widely available. Also a notable benefit is the dimension scalability
in addressing basket products. However, a current limitation of the model is the fact that it does
not have the Markov copula property and in the future the assumption of no simultaneous default
should be relaxed to allow decoupling of calibration across CDS and index products. Additionally,
the time-series calibration should also be addressed as contagion parameters should benefit from
the various credit spread term-structure shapes. So, in the current context, the phase-type distri-
bution is more likely to provide useful results in risk management simulations.
We believe another particular interesting result is related to regulatory requirements associated
with financial claims. In both, defaultable or non defaultable case, the sensitivity of the Counter-
party Credit Risk to contagion exhibit non linear evolution that question the α = 1.4 volatility
parameter adjustment. This is particularly the case with kth-to-default swaps, or more generally,
credit leveraged products (like LSS). The issue of the previously mentioned calibration is here
of importance since this would allow to better link contagion scenario to identified events. The
specific result that is interesting is the Counterparty Credit Risk of the kth-to-default swaps in
terms of “Gap Risk ”when contagion risk goes to level consistent with the financial crisis. The
result shows why “Gap Risk ”is also termed “walk-away ”risk for Leveraged Super Senior products.
To better account for credit spread volatility and capture the optionality term in the Counter-
party Credit Risk, the regime-shift phase-type distribution evolution should be further strengthen
to calibrate to credit volatility products although the liquidity of those products might question
the validity of such approach.
To finish, this document has not covered the new type of risk arising in bilateral claims such
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as the funding cost with the Funding Valuation Adjustment, the liquidity stress, etc. Those risks
have gained more coverage especially in [Brig10a] and point to the fact in its current state the
model is structured for credit risk contagion among obligors.
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Appendix A
Regulatory concepts on Counterparty
Credit Risk
A.1 Economic Capital: measuring and marking Counter-
party Credit Risk
As presented in [Picoult05], Economic Capital is defined as a measurement of economic risk
from an insolvency perspective, i.e. the amount of risk capital that a firm requires to cover the
risks (market risk, credit risk, operational risk) that it is running or collecting as a going concern.
Financial Institutions hold risk capital as an amount equal at least to Economic Capital. This
is different from Regulatory Capital (see section A.2) which is mandatory capital that regulators
require to be maintained. Economic Capital is the best estimate of required capital that financial
institutions use internally to manage their own risk and to allocate the cost of maintaining Reg-
ulatory Capital among different unit within the organisation. The primary distinguishing feature
of counterparty risk (also called pre-settlement risk in [Picoult05]) relative to other forms of credit
risk is that the magnitude (and the sign) of the credit exposure to a counterparty on any future
date is uncertain. It is, thus, more difficult for counterparty credit risk than for a loan for three
reasons:
• the uncertainty in the future credit exposure,
• the bilateral nature of counterparty credit exposure,
• the challenge of defining the credit value (defined as CVA - Counterparty Valuation Adjust-
ment - see section 2.2.4 for a full definition) to take into account the effect of market spreads
on the market value of a derivative portfolio.
The CVA can be viewed as the difference between the risk-free value of a derivative portfolio and
the value after taking the counterparty risk into account. And thus, potential changes in the CVA
of each counterparty are key components of the potential loss of the economic value of the portfolio.
The main difference between Lending Risk and Counterparty Credit Risk is encapsulated in the
bilateral aspect of CVA depending on the future state of the market. For that reason, Economic
Capital for counterparty risk will require a double level of simulation:
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• simulation in market rates (covered by desks specific risk management), and,
• simulation of the types of credit event (covered by CVA desks).
Historically, Economic Capital was first intentionally defined for a loan portfolio where Eco-
nomic Capital as a measure of risk is the potential Unexpected Loss (UL) of Economic Value
of a portfolio or business over some long time horizon (e.g., one year), at some high confidence
level (e.g., 99% confidence level). It can be calculated at different organisational levels of a firm
on a standalone or marginal basis. As show in the figure 2.1, Economic Capital is derived from
the calculation of the probability distribution of Potential Loss over some time horizon. The two
key features of a loss distribution are the Expected Loss (EL) and the Unexpected Loss where
Unexpected Loss is defined as the difference between the Potential Loss at a high confidence
level (99%) and the Expected Loss. Economic Capital is then the Unexpected Loss measured at
a specified confidence level and depends on the shape of the potential loss distribution and the
confidence level.
To help define Economic Capital, [Picoult05] introduces also the Exposure Profile as the
potential exposure to a counterparty at a set of future dates over the life of the portfolio, measured
at a specified confidence level which is best represented as an exposure profile rather than a single
number because:
• the remaining unsettled cash-flows with a counterparty will contractually change over time
as floating rates are set, options expire, etc.
• the potential range or probability distribution of each underlying market rate tend to widen
the further out into the future one looks.
An illustration of the time varying feature of the Exposure Profile is found on figure 2.2 for an
interest rate swap.
Additionally, [Picoult05] develops also the concept Curent Counterparty Exposure which
is defined as the immediate exposure to a counterparty representing the current replacement cost of
the contracts under an immediate default. Naively, a VaR measurement might seem the best way to
measure this potential exposure although market-factor sensitivities are not normally distributed.
The two most common ways of measuring Potential Exposure of a counterparty with multiple
transactions are a
• Simple Transaction methodology for approximating the exposure, and,
• a more precise and sophisticated portfolio Simulation Methodology.
The Simple Transaction method defines exposure as the sum of two terms, its current market
value and its potential increase in value. The potential increase in value can be expressed either
by a time-varying profile over the remaining life of the transaction or as a single number. Typi-
cally, standardised tables can be defined to approximate the potential increase in the value of each
transaction per unit of notional principal. (This however ignores portfolio effects, the problem of
different tenors and is not taking into account offsetting transactions or ignores diversification).
So, this method is only applicable for simple end-user with few transactions since this approach
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comes originally from Economic Capital loans approach.
The Simulation Methodology is defined by the following steps:
• simulate scenarios of changes in market factors over time,
• calculate the potential market value of each transaction at each future date of each simulation
path,
• calculate the potential exposure of each counterparty at each future date of each simulated
path,
• calculate the counterparty’s exposure profile at some confidence level at a set of future dates
starting with the current exposure calculated today and the average positive exposure:
EPEt = Et(Exposuret)+
(see section 2.2.4 for definition)
A typical simulation result for an Exposure Profile will have the shape presented in figure 2.2
in the case of an Interest Rate Swap to produce Counterparty Credit Risk (CCR) metrics such as:
• EPE: Expected Positive Exposure, and,
• PFE: Potential Future Exposure.
(see section 2.2.4 for definition):
As we can see through the concepts and definitions of loss, the shape of the potential loss
distribution arising from the exposure profile will depend on:
• the type of risk (e.g. market risk, loan portfolio credit risk, counterparty credit risk or
operational risk),
• the definition of losses (e.g. economic loss versus accounting loss),
• the time horizon over which the potential loss distribution is simulated (e.g. one year or the
life of the portfolio),
• the degree of diversification risk of the underlying portfolio,
• the assumptions underlying the simulation of the future states of the drivers of potential
losses.
The influence of this set of variables and parameters has led to several levels of complexity in
the computation of the Economic Capital:
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A.2 Regulatory treatment of Counterparty Credit Risk
Counterparty Risk according to the Bank of International Settlements - Models
overview
Common aspects of exposure for CCR:
Key to the implementation required by the regulators is to estimate the Exposure At Default
(EAD) under the Revised Framework. In summary, from [BIS05], there is three methods that are
advanced for calculating the EAD for transactions involving CCR in the banking or the trading
book under the Revised Framework:
1. the existing Current Exposure Method (CEM).
2. the Standardised Method (SM),
3. the Internal Model Method (IMM) that uses the concept of the Expected Positive
Exposure (EPE).
Those methods generate a Credit Exposure, which is defined as the cost of replacing the
transaction if the counterparty defaults assuming there is no recovery of value. In addition, Credit
Exposure depends on one or more underlying market factors and CCR is bilateral by definition.
Other typical characteristics of transactions that involve CCR may include
• the use of collateral to mitigate risk;
• the use of legal netting or rights to offset contracts; and
• the use of re-margining agreements.
Measures reported: The set of metrics of CCR presented are
• Expected Positive Exposure,
• Expected Exposure, and
• Potential Future Exposure.
Banks typically compute EPE, EE, and PFE (see section 2.2.4 for definitions.) using a common
stochastic model. The EPE is generally viewed as the appropriate EAD measure to determine
capital for CCR. Additionally, the EAD for instruments with CCR must also be determined con-
servatively and conditionally on a ’bad state’ of the economy with the IMM and SM scale EPE
using multipliers, termed ’alpha’-α and ’beta’ -β, respectively. Both alpha and beta are set at
1.4, but supervisors have the flexibility to raise either parameter in appropriate situations. This
highlights to a certain extent the non-dynamical feature of those risk measures.
Netting Sets: A ’netting set’ is a group of transactions with a single counterparty that are
subject to a legally enforceable bilateral netting arrangement and permitted to be netted as iden-
tified in [BIS95].
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Summary of Current Exposure Method:
For those banks that do not qualify for the use of the Internal Model Method, the Current
Exposure Method takes the form of the following equation:
CCR Charge = [(RC + Add-on) - VAC] * RW * 8%
with
• RC: Current Replacement Cost,
• Add-on: The estimated amount of potential future exposure (Page 37 to page 42 in [BIS06]),
• VAC: Volatility Adjusted Collateral,
• RW: Risk Weight - The risk weight of the counterparty.
So under the CEM, EAD is equal to
EAD = [(RC + Add-on) - VAC]
Summary of the Standardised Method
The Standardised Method is also available for banks that do not qualify for the IMM method
but that would like to adopt a more risk-sensitive method than the CEM. The Standardised
Method is designed to capture certain key features of the IMM for Counterparty Credit with a
simpler implementation. The concept is that CCR exposures are expressed in risk positions that
reference short-term changes in valuation parameters (e.g. modified duration for debt instruments,
delta concept for options). It also assumes that the positions that are open under a short-term
forecasting horizon of, for example one day, remain open and unchanged throughout the forecast-
ing horizon. There is however no recognition of diversification effects.
For transaction i, collateral l, hedging set j the EAD is:
EAD = β.
(
CMV− CMC,
∑
j
(∑
i
RPTi,j −
∑
l
RPCl,j
)
.CCFj
)+
(A.1)
where:
• CMV: ”Current Market Value” of the portfolio of transactions within the netting set with
a counterparty gross of collateral, i.e. CMV=
∑
i CMVi is the current market value of trans-
action i,
• CMC: ”Current Market value of the Collateral” assigned to the netting set, i.e. CMC=∑l CMCl
is the current market value of collateral l,
• RPTi,j: ”Risk Position from Transaction” i with respect to hedging set j,
• RPCl,j: ”Risk Position from Collateral” l with respect to hedging set j,
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• CCFj: Supervisory ”Credit Conversion Factor” with respect to the hedging set j,
• β: Supervisory scaling parameter.(typical value 1.4)
The exposure amount EAD represents the product of
• the larger of the net current market value or a supervisory EPE, times,
• a scaling factor, termed beta β.
The first factor captures two key features of the Internal Model Method:
• for netting sets that are deep in the money, the EPE is primarily determined by the current
market value of the netting set,
• for netting sets that are at the money, the current market value is not relevant, and Coun-
terparty Credit Risk is driven only by the potential change in the value of the transactions.
Neither of these features are applicable in the Current Exposure Method.
Summary of Internal Model Method
Banks should be allowed to use the output of their ’own estimates’ developed through Internal
Models in an advanced EAD approach. The Internal Model Method permits qualifying institutions
to employ internal estimates of the EPE of defined netting sets of their counterparty exposures in
computing the Exposure Amount (EAD). An illustration of the time profile of Expected Exposure
(EE) and the Expected Positive Exposure (EPE) is provided in figure A.1 respectively as the solid
line and the dotted line .
Internal models commonly used for CCR estimate a time profile of Expected Exposure (EE)
over each point in the future, which equals the average exposure, over possible future values of
relevant market risk factors, such as interest rates, foreign exchange rates, etc.
To address the concern that Expected Exposure (EE) and Expected Positive Exposure (EPE)
may not capture rollover risk or may underestimate the exposures of OTC derivatives with short
maturities, EAD for CCR is to be set equal to a netting sets ’Effective EPE’ multiplied by a factor
α. Effective EPE is calculated using the time profile of estimated ’Effective Expected Exposure’
for a netting set with ’Effective EE’ defined recursively as
Effective EEtk = (Effective EEtk−1 ,EEtk)
+
with EEt0 equal to the current exposure. Thus, in figure 2.3, the time profile of Effective EE is
represented by the dashed line while Effective EPE (defined as the average of Effective EE) is
represented by the solid straight line.
The Internal Method Method is obtained typically by Monte Carlo simulations with parameters
and variables approval set in accordance to the Revised Frameworks requirements. These include
notably:
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Figure A.1: Typical CCR Expected Exposure and Expected Positive Exposure illustration.
• Time Horizon: Effective EPE is to be measured as the average of Effective EE over one
year. This is a key feature as most of the regulation is focused on a short-term horizon (<
1year). We will try in this thesis to focus on longer term exposure subject to liquidity of
hedging instruments.
• Alpha Multiplier: The α multiplier provides a means of conditioning internal estimates of
EPE on a ’bad state’ of the economy. In addition, it acts to adjust internal EPE estimates
for both:
– correlations of exposures across counterparties exposed to common risk factors, and,
– the potential lack of granularity across a firms counterparty exposures.
The α multiplier is also viewed as a method to offset model error or estimation error. Alphas
may range from approximately 1.1 for large global dealer portfolios to more than 2.5 for new
users of derivatives with concentrated exposures and little or no current exposure in their
book.
• Risk-neutral vs. Actual distributions: Industry practice does not indicate that one sin-
gle approach has gained favour. For this reason, supervisors are not requiring any particular
distribution be used. We will se later that [?] uses both and additionally describe variable
change of neutral-real measures of credit contagion models.
• Maturity Adjustment: Like corporate loan exposures with maturity greater than one year,
counterparty exposure is susceptible to changes in economic value with the deterioration
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in the counterparty’s creditworthiness. Supervisors believe that an Effective Maturity
parameter (M) can reflect the impact of these changes on capital and that the existing
maturity adjustment formula in the Revised Framework is appropriate for counterparty credit
exposures (Page 81 and page 28 in [BIS05] and page 89 in [BIS06] - Revised Framework Full
Version) with
Effective maturity (M) =
∑
t t.CFt∑
tCFt
(A.2)
where CFt denotes the cash flows (principal, interest payments and fees) contractually
payable by the borrower in period t. Conceptually, M equals the effective credit dura-
tion of the counterparty exposure.
Model approval:
The usage of the Internal Model Method is conditional to model approval by the regulation au-
thorities. In the Full Framework, detailed in [BIS06], Risk Management approach is split in 3
Pillars,
• Pillar 1 which is focused on establishing the minimum capital requirement process.
• Pillar 2 which provides general background and specific guidance to cover counterparty credit
risks that may not be fully covered by the Pillar 1.
• Pillar 3 which is focused on market discipline principles.
Thus, the 3 Pillars are complementary in establishing a risk system that captures the counter-
party risk of a portfolio.
• the Pillar 1 - Minimum Capital Requirement, in document [BIS05] on page 25 and page
29, describes the approval method to adopt an Internal Model Method to estimate EAD. In
essence, the process of validating the EPE model is close to validating a Value-At-Risk one
with additional elements like
– the forecasting of long-term horizon of market drivers (IR, FX, Equities),
– capturing transaction specific information, and,
– the pricing models to calculate counterparty exposure.
Thus, Expected Exposure or Peak Exposure measures should be calculated based on a
distribution of exposures that accounts for the possible ’non-normality’ of the distribution of
exposures, including the existence of leptokurtosis (’fat tails’). A specific mention is given in
page 32 on the monitoring of wrong-way risk (see definition in section 2.2.4) where a bank
must have procedures in place to identify, monitor and control cases of specific wrong-way
risk, beginning at the inception of a trade and continuing through the life of the trade. The
Pillar 1 - Minimum Capital Requirement also specifies in parallel to the EAD, the Risk
Weighted Assets associated per each type of assets as reproduced in figure A.2.
153
Figure A.2: Risk Weighted Assets table
• The Pillar 2 -Framework states that the bank must have counterparty credit risk man-
agement policies, processes and systems that are conceptually sound and implemented with
integrity relative to the sophistication and complexity of a firms holdings of exposures that
give rise to CCR. The details of the process can be found on page 42 in [BIS05], where Bank
must review the value of the alpha factor α to capture the diversification of the portfolio, the
correlation of default across counterparties, and the number and granularity of counterparty
exposures.
• The Pillar 3 - Market Disclosure has established, due to the rapid growth of credit
exposure from derivatives intermediation activities, a set of disclosures for CCR and OTC
derivatives instruments like the one found in figure A.3.
An always moving concept
The Internal Model Method, detailed in [BIS01a] and [BIS01b], is the most dynamic model
in addressing the CCR and is in constant evolution in order to capture counterparty credit risk.
As an example, the recent paper [BIS10a] highlights the evolution of the validation process in
quantitative aspects such as
• the frequency of backtesting,
• representativeness of portfolios,
• long risk horizons and real trade backtesting versus hypothetical trade backtesting.
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Figure A.3: CCR General Disclosure
The establishment of best practice in the industry is illustrated by [BIS98] which represents
the results of market participants standard questionnaire about settlement procedures and coun-
terparty risk management practices such as:
• Counterparty Credit limits,
• Master Agreements,
• Transaction processing and settlement,
• Close-Out Netting,
• Collateralisation,
• Clearing Houses.
All those practices and procedures will need to be addressed by a counterparty credit risk
system and give rise to new risks and modelling issues, like:
• Master Agreements and Trade Confirmations: Backlogs of uncompleted agreements
(between 5 and 20% of their counterparties) and trade confirmations discrepancies (in 5
to 10% of confirmations received) increase credit risk by jeopardising the enforceability of
transactions.
• Netting systems: Incomplete systems integration make it difficult for dealers to calculate
and administer net payments.
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• Close-out netting: Legally enforceable netting provisions reportedly reduce aggregate
counterparty credit exposure by 20 to 60%.
• Collateral: In recent years some dealers have rapidly expanded their use of collateral to
mitigate counterparty credit risks. Those dealers with the most advanced programmes col-
lateralise transactions with between 10 and 30% of their counterparties at the time of the
paper [BIS10a].
• Collateral Agreements and Custodian Risk: Collateral Agreements may however give
rise to custody risk, that is, the risk of loss of securities received from counterparties and
held in custody because of insolvency, negligence or fraudulent action by the custodian.
• Double Default concept: The Part 2 of [BIS05] extends the concept of the treatment of
Double Default detailed in [BIS06]-Full Framework, i.e, the reduction in risk afforded by
having credit protection place is recognised through a substitution approach. This means that,
for example in the Standardised Method approach, a bank may substitute the risk weight
of the protection provider for that of the obligor. However in the current context no double
default is being granted for:
– Multi-name credit derivatives (other than nth-default basket products),
– Synthetic securitisations and other tranched products,
– Funded credit derivatives (i.e Credit Linked Notes).
New types of risks arising? As the recent consultative paper [BIS10b] shows, proposed
Basel III reforms require banks to more appropriately capitalise their exposures to Central coun-
terparties (CCPs). It proposed that a qualifying CCP will receive a 2% risk weight while the
Basel II Framework allows exposures to CCPs to be nil and, as such, provides significantly reduced
capital charges for banks.
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Appendix B
Numerical Results
B.1 Calibration Results
Results of the calibration to the spreads quoted in table B.1, page 158, with the corresponding
reproduced CDS spread and intensities ai in table B.2, page 158, with a multivariate phase-type
distribution “semi-calibration”process
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Table B.1: Single Name CDS Spread (bps) on 01/07/2010 - Source: Datastream -
Maturity (T in years) 5 7 10
Financials
Axa 148.97 152.96 148.76
BNP Paribas 130.95 134.83 137.31
Cre´dit Agricole 159.01 161.68 163.67
Cre´dit Mutuel 125.40 129.80 136.10
Natixis 199.75 204.11 210.60
Socie´te´ Ge´nerale 145.04 150.12 148.76
Industrials
Renault 346.03 345.12 339.36
Peugeot 353.67 370.03 388.12
Air Liquide 54.91 61.27 67.00
Sanofi 67.30 78.43 86.99
LVMH 64.45 67.24 72.71
Total 93.20 99.59 106.64
EDF 93.66 100.34 109.36
Table B.2: Calibration result to 10y Single Name CDS Spread using MPH
Name Obtained Quote (bps) base intensity ai Error (bps)
Financials
Axa 148.76 0.0054 -0.04e−10
BNP Paribas 137.31 0.0052 0.55e−10
Cre´dit Agricole 163.67 0.0056 -0.01e−10
Cre´dit Mutuel 136.10 0.0052 0.66e−10
Natixis 210.60 0.0061 -0.06e−10
Socie´te´ Ge´nerale 148.76 0.0054 0.04e−10
Industrials
Renault 339.36 0.0077 0.30e−10
Peugeot 388.12 0.0079 -0.02e−10
Air Liquide 67 0.0039 -0.04e−7
Sanofi 86.99 0.0045 0.22e−7
LVMH 72.71 0.0041 -0.004e−7
Total 106.64 0.0049 -0.0016e−7
EDF 109.36 0.0050 -0.0026e−7
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B.2 Probability distribution illustration under phase-type
distribution
For m = 2 obligors, we provide an illustrative simulation of the marginal probability distribution
Q(tau1 > t) of obligor 1 as a function of the base intensity a1 of obligor 1, the base intensity a2 of
obligor 2 and a interval of values of jump intensity b2,1. The six scenarios represented in figure B.1,
page 160, from left-upper right corner,
• obligor 1 and 2 are low risk obligors i.e. a1 = a2 = 0.005
• obligor 1 and 2 are normal risk obligors i.e. a1 = a2 = 0.015
• obligor 1 and 2 are high risk obligors i.e. a1 = a2 = 0.03
• obligor 1 is a low risk obligor and obligor 2 is a high risk obligors i.e. a1 = 0.005, a2 = 0.03
• obligor 1 is a high risk obligor and obligor 2 is a low risk obligors i.e. a1 = 0.03, a2 = 0.005
• obligor 1 is a very high risk obligor and obligor 2 is a low risk obligors i.e. a1 = 0.04, a2 =
0.005
Note that the value interval of values of jump intensity b2,1 is set from low risk to high risk.
The figure B.1 highlight the fact the default of an obligor due to contagion requires under the
multi-variate phase type distribution that another obligor has defaulted to kick-in contagion. This
is why most of the spread of default lines is reduced in the first 10 years unless the one counterparty
is really risky and the contagion paramerter is high.
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Figure B.1: Contagion Illustration: Impact of Jump Intensities on Survival Distributions of two
counterparties - Time in years
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B.3 Counterparty Credit Risk of Contingent Claims
Illustration of Counterparty Credit Risk for non-defaultable claims
We provide in this section implementation of typical financial claims, like interest-rate swaps (IRS)
or cross-currency swaps (CCS), payer or receiver, annual or semi-annual payment frequency, to
illustrate the implementation of a Counterparty Credit Risk model and to generate the distribution
of products in the future using the relevant risk metrics as introduced in section 3.1.2. The
Monte-Carlo simulation implementation using the C++-based quantitative free library Quantlib
will generate the distribution of the price of the financial claims in the future and enable the
computation of the Counterparty Credit Risk metrics such as EPE, ENE, PFE and ES. (See
definitions in section 3.1.2)
The figure B.2, page 162, presents the results (from the upper left to the lower right) of the
following products
• a vanilla interest-rate swap (IRS), 7-year maturity, annual frequency payment,
• a vanilla interest-rate swap (IRS), 15-year maturity, annual frequency payment,
• a vanilla interest-rate swap (IRS), 7-year maturity, semi-annual frequency payment, and,
• a vanilla interest-rate swap (IRS), 15-year maturity, semi-annual frequency payment.
Finally, figure B.3, page 163, presents the results of the price distribution and CCR metrics for
a Cross Currency Swap.
As pointed by [Cesari09], [Gregory10], [Pykhtin05] and [Tang07], the Counterparty Credit Risk
metrics in section 2.2.4 are a function of the structural features of the financial claim valued such
as payer vs receiver, the payment frequency, the reference curves etc. Typically a cross-currency
swap with the exchange of notional at maturity results in a exposure profile that is rising with
time with the volatility of the underlying. In the case of an Interest-rate Swap, the exposure is
limited to the interest payment which results in the profile rising under the effect of the volatility
but decreasing after as a result of less interest payments due towards maturity.
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Figure B.2: Counterparty Credit Risk Metrics for Payer Swap. From upper-left to bottom-right:
1 - Maturity 7y, Annual - 2 - Maturity 7y, Semi-annual - 3 - Maturity 15y, Annual - 4 - Maturity
15y, Semi-annual.
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Figure B.3: Cross Currency Swap (CCS) Counterparty Credit Risk Exposure
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Illustration of Counterparty Credit Risk for a portfolio of non-defaultable claims
Having identified and implemented, according to product-term sheets, the structural specificity
of the financial claims, usually the Counterparty Credit Risk needs to be valued in a portfolio
context as the risk measure for CCR are convex. Using the price distributions of the Monte-Carlo
simulations for different products under the same underlying distributions and same time grid,
one can aggregate the multi-product price distributions to realise netting in order to illustrate the
benefit of netting and bilateral counterparty risk pricing. Thus, three illustrative simple portfolios
are generated
• Portfolio 1 in figure B.4: 7-year Payer IRS with annual payment frequency and 15-year Payer
IRS with annual payment frequency
• Portfolio 2 in figure B.5: 7-year Payer IRS with annual payment frequency and 15-year
Receiver IRS with semi-annual payment frequency
• Portfolio 3 in figure B.6: 7-year Receiver IRS with semi-annual payment frequency and
15-year Payer IRS with annual payment frequency
As extensively covered in [Gregory10], in the case of a Credit Support Annex that allows netting,
portfolio that have opposite sensitivities to underlying drivers will reduce risks like figure B.5 and
B.6. In the case of figure B.4 there is an addition of the notional of the resulting exposure since
sensitivities have the same sign.
Numerically, the results and portfolio simulated in appendix B.3, presents the impact of netting
on the CVA and DVA in table B.3 for an investment-grade counterpart. This just highlights the
typical results obtained in the case of a counterparty credit risk system in the case of an interest-rate
swap with a notional of 1 million USD and a low volatility G8 interest rate environment. The credit
contagion scenario is neutral with obligors having both low default risk with a1 = a2 = b1,2 = 0.005.
The netting results are also illustrative of the benefit of a consistent methodology for portfolio CVA
exposure and the directionality of the exposure (Payer vs Receiver).
Table B.3: CVA - DVA Netting effect for interest-rate swaps defined in section B.3. Prices are in
bps followed within brackets of the MC error.
Products CVA DVA
Payer - Annual 5(0) 45(2)
Payer - Semi-Annual 3(0) 67(3)
Receiver - Semi-Annual 53(3) 4(0)
Portfolio1 21(1) 6(0)
Portfolio 2 7(1) 112(5)
Remark: In closing, most of the products that are presented in this section are products
designed as “vanilla”, i.e. simple with no optionality, like callability or putability, embedded.
164
Figure B.4: Portfolio Counterparty Credit Risk: 7yr Payer IRS and 15 yr Payer IRS Portfolio
Figure B.5: Portfolio Counterparty Credit Risk: 7 yr Payer IRS and 15 yr Receiver IRS Portfolio
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Figure B.6: Portfolio Counterparty Credit Risk: 7 yr Receiver IRS and 15 yr Payer IRS Portfolio
Since CCR metrics require the full distribution of a product of maturity T over the interval (t, T ],
Monte-Carlo simulations are the main pricing method but do not account for early exercise feature.
In case of early exercise, [Cesari09] and [Broadie04] describe a Monte-Carlo structure using the
feature of early exercise through providing price and distribution of price at each point of a grid
of discretised time points. This will permit to generate quantiles of credit exposures for all type
of products. [Longstaff01] and [Tiley93] provide the algorithm mainly based on regression of state
variables that can be included in a Monte-Carlo simulation.
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B.4 Exponential Matrix computation
As listed in [Moler03], there are various ways to compute the exponential of a matrix:
• Series methods revolving around the Taylor series expansion,
• Ordinary Differential Equations methods by solving iteratively using numerical optimisation
methods,
• Polynomial methods revolving around the characteristic polynomial and the usage of eigen-
values λi,
• Matrix decomposition methods using the properties of the matrix.
The preferred choice of the algorithm in terms of stability and efficiency will typically be
a function of the distribution of the eigenvalues (confluent or not, situated in the left pane).
Convergence conditions of the series will be done by introducing:
• the vector norm
‖ x ‖=
[
n∑
i=1
|xi|2
]−1
• the matrix norm
‖ Q ‖= max
‖x‖=1
‖ Qx ‖
• the condition number of a matrix
cond(Q) =‖ Q ‖‖ Q−1 ‖
where the condition measures the asymptotically worst case of how much the matrix can
change in proportion to small changes in the argument. Thus a low condition number is
said to be well-conditioned and will provide that small iterative changes will not generate an
important change in the matrix value thus enabling asymptotic convergence.
• the relative perturbation
φ(t) =
‖ e(Q+E)t − eQt ‖
‖ eQt ‖
The convergence of iterative methods will depend of the minimisation of the relative perturba-
tion presented above with the theorem stated in [Moler03]:
If
α(Q) = max{Re(λ)|λ an eigenvalue of Q}
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and
µ(Q) = max{Re(λ)|λ an eigenvalue of (Q+Q∗)/2}
then
φ(t) ≤ t ‖ E ‖ exp[µ(Q)− α(Q)+ ‖ E ‖]t ‖
if Q is normal (QQ∗ = Q∗Q), then
φ(t) ≤ t ‖ E ‖ exp[‖ E ‖]t ‖
Calculation methods:
• The most classical series method is the Taylor Series of the exponential with
exp(Qt) = I+ tQ+
Q2t2
2!
+
Q3t3
3!
+ ...
Numerically, the implementation is a function of the precision of the computer where there
exist a k ∈ N such that, the serie
Tk(Q) =
k∑
n=0
Qntn
n!
has changes
Tk+1(Q) ' Tk(Q)
that are not significant for the computer precision. The main problem with this approach
is the error that is due when raising power of the elements of the matrix Q might produce
rounding errors.
• The second Series method is the Pade Approximation based on the ratio of two rational
functions of the matrix Q. [Higham05] explains the method of Pade approximation which
is based on a limited polynomial exponential to approximate the matrix exponential. The
(p, q) Pade Approximation to exp(Qt) is defined by
Rpq[Q] = [Dpq[Q]]
−1Npq[Q]
with
Npq[Q] =
p∑
j=0
(p+ q − j)!p!
(p+ q)!j!(p− j)!Q
j
and
Dpq[Q] =
q∑
j=0
(p+ q − j)!q!
(p+ q)!j!(q − j)!Q
j
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The non-singularity of Dpq[Q] is assured if p and q are large enough or if the eigenvalues λi
of Q are negative. In the case of the multivariate phase type distributions presented earlier,
the construction of an upper triangular matrix T with negative elements on the diagonal
will ensure that all the eigenvalues are thus negative. This will be the method used in the
computation of the exponential matrix for the calibration to default probability embedded in
credit derivatives claims. The functions is implemented in Matlab as ’expm()’. Numerically,
the choice of p and q will determine prescribed accuracy with
cond(Dpq[Q]) ' cond(eQ/2) ≥ e(λ1−λn)/2
with λ1 ≥ ... ≥ λn are the real part of the eigenvalues Q. Thus, the Pade Approximation
can be used if ‖ Q ‖ is not too large which will be the case for the matrix T.
• The Scaling and Squaring method is used when the spread of eigenvalues of E increases can
be controlled by the property of the exponential functions
eQ = (eQ/m)m
The idea is to choose m to be a power of two for which (eQ/m) can be reliably and efficiently
computed, and then to form the matrix eQ by repeated squaring. This method cannot be
applied in a calibration process of the exponential matrix with changing coefficients and still
has the problem of convergence of the taylor series method.
• The classical Ordinary Differential Equation method refers to the optimisation presentation
with the ODE solver and the function
f(x, t) =
∂x(t)
∂t
−Qx(t)
with initial condition x(0) = x0. The method involves an iterative sequence of values
t0 = 0, t1, ..., ti = t with a fixed or variable step hi = ti+1 − ti. It will produce a se-
quence of vectors xi that approximates x(ti). However, the backward and forward equation
are of limited utility since the process is cumbersome with dimension greater than 2 with the
possibility of eigenvalues that can turn complex in the iterative process.
• The Polynomial methods use the characteristic polynomial of Q defined as
c(z) = det(zI−Q) = zn −
n−1∑
k=0
ckz
k
with the Caley-Hamilton theorem that states that every square matrix satisfies its own
characteristic equation. Thus,
c(Q) = 0
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is a polynomial of degree n, and, hence
Qn = c0I+ c1Q+ ...+ cn−1Qn−1
Any power of Q can be expressed as coefficients of I,Q, ...,Qn−1 with
Qk =
n−1∑
j=0
βkjQ
j
The exponential matrix can be expressed as
eQt =
∞∑
k=0
tkQk
k!
=
∞∑
k=0
tk
k!
[
n−1∑
j=0
βkjQ
j
]
=
n−1∑
j=0
[ ∞∑
k=0
βkj
tk
k!
]
Qj
=
n−1∑
j=0
αj(t)Q
j
The other methods for determining the coefficients are:
– the Lagrange Interpolation with
eQt =
n−1∑
j=0
eλjt
n∏
k=1k 6=j
(Q− λkI)
(λi − λk)
– the Newton interpolation with
eQt = eλ1tI+
n∑
j=2
[λ1, ..., λj]
j−1∏
k=1
(Q− λkI)
where the divided differences depend on t and are computed recursively by
[λ1, λ2] = (e
λ1t − eλ2t)/(λ1 − λ2)
[λ1, ..., λk+1] =
[λ1, ..., λk+1]− [λ2 − λk+1]
λ1 − λk+1 (B.1)
– the Inverse Laplace Transform where L[eQt] is the Laplace Transform of the matrix
exponential
L[eQt] = (sI−Q)−1
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where the entries of this matrix are rational functions of s. Thus, the Laplace transform
L[eQt] = (sI−Q)−1 =
n−1∑
n=0
sn−k−1
c(s)
Qk
will leading to
eQt =
n−1∑
k=0
L−1[sn−k−1/c(s)]Qk
Like in the case of the Taylor series method, those methods are seriously affected by roundoff
errors.
• The Matrix Decomposition methods are likely to be most efficient for problems involving
large matrices and repeated evaluation based on factorisations and decompositions of the
matrix Q.
If Q happens to be symmetric, the matrix decomposition are based on the transformation
of the form
Q = SRS−1
thus,
eQt = SeRtS−1
The natural decomposition is to take S to be the matrix whose columns are eigenvectors of
Q with
eQt = VeDtV−1
in case V is non singular and D is the diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues. The difficulty
in that case is that Q may be close to singular which means that cond(Q) is large leading
to non convergence. The multivariate phase-type distribution introduced earlier presents
non confluent eigenvalues (Confluent eigenvalues occurs when the matrix Q does not have
linearly independent vectors.) and are a good case for this methods. Another improvement
can be obtained with the use of triangular estimation of the matrix V of eigenvectors using
the QR algorithm.
From [Golub83], since the matrix T is upper-triangular, the product of upper-triangular
matrices is an upper triangular and thus the power series, i.e the exponential is upper tri-
angular. Furthermore, the eigenvalues of an upper triangular matrix are the values on the
diagonal. Since none of the diagonal value is zero the matrix is also invertible. Addition-
ally the exponential of a diagonal matrix is also a diagonal matrix with the value being the
exponential of diagonal value.
D =

a1 0 0 0
0 a2 0 0
0 0 a3 0
0 0 0 a4

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eD =

ea1 0 0 0
0 ea2 0 0
0 0 ea3 0
0 0 0 ea4

The exponential of an upper triangular matrix is a triangular matrix and the matrix T can
be decomposed as
T = UDU −1
where matrix D is a diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of matrix T and matrix U is an
upper matrix representing the eigenvectors of T . Additionally, the mth power of matrix T
is
T n = UDU −1UDU −1...UDU −1...UDU −1UDU −1
= UDnU −1
Thus the exponential of the matrix T can be expressed as
expT t =
∞∑
n=0
T ntn
n!
=
∞∑
n=0
UDnU −1tn
n!
= U
( ∞∑
n=0
Dntn
n!
)
U −1
= U expDtU −1
Computation using backward substitution:
The computation of the matrix U is obtained with the iterative process called the backward
substitution for upper triangular or forward substitution for lower triangular matrices.
Let T be upper triangular and let U be a matrix whose columns are the eigenvectors to T.
Furthermore, assume all the eigenvalues of T are distinct. Additionally, since U and U−1
are the matrices with the eigenvectors, an additional condition is UU−1 = I With those set
of conditions we can establish the recursive equations for n = 1, 2, ..m:
uj,n =

0 j > n
1 j = n
tn−1,n
tn,n−tn−1,n−1 j = n− 1
tn−k,n+
∑k−1
q=1 tn−k,n−k+qun−k+q,n
tn,n−tn−k,n−k j = n− k, 2 ≤ k ≤ n− 1
and
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u−1j,n =

0 j < n
1 j = n
−∑j−n−1k=0 u−1n,n+kun+k,j j > n
Thus, the exponential matrix is calculated recursively by using the symmetrical properties
of the T matrix.
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B.5 QuantLib Implementation
The overall process of the Quantlib implementation for the Counterparty Credit Risk treatment
is presented in figure B.7 with the following steps
• Having generated the csv files of the default probability curves for the reference names in
the obligor set, a vanilla swap and the default probability term structure classes are initiated
using QuantLib-based C++ products.
• Based on the object-oriented generic Monte-Carlo simulation model, underlying stochastic
processes are iterated across different paths and use a ProductEngine class pricer to generate
the NPV of all the transactions and store the distribution. In order to do so, an occurrence
of the product term sheet (in the most basic case a Vanilla Swap) need to be instantiated
using the class InstrumentDeclaration. The Monte-Carlo execution will be controlled by the
class SimulationArchitecture but calling the CurveCalibration class to reprice along the path
and store the distribution across time for Counterparty Credit Risk valuation. In the most
common case, a pricing at t = 0 for valuation is needed and doesn’t require to store the
value of the financial product along the path. However, in the case of CCR, the product
distribution need to be stored to generate EPE profiles.
• Using the previous distribution of product prices along the discretised paths, the Counter-
party Credit Risk (CCR) metrics like EPE (see formula (2.3)), PFE (see formula (2.1)) and
CVA are generated.
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Figure B.7: CVA QuantLib Implementation.
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